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1.3 Key findings and Lessons 
 




Between the 1960s and 1980s huge capital investments in large-scale public irrigation have 
been made by centralized governments. In the mid 1980s it became clear that many of these 
investments, particularly in developing countries, were not achieving the increases in 
productivity that were expected (Hunt, 1989). A common perception of the causes of the 
problem was that upstream control systems had generally been designed with no consideration 
of the problems faced by farmers in securing local control over irrigation water, and that farmers 
were not sufficiently involved in the different aspects of management, including financial ones 
(Freeman and Lowdermilk, 1991). 
More worryingly, hydraulic infrastructure started to deteriorate due to lack of funds for adequate 
maintenance and efficient operation, poor quality of construction, lack of protective measures for 
canal embankments, destruction of hydraulic structures by the users themselves when these 
hampered supply to their fields. It was not anticipated that rehabilitation of the system would be 
needed so early; in some cases less than ten years later construction, and sometimes repeated 
times (Indonesia being an illustration). Underinvestment in maintenance remains, to these days, 
considerable. For instance, total O&M requirements for public systems in India have been 
assessed at about Rs. 25-30 billion per year, yet less than a quarter of this amount is actually 
provided, with wide variation across states (Thakkar, 2000) and revenue receipts covering only 
10% of expenditures in 2000 (Sur and Umali-Deininger, 2003). In Egypt, a desirable level of 
expenditures on O&M/ rehabilitation has been put at US$234 million a year, yet only US$164 
million is provided (Bazza and Ahmad, 2002). In Azerbaijan, the 2012 O&M budget was US$36 
million, against an estimated needed budget two times higher (van den Boom, 2007). The 
recurring O&M costs of large irrigation and water investments amount to a fiscal burden for the 
public sector that is, for many governments, unbearable. 
In the past three decades many countries in the NEN region and elsewhere have re-organized 
or reformed their water sector. These reforms included a wide variety of activities such as 
scheme rehabilitation, community development, capacity building, decrease in subsidies and 
price-fixing schemes, institutional building, development of strategies and legal frameworks. 
Donors and development banks have increasingly shrouded their projects in a participatory 
rhetoric, whereby water users/beneficiaries would build a sense of ownership (of infrastructure 
or organisations) and co-manage irrigation systems, with emphasis on the concepts of 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). Such 
policies emerged in a neo-liberal context of structural adjustment and broke away from the idea 
that water has to be exclusively managed by the state and its institutions. By organizing „water 
users‟ in groups and organizations they could take over specific responsibilities and tasks in 
water management that the state was no longer capable of, or willing to, finance. These new 
„participatory‟ policies ranged from increasing users‟ involvement in irrigation management as a 
supplement to state management (PIM) to transferring full responsibility and control over 
resources to organized users (IMT), as we will examine in next section. 
Initially, these policies were inspired by the idea that it is possible to replicate in public schemes 
the kind of local self-governance commonly observed in communal irrigation systems (Hunt and 
Hunt, 1976). Many donors and governments supported the transfer of management 
responsibilities to farmer and their organizations, with the aim to improve the accountability of 
the irrigation service to farmers, make this service more cost-effective, motivate farmers to 
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invest more in maintaining irrigation systems and, ultimately, make irrigation systems more 
productive and sustainable (Moustafa, 2004). 
The literature, however, provides strong evidence that the financial difficulties experienced by 
most governments have been the driving force – or at least the chief justification – behind the 
revision of pricing policies, and also of many programmes of participatory irrigation management 
and varied degrees of turnover of management to farmer collectives (Frederiksen, 2005; Molle 
and Berkoff, 2007b; see for example Burger, 1998 on Kazakhstan; Çakmak et al., 2004 on 
Turkey; and Rap, 2004 on Mexico). As made explicit by Dr Abu Zeid, a former Egyptian Minister 
of Irrigation, “irrigation operation and maintenance always require big efforts and form a large 
financial burden to the government, and this is true in Egypt with the large Nile irrigation system. 
Therefore, it is of great desire to transfer the irrigation management responsibility to farmer's 
organizations for improved and sustainable irrigation service”. The Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation took many positive steps in the direction of participation and more efficient 
involvement of stakeholders in water management” (APP, 2007). Shifting part of the O&M 
burden onto farmers, at a minimum the costs related to the on-farm and tertiary canal levels, 
became a central objective of many governments. 
This objective, however, was more often than not primarily pushed by aid agencies and 
development banks. In almost all cases, farmers‟ organizations were created within integrated 
irrigation projects financed by the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), KfW, Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC), International Development Association (IDA), Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB), etc. These donors had an interest in the physical and financial sustainability of their 
investments and often made the formation of formal WUAs a pre-condition to their loans or 
grants. They were also influenced by the neoliberal discourse on „rolling-back‟ the state and 
privatization, and saw WUAs as private entities that would eventually be clients of an agency 
turned service provider, and pay the full cost of their production factors. The formation of water 
user organizations came to be seen as standard dispositive on any development project. 
The name given to these farmer water groups or organizations differs from country to country, 
depending largely on the country‟s institutional set up, its history and culture. For example, in 
Turkey, the following terms are used in English: „Irrigation Associations‟ (IAs), „Water users‟ 
Organizations‟ (WUOs) and „Water User Associations‟ (WUAs). Morocco uses the terms 
„Communautés d‟Irrigants‟ and „Association d‟Usagers de l‟Eau Agricole‟ (AUEA). Tunisia uses 
„Groupement de Développement Agricole‟ (GDA) since 2004. Egypt uses the term ‟water user 
association‟ (rabta) for tertiary mesqa-level (tertiary level) in the old lands of the Nile Delta, 
„Water Users‟ Unions‟ (WUU, or itihad) for the news lands and „Branch Canal Water User 
Associations‟ (BCWUAs) for the secondary level. In Yemen there was a shift from „spate 
committees‟ in traditional systems to Water users‟ Organizations (WUOs). The shift was from 
„spring committees‟ to WUA in Jordan. In Sudan, the term „Farmers‟ Unions‟ is common. In 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, „Water Users Unions‟ are used at the secondary canal level in 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. In Algeria the socialist agricultural policy led to collective farms or 
„Exploitation Agricole Collective‟ (EAC) since 1987. The same organization is found in Syria 
under the name „Farmer Unions‟. To simplify, the term WUA is used in this study as a generic 
term to refer to all the above farmers‟ irrigation groups. 
Yet we will have to distinguish between two main situations. In large-scale public schemes the 
term WUA will, with a few exceptions, refer to associations corresponding to the secondary or 
(more frequently) tertiary level of the irrigation system. These WUAs co-manage – to different 
degrees - the scheme with an irrigation agency. For smaller schemes WUAs refer to entities that 
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are taking care of a communal irrigation scheme. Most of the times formal WUAs are traditional 
bodies that have been formalized, often for the sake of being eligible for some aid or 
development project. These WUAs are generally meant to be more autonomous, and although 
the state may control their functioning it is expected (and hoped) that they can be financially 
sustainable. 
2.2 The PIM-IMT continuum 
Because participatory rhetoric has become so pervasive in the development field, terms like 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) have become common currency and are used in 
quite different situations. In the domain of large-scale public irrigation, PIM‟s departure point is a 
situation where the state (or one of its agencies) manages and maintains an irrigation facility 
that delivers water, by gravity or under pressure, to end-users. These end users may be 
individuals or groups of water users who share a common outlet. 
Farmers are expected to „participate‟ in three main different ways or areas: they can contribute 
to water management, maintenance, and/or to recovering financial costs. In practice farmers 
already often cover these three areas at the quaternary and plot levels (where they distribute 
water, maintain ditches and furrows, pay for fuel or electricity when pumping is involved, etc). In 
many cases, the agency is only responsible for (and only interested in) the management of 
water down to the intake of the tertiary canal, after which the group of farmers dependent on a 
particular intake has to share water, and sometimes to maintain the tertiary infrastructure.1 
PIM generally leaves these boundaries of responsibility unchanged but aims at intensifying the 
role or the contribution of farmers in a particular area: typically farmers will be asked to form 
Water User Groups, or Water User Associations, at the tertiary level with the expectation that 
this would help them better manage the distribution of water, carry out maintenance tasks 
collectively, and sometimes collect water fees for the agency (although the fees collected can 
be also kept locally and used by the WUA, in part or fully). Other expected benefits–mostly from 
the point of view of the agency- include creating formal associations with whom they can deal 
(rather than having to respond to numerous individual farmers and as many claims), hence 
better communication, or other tasks possibly assigned to WUAs (like collecting information on 
planned or actual cropping patterns). Even if formal WUAs are not formed, PIM policies may be 
directed at increasing the contribution of farmers in one particular area. As a result the degree of 
participation may vary considerably, in both extent and intensity, and what comes under the 
name of PIM or other similar expressions has to be ascertained in each case. 
The concept of Irrigation Management Transfer, or IMT, as defined by Garces-Restrepo et al. 
(2007), “normally refers to the process that seeks the relocation of responsibility and authority 
from the controlling government agencies managing irrigation systems (under the public sector) 
into the hands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as WUAs, or other private-
sector entities. Usually, these are established as recipients of the transfer or handover of 
management”. 
The difference between IMP and PIM may not, therefore, lie in the formal establishment of 
WUAs, but, rather, in the way attributions of the agency and users are redefined. These 
attributions generally relate to decision-making power, typically on the way water is allocated, 
maintenance priorities defined or works carried out, and who covers the costs of sustaining the 
supply of water (whether this is in cash or in kind). Flows of water and money are intertwined 
                                               
1
 This division point also often defines the boundary of the respective mandates of the irrigation/water and the 
agriculture ministries, in countries where these two ministries coexist (like in Egypt or Syria). 
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since money (defined in terms of amount but also by source and allocation) governs the 
physical sustainability of the system as well as, in part, how managers operate the system. 
In other words a policy that comes under the name of IMT must effectively transfer not only a 
burden or a task, but also a parcel of decision-making power and/or enhance the cross-
accountability between the agency and users. Under PIM the agency keeps full control of all 
essentials tasks and flows; under IMT farmers have a parcel of decision-making power in one of 
the three key areas outlined above. In short, they do not only have to only shoulder additional 
costs, they also receive increased benefits, with the implicit assumption that the latter will be 
greater than the former. 
The distinction made resembles the distinction made between instrumental and transformative 
participation. Many social scientists have theorized participation between several levels, ranging 
from manipulation to citizen control (see Arnstein‟s (1964) „ladder‟ and Cornwall, 2008). 
„Functional participation‟, according to Cornwall (2008), “captures the form of participation that is 
most often associated with efficiency arguments: people participate to meet project objectives 
more effectively and to reduce costs, after the main decisions have been made by external 
agents. This is perhaps the most frequently found type of participation in development”. 
In the field of water management, empowerment of farmers typically gives them a say on issues 
beyond the tertiary or farm levels: seasonal water allocation at the secondary level, definition of 
distribution schedules, monitoring of water status, etc. These may be achieved in tandem with 
the agency under a type of co-management. But formal accountability mechanisms are often 
the key factor that distinguishes a co-management, where farmers sit at the table but are mostly 
consulted (in which case we are in a PIM situation), from a transfer situation. What is often 
referred to as „bulk allocation‟ is a seasonal planning that deals with the allocation of volumes of 
water to particular areas (typically secondary canals); this allocation may sometimes even be 
defined at a finer temporal grain (e.g. monthly volumes, or n successive turns). A situation of 
transfer would include a written engagement between the WUA and the agency, whereby the 
latter would commit itself to deliver these specific amounts. In some cases WUAs can distribute 
their quota along the season as they see fit (eg Morocco or Jordan), or even shift part of it –if 
unused- to the next season. Scheduling is also formalized, and the duration and amount of 
water to be supplied at each rotation are specified. Whether allocation and actual distribution 
are effectively jointly monitored and assessed, is yet another step towards greater accountability 
and transfer. In such a situation predictability of supply is generally improved and farmers 
clearly benefit. 
In the field of maintenance, PIM may include the participation of WUAs in the definition and 
prioritization of the work to be done. IMT would include a contract which defines the 
commitments of both sides, the contracting of WUAs for executing some works, or their 
autonomy to chose their own contractors, the formal joint evaluation of the works done (which 
can be refused by WUAs if they consider the execution to be faulty), the transfer of machinery to 
the WUAs which become service providers, etc. 
Financial management will in general be altered by IMT, in line with the redistribution of 
responsibilities in the two other fields. Farmers may mobilize more financial resources to pay for 
gate-operators (chosen by them and replacing earlier agency staff, although these may be hired 
again by the WUA), or even directly contributing to covering the salary of agency staff, or to 
cover a larger part of maintenance expenditures. On the other hand WUAs may also generate 
income by various means (providing seeds or fertilizers, collectively marketing produce, 
providing services for maintenance, selling water to third parties like small municipalities, to etc). 
This is referred to as the „horizontal expansion‟ of WUAs, whereby their attributions are widened 
(see §‎6.7). It must emphasized that „who pays what‟ is not only a question of distribution of 
costs but also governs the decision-making power that goes with it (see §‎8.3). In what Small 
and Carruthers (1991) once termed the „financing of irrigation‟, farmers‟ cash contributions 
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through water fees do not merely accrue to the overall state‟s revenue, but are –ideally- partly 
used internally (for WUAs‟ expenditures) and partly to pay agency‟s staff, thus creating a 
powerful mechanism of accountability that is expected to increase the quality of supply; and to 
empower farmers accordingly. Expectedly, this system is not often implemented. 
We can summarize these statements by the following chart, which illustrates the three main 
areas of responsibility and the two levels concerned (secondary and tertiary)2. A shaded area 
represents (qualitatively) the extent of WUAs‟ decision-making power, in a hypothetical case. 
Figure 1. WUAs’ three main domains of responsibility 
 
2.3 Assessing WUAs’ performance 
How do we know that a WUA is “performing”? The question may sound misplaced as it may 
seem evident that WUAs‟ effectiveness should be judged against a set of criteria and indicators 
that reflect the objectives and tasks ascribed to them (improve water management, fee 
collection, maintenance, etc). This, however, is not as straightforward as it might look: 
                                               
2
 One could have also shown a third ring corresponding to the primary/main level. But as this level is very rarely 
transferred (in which case we would have a situation close to full privatization), we are not showing it in order to keep 
the chart simple. 
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 A first difficulty refers to the complexity of identifying causal links: whether yields have 
increased (or not) after PIM/IMT might be related to a set of variables and causes 
(prices, rainfall, pests, labour shortage, etc) that are not easy to unpack and have little to 
do with the reform. For example, a reduction in water abstraction by farmers may be 
ascribed to the establishment of the WUA while it is in fact a consequence of less water 
being available at the river basin level, better precipitations, or a shift from surface to 
groundwater. 
 PIM/IMT is by nature a social process and the quality of this process –changes in 
behaviors, social interactions, sense of responsibility, accountability mechanisms, etc- is 
very hard to capture on a quantitative scale, especially when –to take one caricature 
example- the effectiveness of a WUA is measured by, say, the number of meetings it 
held. It is apparent that site-specific conditions (eg the presence of a charismatic leader, 
influence of party politics, etc) are often paramount in explaining social dynamics, while 
not well captured by indicators. 
 Because of the diversity of situations, where WUAs may perform different tasks in 
different ways, it is often difficult to draw a line between WUAs which would be 
„successful‟ and others which would have „failed‟ (although of course non-existing ones 
can easily be put in the second category). Rare are those who fully perform as expected 
in all their components but they may sometime be achieving one particular objective, 
while not performing well on others; or the process may lead to changes that were not 
expected, and might even draw benefits in other areas. 
 Likewise, some countries (eg Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan) have a large diversity of 
situations that is poorly captured by the literature that presents and discuss policy results 
at the country level, or takes one particular case and extrapolates the conclusions to the 
country. We suspect, for example, that countries like Azerbaijan (and probably Turkey) 
would reveal contrasting dynamics if we had in-depth surveys over a large number of 
cases; the only literature available originates from projects or papers on national 
experience, and these generally offer very „averaged‟ and evened-out views. 
 Another issue lies with the bias attached to the assessments carried out and published. 
Most of the literature originates from persons belonging to ministries, companies, or aid 
agencies that are linked to these projects and merely publicize their results in a 
summary and uncritical manner. In addition most of the assessments are done while the 
project/policy is still running, or a very short time afterwards, and changes are frequently 
reported in a partial and/or vague way. There is a sheer lack of independent, 
comprehensive, long-term assessments, which makes it very difficult to discuss the 
sustainability of any arrangement or reform. 
Few comparative studies have tried to assess quantitatively the effectiveness of WUAs. Garces-
Restrepo et al. (2007) based their global assessment on indicators like O&M costs for both 
governments and WUAs, rate of fee collection, timeliness and equity of water delivery, and tried 
to quantify their impacts on crop yield and farm income. Mukherji et al. (2009) looked at the 
experience with PIM/IMT in Asia and identified other additional quantitative indicators such as 
financial viability of WUAs, quality of infrastructure, in addition of indicators related to water 
management (equitable distribution of water, reliability and adequacy in water distribution, 
reduction in frequency of disputes). They also quantified their effects on crop yield and also on 
the overall livelihood of farmers. 
Despite having to contend with fragmentary and incomplete evidence, these studies have 
offered some quantitative insights in the transformations triggered by IMT policies (Garces-
Restrepo et al., 2007) and both PIM and IMT (when analyzed together: Mukherji et al., 2009). 
In the particular context of this study, the literature corresponding to the NEN region did not 
allow us to code the different cases and pursue such quantitative comparisons. Most 
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documents, and IFAD project reports in particular, are very general (even for countries like 
Morocco and Turkey, which are frequently credited with some degree of success) if not 
impressionistic, which led us to limiting our analysis to qualitative insights. 
2.4 Methodology 
With the limitations underlined above, this study is based on a comprehensive literature review 
on water management and WUAs in the NEN region. All relevant documents on IFAD projects 
in the region that included a component on setting up or strengthening WUAs were also 
examined. These twelve IFAD projects were located in the seven following countries (see 
Appendix 1 for more details on the projects): 
Egypt: West Nubaria Rural Development Project (WNRDP) 
Tunisia: 
 Programme De Developpement Agro-Pastoral Et De Promotion Des Initiatives Locales 
Du Sud-Est (PRODESUD) 
 Projet de Développement Agricole et Rural Intégré (PDARI) de Siliana 
 Projet De Developpement Agricole Et Rural Intégré de Siliana (Phase II) 
 Projet de Développement Agricole et Rural Intégré (PDARI) de Zaghouan 
Morocco : 
 Projet de Développement Agricole (PDA) dans les Zones Montagneuses de la Province 
d‟Al-Haouz 
 Développement Rural (DR) de Taourit-Taforalt 
Azerbaijan: North-East Development Project (NEDP) 
Sudan: Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GSLRP) 
Yemen: Dhamar Participatory Rural Development Project (DPRDP) 
Jordan: 
 Yarmouk Agricultural Resources Development Project (YARDP) 
 Yarmouk Agricultural Resources Development Project (YARDP II) 
Because IFAD documents turned out to contain little information on the inner workings of WUAs 
- only one of the above projects (NEDP) had the support of WUAs as a main objective-, it has 
not been possible to carry out an in-depth assessment of IFAD‟s approach with regard to setting 
up WUAs, nor on the determinants of their degree of success/un-success. We have therefore 
used IFAD projects to illustrate the various observations and analyses made on the wider 
sample of cases. Pieces of information relative to IFAD projects are presented in boxes. In the 
conclusion, we also try to identify a few commonalities of IFAD projects and to draw some 
conclusions on how WUAs are dealt with. 
In addition to the literature, three IFAD projects (Egypt: West Nubaria Rural Development 
Project; Tunisia: PDARI Siliana and Zaghouan; Morocco: PDR de Taourit-Taforalt) have been 
visited by IWMI researchers who carried out a Rapid Rural Appraisal and wrote terms of 
reference for local consultants to carry out more detailed surveys. The results of these surveys 
are presented in Volume 2. 
The literature review identified the following relevant key-words for the NEN region: Irrigation, 
management, farmer community, water user, association, organization, agency, transfer, 
participatory, performance, efficiency and the countries of the NEN region. These words were 
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used in Cab Direct and Water Resources Abstracts bibliographic databases. Including the more 
general literature on PIM/IMT around 500 documents have been consulted. 
Additional information obtained through the three case studies and personal contacts (Jordan 
valley, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Sudan, Maghreb, Yemen) were key, in most cases, to allowing us to 
come up with a clearer and more detailed picture of the situation. 
For analytical purposes we have distinguished between two main situations: the first category 
includes farmer-managed (generally small) schemes. These schemes are in most cases 
communal schemes based on a spring, a river diversion weir, a qanat, or a well that have been 
built, managed and maintained by farmers, but where a formal WUA has been set up; there are 
also cases of new schemes established by the state (typically a collective well) that users are 
supposed to take over and handle more or less autonomously. The second category includes 
large-scale public schemes, run by a state agency. These schemes can be fully operated by 
gravity but they can also be hybrid, with water being distributed under pressure after a given 
level (secondary, tertiary, sub-tertiary, or individual). IMT refers to the second category, where 
the interface between the state and water users is the critical issue; but many aspects, such as 
the conditions needed for successful collective action, are shared or similar. 
For this study we draw and build on a conceptual framework that was originally developed for 
the examination of WUAs in IFAD projects (IFAD, 2001). This conceptual framework analyses 
the performance and sustainability of WUAS and distinguishes external and internal factors 
which are of influence. External factors include the policy environment, the legal framework, 
the physical and technological aspects of water users‟ capacity for water management and 
socio-economic factors. Internal factors encompass the origin of WUAs, membership criteria, 
the structural organization and internal group dynamics. The framework broadly defines the 
possible impacts of WUAs, by not only focussing on scheme sustainability and improved 
irrigation performance, but also on increased agricultural productivity and incomes, food 
security, empowerment and poverty alleviation (IFAD, 2001). Several authors have later refined 
components of this framework. Wegerich (2010) gives a useful overview of these contributions. 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework for the analysis of WUAs (Jordans, 2001) 
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Although we have used this framework somewhat loosely, several components reverberate with 
it. Our selection of internal and external factors is based on a recent literature review and the 
factors that were crucial in the large diversity of WUAs in the NEN Region that we reviewed.  
As external factors we identified: - Legal framework and definition of roles; - The predictability of 
water supply; - Early participation of users in projects; - Capacity building and training; - 
Rehabilitation/status of the hydraulic infrastructure; - Speed vs. effectiveness of the transfer 
As internal factors we identified: - Elections, board nominations and political interference; - 
Social homogeneity and social capital; - Leadership; - WUA‟s capacity and commitment; - The 
origin of the WUA; - Accountability and transparency; - Diversification of activities and horizontal 
integration. 
After this introduction, the second section presents a short summary on irrigation and PIM/IMT 
policy dynamics in each country. This is mostly intended to give the reader not acquainted with 
the region some background data. Readers familiar with the NEN region can jump to section 4 
which describes community-managed irrigation schemes and analyzes their sustainability 
concerns as well as the impacts of state interventions on such systems. 
Section 5 focuses on large-scale public schemes and briefly reviews the performance of WUAs 
in the three responsibility domains introduced earlier (water management, maintenance, 
financial management). Section 6 and 7 review the internal and external factors influencing the 
performances of WUAs in large-scale irrigation systems. External factors include both the 
boundary conditions (legal environment, reliability of water supply) and policy choices about the 
nature and pace of policy implementation. 
We have not attempted to establish statistical relationships between relative success in the 
three domains and particular internal or external variables, or sets of variables. This is due to 
the weakness of the literature that reports on specific cases and to the other reasons made 
explicit in section ‎2.3. From a qualitative point of view it is apparent that no variable is either 
necessary or sufficient. There are counter-examples for each of them. It remains that a tightly-
knit community with strong leadership and dependence on agriculture will have a higher 
probability to perform well than one that is riddled with conflicts and has a chaotic access to 
water. There might be a set of rules, like the 8 ones proposed by Ostrom for common-pool 
resources, which correlates positively with a higher likelihood of success, but a large number of 
well documented cases is necessary to identify them. 
In section 8 we reflect on the cost/benefit ratio of reforms and try to classify our different 
countries along a PIM-IMT axis, examining in more details how decision-making power is 
distributed. That takes us to two additional reflexions on the importance and diversity of financial 
flows, and on the wider political economy of reforms. Section 9 provides some conclusions and 
a recap of the most significant results of the review. 
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3 Institutional settings and dynamics of WUAs 
From the late 1980s onwards, institutional reforms have been introduced to water management 
in almost all of the NEN countries, as in many other parts of the world. With the support of 
donor-funded programmes, governments established formal Water Users Organizations 
(WUOs) or Water Users Associations (WUAs) to take over some of the irrigation management 
tasks that were publicly managed before. This led to varying degrees of water user participation 
in the operation, maintenance and administration of irrigation systems. In most cases, laws have 
been formulated and legal arrangements adapted to provide a legal status for these WUAs. For 
the purpose of presenting the contexts in which such reforms occur, we divide the NEN region 
in five main areas, taking in account geographical3 and historical factors. 
3.1 Central Asia and the Caucasus 
In the 1940s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced large-scale irrigation 
infrastructure in order to increase agricultural production of cotton and wheat for an empire at 
war (Kitamura, 2008). Under Stalin, large-scale state and collective farms, sovkhozes and 
kolkhozes, became responsible for this irrigated production within a centralized planning and 
bureaucratically managed system. As a result, the institutions assuring “on-farm water 
management” (secondary level) were the farms themselves (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010). 
In the late 1980s, with the decline of the Soviet Union these state and collective farms 
collapsed, as well as the bureaucratic apparatus that enabled centrally led agricultural 
production. An increasing number of smaller agricultural units emerged in countries such as 
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. As a consequence, the disintegrating 
bureaucratic system in charge of irrigated production was no longer capable of dealing with this 
emerging complexity. The fragmentation of land complicated water management, because it 
multiplied individual demands, making design and implementation of water distribution plans 
difficult (Ul Hassan et al., 2004). 
In the midst of this wider crisis of the Soviet state, land and water reforms were inextricably 
connected to the structural reforms of the state-led and central planning system into a market-
based economy. To this purpose, international organizations promoted different neoliberal 
policies such as privatization, decentralization and market deregulation. 
However, the trajectory, pace and depth of these agrarian and water reforms differed a lot per 
country. Some countries in the region already initiated reform processes before independence 
from the Soviet Union. After independence these institutional reforms gradually continued. In 
irrigation management these institutional changes had a different impact (Gunchinmaa and 
Yakubov, 2010). For example, Kyrgyzstan currently has a fairly elaborate legal water framework 
and has transferred the management of most of the secondary canals to newly formed WUAs. 
However, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been adopting irrigation reforms with a much more 
moderate pace, which was more in line with maintaining a prominent role for the state in 
planning agricultural production. Because the state either formally or informally determined 
cropping patterns, i.e. wheat and cotton in Uzbekistan and cotton in Tajikistan (Ul Hassan et al., 
2007), water management could maintain a more centralized model. A general problem for most 
                                               
3
 In this Chapter we generally use recent data from the World Bank to give an overall picture of irrigated agriculture in 
individual countries (World Bank, 2010). 
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countries is that the irrigation infrastructure remains in serious need for repair and rehabilitation 
(Ul Hassan et al., 2007; Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010). 
In Azerbaijan 1.5 million hectares are irrigated, which is 30% of its agricultural land. Surface 
irrigation is used on 65% of the irrigated area, and 35% is irrigated with lift irrigation. The 
collector-drainage networks (both off-farm and on-farm) serve about 45% of the irrigated area. 
Water reforms have gradually followed the land reforms. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1996 has 
created the basis for the privatization of agricultural lands (Rzayev, 2007). Of the total of 8,6 
million of hectares, 44% remained state property, 24% was privatized and 31% was transferred 
to local municipalities (Ahmedzade and Aliyev, 2003, cited by Rzayev, 2007). The latter group of 
new owners received free pieces of land from the state. The Law on Irrigation and Land 
Reclamation, adopted in the same year, specified the legal status of land reclamation and 
irrigation, as well as the property rights for water infrastructure. Since 1997, the payment of 
water services was introduced and promoted. In 2006, tariffs in rehabilitated areas were fixed on 
the basis of used water volumes. The Water Users Unions‟ (WUUs) reference charter was 
registered by the Ministry of Justice in 2005 through an amendment to the Land Reclamation 
and Irrigation Law. The alleged main purpose of these WUUs is to supply irrigation water in an 
organized, equitable and efficient manner to all users (Rzayev, 2007) but cost-sharing is an 
overriding objective. 
The landscape of Kazakhstan is dominated by deserts and steppes. In 1992, 6% of its 
agricultural lands, 2.3 million hectares, were irrigated. Reforms of state-led water management 
in Kazakhstan were following land reforms and took place in two phases. The first phase 
addressed the transformation of the former state and collective farms into collective enterprises, 
production cooperatives, and joint stock companies. The second phase took place after the 
Bankruptcy Law of 1998. This phase was characterized by the liquidation of the cooperatives 
and the expansion of the role of private and peasant farms (Wegerich, 2008). In spite of the 
reforms, Kazakhstan has maintained a centralized administration in which the president fully 
controls the appointment of regional and municipal akims (administrative heads). The official 
argument that was used against delegating responsibilities to these akims was that regional 
authorities were not ready for these new responsibilities and also not financially prepared to 
hold elections (Kangur, 2008). 
Although some privatization occurred after the decline of the Soviet Union, the bulk of 
Kazakstan's agriculture remained organized in 7,000 to 8,000 state and collective farms that 
averaged 35,000 to 40,000 hectares each. The state also has maintained control over 
agricultural inputs, equipment, processing and marketing. 
According to the Kazakhstan Water Code of 2003, the central government ensures state 
management of water resources through the authorized management body (Committee for 
Water Resources) and River Basin Organizations. At the regional level, representative bodies 
and executive bodies of the state provided implementation and control of the national water 
management programs. Regional public organizations maintained the state owned water 
facilities. The new law (RK Law No 404–11) of 2003, allowed non-legal entities or private farms 
to become members of WUAs. 
In particular international donors such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
promoted the formalization of WUAs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Kangur, 2008; Wegerich, 
2008). 
In Kyrgyzstan irrigated land represents 1.04 million hectares, which is 9% of the area under 
agricultural cultivation. Since Kyrgyzstan is a very mountainous country, the main water sources 
for irrigation are small mountain rivers within seven major river basins (Dj Ailoobayev, 2005). 
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Water reforms developed in synchrony with the relatively early, rapid and comprehensive land 
reforms (Ul Hassan et al., 2004; Lerman and Sedik, 2009). Towards the end of the Soviet era in 
1988, 500 agricultural enterprises (collective and state farms) controlled the vast majority (98%) 
of the arable land. Smallholders (0.1 - 1 ha) produced on the remaining 2% of arable land. After 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union a radical land reform privatized most of the former collective 
and state farms (kolkhozes and sovkhozes). The individualization of farms was massive and by 
2008 these farms produced 98% of the Gross Agricultural Output (Lerman and Sedik, 2009). 
Irrigation systems greatly deteriorated because of a lack of O&M and financial means (Sehring, 
2005; Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010). Hence, under influence of donors such as the World 
Bank and ADB the Kyrgyz Republic adopted a new strategy and issued legislation on water and 
irrigation management, which introduced WUAs in a big way. The purpose was to “compensate 
for the disappearance of state and collective farms as water managers in the old on-farm 
system” (Ul Hassan et al., 2004:34). The first legal foundation of WUA was provided by the 
1995 government decree “Regulations on WUAs in Rural Areas” and the 1997 “Statute of 
WUAs in Rural Areas“. The latter regulates the transfer of on-farm infrastructure to WUAs, 
stipulates bookkeeping and fees, and enables the WUA to impose sanctions in the case of a 
breach of regulations. Based on these decrees the “Law on Water User Associations” in 2002 - 
provided the basis for WUAs to take over irrigation management and infrastructure development 
(Sehring, 2005; Kazbekov et al., 2009). 
Since the mid-nineties, WUAs were established at the local level to distribute water, maintain 
field channels, and to collect the newly introduced irrigation service fees (ISF). The level at 
which WUAs operate often corresponds with or is related to that of the former collective farms. 
The transfer of irrigation management to the users aimed to make it market-oriented (through 
cost-recovering fees, demand orientation, less state interference and more efficiency) and 
democratic (through decentralization, user participation and empowerment). The main functions 
of a WUA are O&M of the on-farm (secondary level) irrigation system, water distribution, dispute 
resolution and self-financing of these tasks. A WUA is headed by an elected council (usually 7-
11 members) with a chairman (or chair-woman), who all work in an honorary capacity. To get 
officially registered, the WUA needs to present a statute, article of agreement, the minutes of 
the general assembly, and the chart of the irrigation system. 
However, the institutional reforms produced an institutional vacuum. The capacity of WUAs for 
O&M is only slowly emerging (Ul Hassan et al., 2004). Under influence of donors, the 
government wants that WUAs expand their role to the secondary level, but currently O&M is still 
mostly the responsibility of the government apparatus. 
Tajikistan is also an extremely mountainous country. The primary sources of water for 
Tajikistan‟s rivers are the glaciers in the Pamir and Alay mountains. The irrigated land increased 
to nearly 750,000 ha in 2006, which represented about 5.3% of the agricultural lands (143,100 
km2). Irrigated agriculture is mainly concentrated in four valleys (the Ferghana Valley, the broad 
Khatlon lowlands in the south-west, the Gissar Valley, Zeravshan Valley) (Lerman and Sedik, 
2008). 
Land reforms in Tajikistan followed a very moderate pace partly because of the civil war (1992-
93). However, afterwards the process took a few years while reforms in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan took as long as a decade. In addition, the number of private farms has not 
increased after the independence. The Water Code, adopted in 1993, and renewed in 2000, 
addressed some of the legal aspects of WUA establishment (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010). 
Uzbekistan has 4.2 million hectares of irrigated land (World Bank, 2005). Approximately 82% of 
its agricultural water needs are met by water from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, especially through 
the two trans-boundary rivers Amu Darya and Syr Darya (Rakhmatullaev et al., 2011). 
Uzbekistan is thus hugely dependent on these upstream countries, as the current conflict with 
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Tajikistan illustrates. This country aims to build the Rogun dam for producing hydropower on a 
major tributary of the Amu Darya, a main source of water for Uzbekistan. According to some this 
could become “the first water war of the 21st century. This water and energy conflict occurs at 
the border of the former Soviet Union, in a triangle of contested geo-political influence involving 
three world powers. 
After its independence, the country underwent a series of land reforms which also determined 
the pace of water reforms. Soviet farms were first transformed into collective farms which, in 
turn, were transformed into semi-cooperative shirkat farms at the end of 1990s. The reforms 
continued and the shirkat farms were gradually transformed into and privatized to individual 
farming enterprises (Spoor, 2004). The land reform initiated in 1996, established a framework 
for Water Users Associations. Uzbekistan privatized unprofitable collective farms in 2000 
(Wegerich, 2002). In general, land reforms have resulted in a complex land and water 
management situation, because a small number of collective or state (cotton and wheat) farms 
along the main canals, disintegrated into a mosaic of different types of farms: shirkats, private 
family-based farm units, pudrats (family contractions on shirkats) and dekhans (peasant 
households with small plots) (Veldwisch, 2007). In some cases these farmers started cultivating 
different irrigation intensive crops, such as rice, wheat and vegetables (Abdullaev et al., 2009), 
although the state continued to exercise a degree of control over crop planning. The Water 
Users Associations that were established as non-governmental and non-proﬁt organizations at 
the canal level, had to deal with this increased complexity of water supply. Water that was 
managed and optimised before at the collective farm level, now had to be shared among many 
smaller enterprises within the WUAs (Veldwisch, 2007). Most of these WUAs were established 
in the 2003–2006 period and now play an important role in the allocation and distribution of 
irrigation water, the maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure and the collection of ISF 
(Abdullaev et al., 2008). 
3.2 Middle East 
In Egypt 3.4 million hectares of agricultural land are irrigated but, generally with 2 or 3 cropping 
seasons each year. The Nile River is the principal fresh water resource (Egypt‟s official water 
quota is 55.5 billion m3/year), serving mainly the Nile Valley and the Delta. The second water 
resource is groundwater with two main aquifers (the Valley and Delta aquifer and the Nubian 
Sandstone non-renewable aquifer located in the Western Desert). Cultivated lands are 
classified into two categories: Old Lands, located along the Nile Valley and Delta regions, and 
New Lands, located west and east of the Delta, in the Sinai and oases. 
Historically, the Egyptian state has assumed the responsibility of water delivery down to the 
level of the branch canal, and delegated to farmers control of management and distribution at 
the tertiary level canals, known as Mesqa, a farmer‟s private property by law (Abdel-Aziz, 2003; 
Mahmoud 2005). Given the long history of irrigated agriculture in Egypt, a number of traditional 
forms of farmer participation (munawaba and mtarafs system, the saqia ring for collective 
pumping of water, etc) provide a good background for establishing formal private water user 
associations (Abdel-Aziz, 2003). Thus, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) 
has adopted a policy to encourage farmers to play a more important role in irrigation 
management and related water services, with the additional objective to shift a part of costs of 
O&M onto farmers, in order to improve the O&M of irrigation and drainage systems, equity of 
irrigation supply and the resolution of conflicts among users. 
The first attempts of establishing formal WUAs were led by the MWRI in the late 80s early 90s 
under the USAID funded projects, the Egypt Water Use and Management project (EWUP), 
Irrigation Management Systems (IMS) project, and the Irrigation Improvement Projects (IIP) (El-
Sharkawy et al., 2006). In 1994, the government of Egypt issued the Law 213 providing the 
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legal framework for WUAs, where WUAs were defined as „legal private organizations at the 
mesqa level in the improved irrigation systems, owned and operated by their members for their 
own benefit in the old lands‟. WUAs were responsible for operating and maintaining the 
“improved mesqas”, that included single-point lift pumping stations, introduced by the IIP project 
(and its successor, the IIIMP) (Batt and Merkley, 2010). The same law also introduced the 
Water Users Unions, (WUUs) which are applicable for the New Lands (Attia, 2004; Hassabou 
and El-Gafy, 2007). Water users associations have managerial, financial, and technical 
autonomy. They make their own budget and set the tariff for irrigation (Hassabou and El-Gafy, 
2007). 
USAID was also instrumental in fostering the establishment of branch canal water user 
association (BC-WUAs) at the secondary level and, while the Dutch Cooperation promoted 
water boards (WBs) at both the branch canal and district levels (Ezzat El-Agha, 2010). About 
600 BCWUAs have been established, covering 15% of Egypt‟s irrigated area and involving half 
a million farmers and residents (El-Sharkawy et al., 2006). But in practice, BCWBs lack legal 
sanction for their roles and have had few real responsibilities to implement. Their role has been 
limited to that of an advisory body to MWRI and other government agencies. It is not clear how 
the BCWBs would fund themselves once project benefits are gone (Svendsen et al., 2003). 
In Syria irrigated land represents 1.37 million hectares, which is almost 10% of its total 
agricultural area. Its agricultural landscape is still dominated by rain-fed lands. In the 1940s and 
1950s the irrigated area expanded with the introduction of machinery and pumps. The irrigated 
area doubled around 1978 with the Euphrates Dam, and the expansion of irrigated land in the 
Euphrates Valley and adjacent lands. Aside from the Euphrates, the bulk of irrigation is found is 
the Orontes (Homs/Hama), Barada (near Damascus) and Quaick (near Aleppo) river valleys. In 
addition to public networks in main valleys, springs, small rivers and private wells are used for 
irrigation (Sadiddin and Atiya, 2009), with groundwater supplying 60% of the total irrigated area 
(Aquastat). 
The experience with formal water user associations (WUAs) in Syria is limited in spite of some 
early experiences with collective farm and water management. In the early 1930s the Deir Atyah 
associations (near Damascus) was credited with encouraging other village farmers to establish 
cooperative community associations for the utilization of water resources in irrigation in other 
governorates (Kaisi and Yasser, 2004). Since 1969 the government promoted what it called a 
participatory system of association management (Kaisi and Yasser, 2004). Recently, the 
government has adopted a range of measures and polices, aiming at the sustainable 
development of water resources and the establishment of WUAs, as well as the activation of 
existing ones. The Presidential Resolution no 31 of the 6 November 2005 defines in its eleventh 
chapter the WUAs, their responsibilities and the process to be followed for their formation. No 
literature was found on whether these WUAs are performing or not, and what they really do. 
In Jordan, roughly 100,000 ha, or 10% of almost a million hectares of agricultural lands, is 
irrigated, one third on the highlands (with groundwater), and two thirds in the Jordan and lateral 
valleys (mostly with water from the Yarmouk and small side-wadis). Large-scale water 
development in the Jordan Valley is publicly managed, whereas small-scale systems are the 
initiative of farmers. Large-scale water resources development in the Jordan Valley started in 
the 1960s and led to a centralized system of water management under the Jordan Valley 
Authority (JVA) of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) (Regner et al., 2006). Currently, 
one-third of Jordan's irrigated areas, approximately 30.000 hectares, falls under its jurisdiction. 
The JVA is a government organization in charge of the operation and maintenance of the 
irrigation system but also has the responsibility for economic and social development in the 
Jordan Valley (Salman et al., 2008). The Jordan Valley irrigation scheme includes 53 
development areas distributed along the valley. These areas are usually fed by one common 
source of water, which can either be one of the 28 collective pumping stations sourcing water 
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from the King Abdullah Canal that flows through the valley, a wadi or a dam (Salman et al., 
2008). Water is conveyed from this source to farmers‟ fields through a pressurized pipe network 
covering 400-500 ha, and distributed to each farm unit. 
Although springs and wadis have always been managed through farmers' cooperation, formal 
water users associations (WUA) did not exist in Jordan (Salman et al., 2008). In the 2000s, the 
French cooperation supported participatory projects to improve pressurized network efficiency 
and water management, which included the establishment of WUAs. According to Mazahreh et 
al. (2004) the technical improvements were successful and well received, but the transfer of 
irrigation management to WUAs was somehow rejected. The farmers did not sustain their 
participation after the project interventions had ceased. 
Nevertheless, decentralisation and privatization, and support to retailing of water by WUAs 
featured as main objectives in the Water Strategy of Jordan 2008-2022 called, “Water for Life”, 
(GoJ, 2009): 
Under the new structural reform, we will have one organisation responsible for bulk water supply 
in the Jordan Valley. Farmers associations will be formed and empowered to handle retail 
water. For this purpose appropriate legislation will be introduced. 
Over time, we will redefine the role of the new institution responsible for irrigation in the Jordan 
Valley to focus on regulation and supervision of services. Involvement of stakeholders and the 
private sector in irrigation management shall be introduced and gradually promoted. Care will be 
taken to monitor and supervise the use and distribution of water resources in that regard. 
The French technical cooperation (focused on network rehabilitation) and GIZ jointly contributed 
to bringing significant changes in the valley in recent years. WUAs have been established over 
80% of the irrigated area in the valley and half of them have entered in contractual 
arrangements with the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), whereby they take over the responsibility 
of Operation and Maintenance in the area served by their collective pumping stations. WUAs 
are currently organized under the Cooperative Law but a new by-law has been under 
consideration for several years to give full recognition to WUAs. This by-law defines the rights 
and duties of WUAs and governmental partners, but has not been passed yet. 
In Lebanon, the irrigated area of 139,746 ha amounts to almost 20% of the agricultural land. 
Roughly 2/3 is under gravity irrigation and 1/3 under pressurized systems. Groundwater 
supplies about half of the irrigated area. Lebanon has 17 main rivers, 2,000 springs; and 50,650 
wells, but only two major dams: Qaraoun Dam in the Bekaa valley and Chabrouh Dam near 
Mount Lebanon. 
Formally governed through the Ottoman Majallah Code of 1877 and later through the French 
Civil Code during the Mandate period (Gharios, 2009), water was managed in a tension 
between central governments and local powers (Ghiotti and Riachi, 2012). After the civil war of 
the 1980s, Local Irrigation Committees were established. These gained some financial and 
managerial independence, but remained under the tutelage of the Ministry of Energy and Water 
(MEW) (Comair, 2007). In general, these committees had a very limited role in the operation, 
maintenance, rehabilitation and renovation of the irrigation infrastructure and equipment 
(Gharios, 2009). In 2000, the Lebanese government launched a reform of the water sector with 
assistance from donors such as the World Bank and AFD (Agence Française de 
Développement). It adopted a water master plan together with a series of laws and decrees. 
The stated aim was to improve water resources management through the implementation of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Reforms included a proposal for the 
implementation of WUAs in small and medium schemes and the establishment of four new 
regional Water Establishments to manage water resources in the place of the 22 existing 
Autonomous Water Offices (AWOs) and 209 Local Committees, including 128 devoted to 
communal irrigation (Comair, 2007). These establishments are in the process of aggregating 
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local water committees (formed for domestic water purposes), which seems to go against 
decentralization and co-management (Alles and Puig, 2012). According to Comair (2007), 25 of 
the irrigation Local Committees “efficiently undertake O&M tasks”. The few existing (irrigation) 
WUAs are generally agricultural cooperatives that provide various services to farmers or have 
been set by aid and development projects without clear legal status (Gharios, 2009). Most 
manage communal systems, except the one set in 2003 in Canal 900 area, the 600 ha scheme 
managed by the Litany River Authority. This WUA never really worked, was unsuccessfully 
revived in 2006, and how to organize farmers is currently again under consideration by an 
USAID-funded project (Nassif, 2012). 
Palestine has 16,920 hectares of irrigated area, which is 5% of the total agricultural land 
(367,822ha). Water supply decisions are taken by the Israeli state. Local municipalities and 
Regional Water Utilities (RWU) that were established during the Palestinian water reform in 
2004 are responsible for local networked supply. The private sector plays an important role in 
providing service from septic tanks and drinking water by tankers. The few community-based 
water associations and village user councils that were established to represent end users, pay 
full cost of domestic water and subsidized cost of irrigation, but without any input to water supply 
or demand decisions (Empowers Country Teams, 2007). WUAs have been established 
especially to improve the efficiency of irrigation with support from donors in the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
3.3 Yemen and Sudan 
Yemen has a long tradition of farmer-managed rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. Rain-fed 
agriculture is important in its farming systems with 45% of the irrigated area, but 40% are under 
tube-well irrigation and the remaining 15% under spate and spring-fed irrigation (Atroosh, 2006). 
Community-managed irrigation and rights systems have traditionally governed the access to 
land and water. 
The centralization of water management started from the 1970s onwards with the construction 
of large-scale water infrastructure in main wadis (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). From 
the early 1980s, the responsibility for the O&M was adopted by the irrigation section of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In 1996, the Governor of Lahej and the Ministry of Agriculture issued 
Resolution 14/1996 and Decree 7/1996, which re-established the regional Irrigation Councils 
already created in 1967 after creation of independent South Yemen. The Irrigation Council 
comprises the District Commissioner as Chairman, the Director of Agriculture as Deputy 
Chairman, the Director of Irrigation as Secretary and 14 farmer representatives -who are 
permanently appointed- as members. In its consultative and advisory role, the Irrigation council 
discusses and approves irrigation plans as proposed by the Director of the Regional Agricultural 
Office. It also decides on the distribution of floods and assists in the management and 
maintenance of the irrigation structures (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). 
Decentralization often implies the centralization of planning and the decentralization of 
implementation (Attia, 2003). The Local Authorities Law (No. 4/2000) empowered local water 
authorities with greater administrative, managerial and fiscal responsibilities. However, within 
this new formal system it is not clear who is in charge of the management of spate irrigation 
systems (e.g. in Wadi Tuban) (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). 
A policy trend towards decentralized water management was reinforced but retained 
weaknesses. The 2001 Law No. 1 on Nongovernment Organizations and Societies establishes 
the legal status of WUAs. The local council has formal ownership of infrastructure, provides 
support and helps improving WUA performance. The registration of a formal WUA offers some 
advantages in terms of banking, formal accountability mechanisms, supervised elections, 
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reporting, audits, etc. However, the registration procedure is complicated and requires going 
through an elaborate series of procedures. In addition, the legal status is not sufficient to make 
and enforce rules of water use, maintenance, fees and other matters over all users of the water 
resources (Bruns and Taher, 2009). WUAs are responsible for irrigation management according 
to the existing water rights along with settling disputes, participation in preparation of irrigation 
plans, fee collection for O&M expenditures. 
In Yemen, the Water Law was issued in July 2002. It contains the basis for setting up new 
organizations in water management: Water Basin Committees, Water Zone Committees (for 
parts of the basins) and Water Users Associations as well as federations and unions of WUAs. 
The Water Law does not describe the power given to these new bodies and the procedures for 
their establishment, but it refers to a forthcoming bylaw that has eventually only been passed in 
2011. In the meantime around 700 WUAs have been formed – often registered under Law 39/ 
1998 or Law 12001/ on Cooperative Societies and Associations – and frequently in the 
framework of aid/development projects. This, however, does not grant them authority to make 
and enforce rules and manage local water (Bruns and Taher, 2009). According to van 
Steenbergen et al. (2012), “the status of the 700 WUAs formed in the last decade is unknown 
and an inventory would be important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many WUAs have 
withered after the intensive engagement in the concerned project was over”. 
In Sudan, the irrigated land is estimated at 1.71 million hectares, 93% of which under 
government projects; the remaining 7% belonged to private operations. The Nile and its 
tributaries are the main source of irrigation water (93%), with two thirds served by gravity and 
one third using pumps. Spate irrigation contributes about 3% of the country‟s irrigated area. 
Flood irrigation contributes with about 2% of the irrigated area, mainly along the Nile and mostly 
supplemented by ground water with small pumps (Ahmed, 2005). 
Although the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources (MOIWR) was responsible for the O&M 
of irrigation infrastructure in Sudan, farmer participation was not entirely a new idea in irrigation 
management. Since the early nineties the government has adopted neoliberal measures to 
reduce subsidies, promote cost sharing and fee collection, and encourage a more active role for 
water users in O&M of the irrigation infrastructure (Eldaw and Ahmed, 2004). This started in the 
Gezira Scheme. 
Gezira is the largest gravity irrigation system of the African continent. It covers about half of the 
irrigated area in Sudan and uses water from the Nile (Adam, 2003). In the Gezira scheme the 
responsibility of the MIOWR included the O&M of the whole system from the Sennar dam to the 
off-take of the tertiary canals feeding the fields. O&M responsibility of the lower system was 
done by the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB) and the tenants were responsible for the O&M of the 
field canals irrigating their fields. Under the umbrella of rehabilitation and modernization and 
with World Bank support, the FAO experimented with WUAs and promoted reforms in the Abdel 
Hakam Pilot Project from 2000 onwards. This pilot project was reported to be a success and 
recommended for replication (Abdelhadi et al., 2004). 
With the Gezira Act of 2005, the tertiary level of the Gezira Scheme was turned over to the 
water users (Woldegebriel, 2011; Mathot, 2011). Farmers who were organized in WUAs 
became responsible for O&M, fee collection and crop rotations. However, these decentralizing 
tendencies in the management were followed by a more recent policy turn. In 2010, a policy 
declaration was signed that transferred the control over water from the old Gezira Board to a 
new Gezira Scheme Management Body (Mathot, 2011). This implied a huge loss in public jobs 
at the MIOWR and the SGB. O&M responsibilities that belonged before to the MIOWR and the 
SGB were devolved to the new Management Body and contracted out to private security and 
earth moving companies. Since these companies had no experience with the distribution of 
water at the field level they re-employed ghaffirs (canal operators) who had gained experience 
with this job before. This represents a degree of continuity in the daily water distribution of a 
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relatively flexible irrigation system (van der Zaag and Rap, 2012). For maintenance purposes, 
the earth moving companies‟ supervisors instruct the machine workers, WUAs or informal 
farmer groups mobilize labour or pay a machine worker for the excavation of canals. At times, 
the security companies also appear to be involved in fee collection together with the WUAs. 
3.4 Turkey 
Turkey has an irrigated area of 5.29 million hectares, that is, 13% of its agricultural area. Most of 
its larger irrigation projects are concentrated in the coastal regions of the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas. However, the GAP Project, located in Southeast Anatolia (Güneydogu 
Anadolu Projesi), is a huge regional development project that irrigates around 1.7 million 
hectares in the upper Euphrates and Tigris basins. The country also includes around 1.3 million 
ha of small-scale irrigation schemes and 1 million ha of private irrigation schemes. 
The Turkish state was unified under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, after the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Independence War (1919-1922) that followed the First World War. It opted for a 
centralized approach to water resources and infrastructure under the responsibility of a 
bureaucratic agency (DSI: State Hydraulic Works) which was established in 1954. Large water 
infrastructure was central to building the state and therefore centrally planned, constructed and 
managed by this government agency, which was modelled after the Bureau of Reclamation 
(Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011). Nevertheless, already from the 1950s onwards, legal 
provisions (Law 6200, article 2,subclause k) did allow for the transfer of small-scale, marginal 
and difficult-to-manage public systems to irrigation groups, at the modest annual rate of about 
2,000 hectares (Burak, 2005; Svendsen and Nott, 2000; Yercan et al, 2004). However, central 
government officials were reluctant to decentralize larger irrigation systems out of concern for 
losing control of the management (Vidal et al., 2001). 
This modest rate of transfer radically changed around 1993, when the government adopted the 
PIM policy and accelerated the rate of transfer sharply. The IMT policy and the establishment of 
WUAs fulfilled a prerequisite for new loan allocations to the water sector and realised a set of 
(neoliberal) economic expectations (Burak, 2005; Kibaroglu et al., 2009; Özerol et al. 2013). The 
policy coincided with a great economic need to reduce public expenditure in order to get new 
loans, which explains the receptiveness of government officials for new policy ideas. The World 
Bank persuaded the government that a substantial transfer of its large irrigation infrastructure 
was necessary and could be successful. Key in the World Bank‟s catalytic role and part of the 
loan package was to invite more than 50 senior officials to the Mexico and USA. Mexico at that 
time had also accelerated its transfer and the visitors were shown examples of WUAs that had 
actually taken over the management of large and medium scale irrigation systems. This success 
encouraged the DSI staff to adopt the Mexican model, pursue an ambitious program of 
accelerated transfer and select a number of four pilot projects where conditions were favourable 
to get the process going (Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001; Döker, 2003; Tekinel, 2004; Kodal 
et al., 2005; Rap, 2006). From 1994 onwards, the annual amount of land transferred in Turkey 
increased dramatically and surpassed the DSI‟s original action plan (Tekinel, 2004; Yercan et 
al., 2004). This „Big Bang‟ approach was much appreciated by the World Bank, which decided 
to make Turkey a model country (Tekinel, 2004) and an example of a successful IMT 
programme (Vermillion, 2000, Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001; Vidal et al., 2001). The PIM 
programme resulted in the transfer of around 95% of the irrigation infrastructure to users 
organizations by 2005 (Uysal and Atiş, 2010). 
According to the literature there were three main drivers for PIM in Turkey. First, the rising costs 
of public irrigation management that the government could no longer afford. The increasing 
O&M costs posed a heavy financial burden on the government, as these expenses were not 
recovered because of very low fee collection rates among the beneficiaries (Döker et al., 2003). 
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Structural adjustment policies of the IMF and a national budgetary crisis necessitated the 
reduction of the public expenditure on irrigation management. The limitations on financial 
allocations to DSI and the O&M department also led to deferred maintenance and the 
deterioration of irrigation infrastructure (Svendsen and Nott, 2000; Kibaroglu et al., 2009). 
Second, the neoliberal policies of privatization, liberalisation and commercialization were 
strongly promoted by the Turkish government and international agencies for all economic 
sectors. Third, farmer participation was expected to increase the efficiency and productivity of 
irrigation and sustainability of irrigation facilities (Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001; Yercan, 
2003). 
Different organizational forms were given to the newly created water user organizations under 
different laws. In 2012, Irrigation Associations (IAs) managed by far the largest part (90%) of the 
totally transferred area, 3.21 million hectares (DSI, 20124). Larger irrigation systems cover 
several villages or municipalities and therefore the IAs were formed as overarching local 
administrative unions that encompassed multiple jurisdictions under the Municipal Law. 
However, IAs were not the only possible form of user organization, because also cooperatives 
(5%; Cooperative Law), municipalities (3%) and village legal entities (2%; Village Law) were 
made responsible for managing local irrigation systems. Local leaders such as village headmen 
(muhtars) or mayors of municipalities often became the heads of these user organizations (all 
called IAs below). This shows that the transfer depended partly on already existing 
organizational and legal structures and local authorities. 
With support from the World Bank, DSI remained the main initiator, executor and supervisor of 
the transfer program (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). It was undertaken entirely with existing DSI staff 
and was implemented in the field by regional O&M personnel acting as promotors. Extensive 
training and orientation programs were held to acquaint field personnel with the program‟s 
approach. At every transfer, a transfer agreement and protocol were signed between the DSI 
and the IA, which specified the transfer of management responsibilities. In addition, the bylaws 
of the IAs stated that the IAs became responsible for distributing water below the secondary 
canal, maintaining canal infrastructure and collecting fees in this zone (Yazar et al., 2006; 
Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008). In all cases, the ownership of the infrastructure, the maintenance 
machinery, and the water rights remained with DSI and the Turkish state. After transfer, DSI 
managed bulk water allocations and the primary canal infrastructure, IAs managed the 
secondary network up to the tertiary intakes and informally organized groups of water users 
controlled water distribution within the tertiary units (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). 
Hence, the legal framework clearly demarcated the rights and responsibilities of the IAs (Yercan 
et al., 2004; Uysal and Atiş, 2010), but did not always clearly specify the-transfer-of-what 
exactly the state committed to. For example, in the present circumstance, IAs identify the total 
water demand at the start of the season for the DSI, which then allocates the amount of water 
from the reservoirs (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008). “DSI has ultimate control of bulk water deliveries by 
virtue of its control over reservoir operations” (Kodal et al., 2005). The transfer agreements fail 
to specify the bulk allocation or water entitlement of individual IAs and also the exact details and 
conditions of the operation, maintenance and administrative facilities that were transferred 
(Dadaser-Celik et al., 2008; Kukul et al., 2008; Kibaroglu et al., 2009). 
The IAs were set up by local authorities with DSI support (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011). 
The General Assemblee of the IA is composed of municipal and village leaders (muhtars) and 
democratically elected members of municipal authorities within the irrigation system. For the 
governing body they elect a chairman and four executive committee members. Together with an 
assigned manager (an agricultural engineer) and an accountant, the body consists of seven 
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members (Tekinel, 2004). At every regular general assembly, which consists of local authorities, 
the chairman and the board of directors present their account for approval and the technical and 
managerial issues are discussed for water tariff setting. IAs are non-profit organizations which 
cover areas ranging from 300 up to 35 000 hectares. If an irrigation system serves more than 
one region or village, it is generally transferred to the IAs formed by the municipalities of these 
villages (Tekinel, 2004). The most striking feature of these original legal provisions and 
organizational structure for the IAs is that there was no direct water user representation in the 
transfer process and the irrigation management. Their only recourse was the five yearly 
elections of muhtars (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). 
Several legal complications have influenced the formation of IAs. These user organizations 
were originally established in majority under the Municipal Law No. 1580. This legal solution 
was considered convenient although not entirely appropriate, because it made IAs accountable 
to the Ministry of Interior. This Ministry did not necessarily possess the appropriate technical 
expertise to supervise the IAs. DSI officials (and WUAs) started to regret this „patchy legal 
foundations‟ (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011) and the plea for a new law, specific to make IAs 
sustainable, was frequently repeated in the literature (Vidal et al., 2001; Çakmak et al, 2004; 
Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008; Uysal and Atiş, 2010). Several drafts of this law were circulated, presented 
and discussed during the last decade or more. In 2001 a proposal was debated but not 
accepted. In 2005, the Local Administration Associations Law 5355 incorporated a special 
article 19 that specifically mentions the Irrigation Association for the first time in Turkish legal 
history (Özerol et al., 2013). The IAs acquired the status of local administration associations and 
remained under the Ministry of Interior. In March 2011 a new Irrigation Associations Law was 
finally enacted. Amongst others, this law reinstated DSI as the dominant public water authority 
that acts as an „advisory and controlling institution‟ to IAs (Uysal and Atiş, 2010).5 
3.5 North Africa 
North African countries developed centralist and hierarchical policies for the coordination of the 
agricultural sector and the access to land and water resources. This choice led to a strong 
control of planning and management of agricultural activities by national states. They designed 
legal frameworks and public policies in the irrigation sector without much contribution from 
farmers‟ organizations (Errahj et al., 2009). In spite of the relatively high standards of water 
delivery technology, irrigation in the North African countries is not performing as expected 
(Plusquellec, 2002). 
Tunisia irrigates 416,224 hectares, which is 4% of its total agricultural area. In 56% of the 
irrigated area (368,000 ha), irrigation infrastructure has been developed by the state. These 
areas are either managed by state agencies or by the farmers. Large-scale schemes are 
created below dams (125,000 ha). Medium and small-scale public schemes are organized 
around deep tube-wells (82,000 ha) or the re-use of treated sewage effluent (7,000 ha). Private 
small-scale systems manage shallow wells (140,000 ha), deep tube-wells (10,000 ha) or river 
diversions (10,000 ha) (Al Atiri, 2004). 
Tunisia adopted a national strategy of decentralisation as part of the structural adjustment 
policies of 1986 (Al Atiri, 2003). In 1995, a national water saving strategy was implemented, 
especially to improve irrigation efficiency in collective irrigation schemes, including the 
rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation systems, the promotion of water saving 
technologies, laws, programmes and trainings, as well as information, decision support tools 
and extension techniques (Lebdi, 2006). The creation of and assistance to WUAs in running 
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irrigation schemes was expected to increase awareness of water scarcity and the need for a 
rational use (Vidal et al., 2001). 
Nevertheless, the involvement of farmers in water management has historical antecedents, all 
assisted by the state bureaucracy. In the 1920s, Collective Interest Associations (Association 
d‟Intérêt Collectif, AIC) were developed for the management of irrigation water in the oasis of 
Zarzis (South Tunisia). In the middle of the 1980s, the regional branches of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (CRDA), with USAID support, re-activated the AIC to become a local body for water 
resources management. But the Ministry of Agriculture also re-activated “Groupements 
d‟Intérêts Collectifs” (GIC), dating from the colonial era, to ensure the management of water 
resources. 
The Law no 99-43 and its Decree no. 99-1819 both promulgated in 1999 introduced the new 
entity of the Groupement de Développement Agricole (GDA). The main stated objectives of the 
GDA were: natural resources preservation, agricultural works, provision of equipment, 
agricultural inputs, productivity improvement, technical advice, and marketing. The GDAs‟ 
income may include service fees, incomes form other activities and others (loans, subsidies, 
donations, etc.). Expenditures can be on O&M, administration of the GDA, reimbursement of 
loans and other expenditures. 
In 2004, the Law 2004-24 transformed all the AICs and GICs into GDAs. These GDAs had to 
enter into a contract of operation with the CRDAs. In 2006, 1250 GDAs managed 200,000 ha or 
75% of public irrigation schemes in Tunisia (MARH, 2008 cited by Frija et al., 2010). At the 
National level, a performance evaluation of GDAs suggests that 41% are good, 43% average 
and 16% weak (World Bank, 2008). 
On paper, these new entities enjoy a large degree of autonomy from the government. GDAs are 
managed by an administrative council composed of three to nine members belonging to the 
association and elected by the general assembly for a total period of three years. The president 
of this administrative council is chosen from among these elected members. His main mission is 
to represent the interests of the GDA in its relationships with the public administration and other 
actors. He can also choose a technical director (according to the needs and the financial 
situation of the GDA) to ensure a closer follow-up of O&M tasks. Financial aspects of the GDAs 
are dealt with by a treasurer, appointed on the recommendation of the administrative council 
and approved by the governor. Accounts are controlled by a regional financial agent from the 
Ministry of Finance (Frija, 2009). Each GDA is responsible for setting its own budget, defining 
water and other fee to cover the running costs of the GDA. 
However in practice, the administrative council is usually appointed in agreement with the local 
government and contributed to the political propaganda and financial support of the then ruling 
party (Mouri and Marlet, 2007). Consequently, most GDAs are dominated by local or higher-
level political powers, which tends to undermine their legitimacy and make them ineffective (see 
Case study, Vol. 2). In addition, GDAs are under the bureaucratic supervision of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Interior, which makes their operation a difficult 
task (Chennoufi, 2008). 
The successive institutional changes from AIC to GIC and then to GDA were not necessarily 
enshrined in a legal framework. Nevertheless, some GDAs have inherited debts from the earlier 
forms of association and others have received a degraded infrastructure. Further, farmers have 
not been involved in the process of institutional changes. In spite of the transfer to farmers‟ 
organizations and involvement of farmers in decision-making, the central administration and 
political institutions still dominate the organizational landscape. In the Tunisian legal framework 
roles and responsibilities of WUAs seemed to be oversized, whereas the state‟s role –however 
dominant it remains- is not clearly defined. 
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In Algeria, the area under irrigation covers 865,286 hectares (i;e. 2% of its agricultural area), 
with a predominance of medium and small-scale schemes (88% of the area). These systems 
were partially or entirely created by farmers using surface wells, deep tube wells, small 
reservoirs, wadis (spate irrigation systems), springs, ghotts (small oases in the South) 
(Mouhouche and Guemraoui, n.d.). Large scale schemes were constructed and are fully 
managed by the state. 
Algeria has a legacy of state-managed and collective farms. After the dissolution of the socialist 
state-managed farms, the land reform of 1987 created collective farms (Agricultural Exploitation 
Collectives or EACs) on public land under the law 87-19 (Errahj et al., 2009; Imache et al., 
2009a). Water reforms have only slowly followed this land reform. In 2005 the Law n° 05-12 
included representatives of the different user categories in the management of irrigation 
schemes and served as an umbrella to develop WUAs (This law did not clearly state the legal 
status of WUAs, but was later flexibly appropriated to form WUAs). The main purpose of these 
WUAs was to support the management, use and protection of water resources within their area 
of responsibility. Since 2006, a monitoring committee in each large scale system promoted 
Participatory Irrigation Management. In small scale systems, the state currently imposes the 
formation of a WUA before any state intervention on the hydraulic infrastructure can take place 
(Belkateb, 2012). In Algeria the active participation of WUAs in water management still remains 
at an embryonic stage (for more details see Amichi, 2009; Imache et al., 2009a and b). 
Morocco irrigates 1.32 million hectares, which corresponds to 4.4% of its agricultural area. 
Gravity irrigation is the most widespread method (81%), while sprinkler irrigation (10%) and 
micro-irrigation (9%) slowly expand. The latter technique is mostly found in private systems. 
Large-scale schemes have been constructed and managed by the state and dominate the 
irrigation landscape with 682,600 ha. These systems are usually fed by dams. The state also 
sometime assisted in constructing or renovating medium and small schemes (334,130 ha) that 
are managed together with the water users. The sources of supply include small dams, springs, 
qanats (khetaras), tube wells, weirs for spate irrigation. Many communal systems with a long 
history are, however, managed based on collective rules and local management. Private 
schemes (441,430 ha) are developed and managed by individual farmers or private companies 
(MADRPM, 2007). 
In 1968, the state launched an irrigation programme with the goal of attaining 1 million hectares 
of irrigated land by 2000 (Bergh, 2007). This programme was based on irrigation development 
that was planned, constructed and managed unilaterally by the State. After the adoption of 
structural adjustment policies in 1983 and economic liberalization, the government started to 
explicitly call for involvement and empowerment of users in water management (van Vuren et 
al., 2004; Bergh, 2007). The compulsory and fixed cropping pattern was liberalised and a kind of 
on-request water delivery was introduced. The government introduced the PIM policy in 1990 
and advocated the progressive involvement and empowerment of users in water management 
in 1995. The 1990 Law no 02-84 specified the legal status of WUA and named them 
„Association d‟Usagers de l‟Eau Agricole‟ (AUEA). The 1992 Decree no 2-84-106 fixes the terms 
of agreement between the government and the AUEAs. They became responsible for irrigation 
management, water works, O&M of infrastructure and fee collection within their (tertiary areas). 
Almost all medium and small public schemes in Morocco are presently fully managed by AUEAs 
(Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). In most large-scale public irrigation systems however, the 
AUEAs have remained weak (Haouz, Tadla), or non-existent (other schemes) (Faysse et al., 
2010). 
AUEAs are not granted specific water rights or ownership of the irrigation infrastructure. The 
AUEA General Assembly elects six out of a total of seven members of the council (conseil), the 
remaining so-called „seventh member‟ being a government representative. The council is 
responsible for preparing the annual budget of the WUA and for implementing the decisions 
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taken by the General Assembly (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). However in practice, the 
irrigation agencies controlled the formation of many AUEAs and incorporated local notables 
(elites) in the administration of rural areas, while in exchange, these rural elites provided political 
support to the central administration (Leveau, 1985 cited by Faysse et al., 2010). 
3.6 Conclusion 
IMT and PIM policies were part of structural reforms of national states that were introduced at 
the end of the Cold War, in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The political 
and economic crisis at that time paved the way for neoliberal transformations aimed at „rolling 
back the state‟ (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). These reforms were directed at reducing the state and 
bureaucratic dominance in the economy that was developed over half a century under the 
centralized planning systems of communist and developmental states during the post-war era. 
Structural Adjustment programs designed to transform national economies in a neoliberal 
fashion prompted governments to reduce state expenditure, in particular in the costly public 
irrigation and water management sectors. This called for the “participation” of non-state actors 
or „water users‟ in the financing and organization of water management. These water users 
were mainly conceived to be farmers, since the agricultural sector was the main consumer of 
nations‟ water resources. These strong economic motivations were accompanied by an equally 
strong belief among international donors that the participation of water users could increase the 
efficiency, productivity and sustainability of irrigation systems and empower water users. 
Since neoliberal policies to reduce state expenditure and increase cost recovery were applied in 
a top-down manner, it is not surprising that the participation of water users was especially 
valued in terms of cost-recovery and of taking-over expensive tasks that were formerly carried 
out by public water institutions. The promotion of user participation and empowerment to 
improve irrigation performance, however, played a useful role in persuading government 
officials and water users that this was a positive change and more than just a cost-cutting 
operation. The IMT/PIM policy discourse thus combined a remarkable mixture of pragmatic 
material needs with ideological fervour. 
International banks and donors played a major role in promoting IMT/PIM policies, but also 
international organizations such as FAO and IFAD played a supportive role in the formalization 
of WUAs. In several cases, these water reforms were part of a conditional loan package. To 
what extent domestic actors adopted and responded to these reforms varies from country to 
country. But it is clear that these policies were to a large extent conceptualised and promoted at 
the international and national levels. The relative top-down nature of water user organization 
formation, within the state‟s requirements, becomes obvious when studying policies in detail. 
First, although IMT/PIM policies and the accompanying legal framework and contractual 
agreements usually demarcate the rights and responsibilities of WUAs, they do not always 
specify what the state actually „transfers‟. Second, it is striking that in the policy process of 
formulating and implementing IMT/PIM the participation of water users was often lacking. For 
example, the definition of what organizational form a WUA takes was more a bureaucratic 
decision than based on water users‟ opinions or preferences. The case of Turkey showed that 
the water bureaucracy secured being the main authority in control of these issues. 
In the ex-Soviet Union and other states with a statist and collective forms of land tenure (e.g, 
Algeria or Syria), land reforms were often setting the tone and pace for water reforms. The rate 
and pace with which national governments, with the support of international agencies, 
dismantled the state-led system of irrigated production varied substantially. This also influenced 
the extent to which water reforms and the transfer of irrigation management to WUAs was 
hampered by the ongoing land reforms. In a country like Kyrgyzstan, land became fragmented 
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into small subsistence farms, which greatly complicates water management. Land fragmentation 
multiplied the individual demands and crop choices, making water distribution hugely complex 
and the financial basis of WUAs very meagre. Uzbekistan chose for a different model in which 
land was distributed to a relatively smaller number of larger private farms that were encased at 
a collective level and the state kept a degree of control over crop choice. This facilitated water 
management to some extent, as it is easier to distribute water to a more limited number of 
farms, however it excluded a large part of the population from the access to land and water. In 
reality there exists a diversity of water management situations that WUAs face within these 
countries. 
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4 Community-managed irrigation and sustainability 
4.1 Introduction 
The Middle East and Northern Africa region is famous for its longstanding experience with water 
systems managed by communities or farmer groups. In arid and semi arid regions any local 
source of water - a spring or a well - is the key to the life of communities and therefore also a 
source of collective action to allocate that water and maintain its source. 
Community- or farmer-managed irrigation systems are considered to be endowed with „social 
capital‟. This „refers to those stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw 
upon to solve common problems‟ (Pradhan, 2002a). A history of self-organization in community-
managed irrigation demonstrates that farmers have the desire and ability to develop functional 
self-sustaining norms of collective action in order to manage the allocation and distribution of a 
common water resource. Communities developed customary rules on how to schedule irrigation 
and divide the water, collectively maintain the water source and water ways, and manage 
irrigation themselves. These customary systems of rights and rules governed access to land 
and water and helped to resolve conflict. Often these systems were characterized by the 
existence of strong leadership and clear rules for „equitable‟ water distribution, especially under 
scarcity conditions. 
While irrigated agriculture continued to provide substantial benefits to local communities, state 
institutions and development practitioners argued that these systems were declining and facing 
sustainability concerns. Since the late 1970s, international development agencies started to 
fund technical projects by state organizations to rehabilitate and modernize these communal 
schemes. Such governmental interventions are generally legitimized by the claim to „modernize‟ 
traditional systems, introduce sophisticated „technologies‟, improve „efficiency‟, increase 
agricultural production and farmers‟ income (Coward, 1985). However, many of these 
modernization efforts produced negative effects for the social organization and local governance 
of water resources. 
These ideas on community- and farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS) were very influential 
and inspiring in the emergence of PIM and IMT policies. The reasoning was that if water users 
could sustain small-scale irrigation systems then why not also larger systems. This reinforced a 
belief that Water Users‟ Associations would constitute a more local, democratic, and rational 
form of management. 
We have divided this review according to four types of community-based irrigation commonly 
found in the NEN region: spate irrigation; spring and deep wells; qanats and other cases. We 
then examine patterns of state intervention in these systems and attempt to identify some 
commonalities, conditions and factors for successful resource management. 
4.2 Community-managed irrigation systems and emerging problems 
4.2.1 Spate irrigation 
Spate irrigation is the diversion of water from fast-flowing torrential streams by (often temporary) 
weirs onto farmers‟ fields for the purpose of irrigation. This is a common and ancient technique 
of farmer communities in arid and semi-arid regions to cope with the unpredictable and heavy 
rainfall and to control floodwater of wadis in a sustainable manner. Spate irrigation has been 
developed by communities especially in Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, central Tunisia and 
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Sudan. In fact, spate irrigation systems account for approximately 20% of the irrigated area in 
Algeria and Yemen, 13% in Morocco, 8% in Tunisia and 2.5% in Sudan (Perry and Bucknall, 
2009). In these countries farmers reshaped the landscape with ditches, terraces and bunds to 
control and guide surface flows to their fields. 
How communities manage water for spate irrigation is impossible to understand without the 
concept of Aurf. This encompasses a collective and customary rights system of Arabic origin, 
based on Islamic law, but usually unwritten and passed on through oral tradition from one 
generation to the other. This customary system of spate irrigation raises some power and equity 
issues associated with collective action, such as upstream/downstream problems (e.g. in 
Yemen, priority is given to upstream users; Bahamish, 2004; Bruns and Taher, 2009), water 
conflicts among farmers and the dominance of local elites. 
The power and responsibility of managing communal systems in Yemen – on tributaries and 
small streams – is given to water masters or Sheikhs (Bahamish, 2004; Lawrence and van 
Steenbergen, 2005). Water masters supervise flood water distribution, look after the 
maintenance of canals and dikes following heavy floods, by gathering and organizing farmers to 
build earthen dikes (uqmas). They do so by estimating the costs and charging each farmer 
proportionally to his irrigated area. Water Masters also resolve disputes according to 
established rules. Customary rules prohibit receiving flood water more than once in a 14 days 
period, expanding the command area of a given channel, digging new channels in order to 
irrigate reclaimed land or irrigating a neighbouring land which is not part of the command area. 
Despite of these well-established rules that regulate the access to land and water, conflicts 
occur frequently because of the scarcity of water (Bahamish, 2004). 
Customary rules often embody equity considerations. In Yemen, until the 1950s Wadi Tuban 
and Wadi Zabid were considered as equitable system where rules and sanction were clearly 
established (Bahamish, 2004; Steenbergen et al., 2010). In Wadi Tuban command area, 
downstream farmers had the right to grow crops on the irrigated fields of their upstream 
neighbours. If crops were already cultivated, the yields had to be given to the immediate 
downstream farmers after the harvest (Steenbergen et al., 2010). The same intent to deal with 
disadvantaged downstream farmers was also found in the Wadi Laba irrigation system with a 
continuous search for a „fair‟ water distribution (Mehari et al., 2005). 
However, it is common that influential farmers try to break the inherited rules, which leads to 
conflicts. Indeed, there is great variation in farm area, resulting in repeated conflict between the 
users of spate water. Sheiks are highly respected and well remunerated for their work in 
managing spate systems, up to 5% of the farmer's crop (Bahamish, 2004). Nevertheless, Sheiks 
may act in an authoritarian way or fail to prevent such water conflicts. This does not favour the 
equitable management of spate systems, especially when communities and other institutions 
cannot challenge their ruling (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). 
In central Tunisia, a strategy of household plots distribution has been adopted to cope with the 
upstream/downstream inequity. It consisted in the division of the command areas into three or 
four sections, with each landowner having a plot in each section. In this way, each household 
has access to spate water even if the limited flood does not reach all sections of the command 
area. However since the 1980s, because of land fragmentation (less than 0.1 ha), it was no 
longer possible to allocate a plot of land to each household in each section (Van Mazijk, 1988 
cited by van Steenbergen et al., 2010). 
In Morocco, village leaders (Jemaâ ) along the wadis, have Friday meetings (after the Friday 
prayer) to manage irrigation water, resolve conflicts and take other decisions related to forests, 
grasslands, rural tracks, etc. (Keita, 2006). In the Aït Hakim and Aït Bouguemez valleys, 
sophisticated and flexible water sharing arrangements were formalized, with different upstream 
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and downstream irrigation rules, and also different village-level rules (Keita, 2006; Romagny 
and Riaux, 2007). 
4.2.2 Springs/Oases 
Oases are one of the first forms of community-managed irrigation systems in the region. In 
southern Tunisia, communities have been using ingenious management arrangements for 
centuries. These were developed in the thirteenth century not by the user community itself but 
by the scientist Ibn Chabat (1221-1285). He was a distinguished Tunisian historian, magistrate 
and engineer who developed an equitable system for water distribution in the Tozeur Great 
River. In the oases of southern Tunisia, groundwater was exploited by collecting the discharge 
of natural springs and water rights were defined in terms of units of time, as measured by a 
clepsydra (water clock). A water inspection agent had the duty to ensure that water rights were 
respected (Bédoucha, 1987). From the 1950s onwards, however, the flow from natural springs 
and artesian wells diminished as groundwater was overexploited, which led to agricultural 
decline and rural exodus. 
Another form of cooperation between small farmers can be observed around the numerous 
springs over the whole region, notably in Morocco, Lebanon or Jordan. In Jordan communal 
forms of water management rely on time-based sharing of a water source, usually proportional 
to the size of irrigated area. Water rights have been determined by Islamic sharea, customary 
law, tribal values and the relationship between arable land and water rights (Salman et al., 
2008). Violations of rules are usually minimal. When these violations occur they are mostly 
handled either by the farmers themselves or the head of the clans (Mazahreh et al., 2004; 
Salman et al., 2008). However recurring water shortages threaten the system and affects 
farmers‟ willingness to respect established rules. 
4.2.3 Qanats 
Qanats are underground drainage galleries stretching over several kilometres. These 
community-managed systems are known all over the Islamic world under different names 
(Kettara in Morocco, Foggara in Algeria, Damous in Tunisia, qanats in Iran, etc). The galleries 
appear on the surface as a chain of wells connecting with the manmade tunnel. The wells are 
used as entrance for maintenance and cleaning of galleries on a regular basis to prevent silting 
and collapsing. Since Qanats are the key to life in arid regions, many laws have been developed 
to govern their construction and use. Some of these laws regulate the distance between new 
Qanat tunnels and already existing tunnels. Other laws govern water distribution or 
responsibilities of the owners, notably regarding maintenance. The sustainablity of these 
systems varies a great deal. In Morocco, Jordan and Syria, Qanats have largely ceased to 
function, yet they have been preserved and revived in Oman (Lightfoot, 1996a) and some 
specific areas (Tafilalet in Morocco). 
Qanats must be constantly repaired in order to maintain water flow, and this cost in a burden to 
the community. Land reforms and the introduction of well technology have, since the 1950s, 
radically changed water needs and perceptions regarding the utility of Qanats. Qanats are 
declining since they are not able to provide enough water for large-scale agriculture and 
therefore lost their importance for the youngest people, who opted to migrate or to shift to 
easier/cheaper water withdrawal techniques (Lightfoot, 1996b; Wessels and Hoogeveen, 2002). 
The spread of wells has resulted in a drop of aquifers, a decline/drying-up of qanats, the erosion 
of collective rules, and their physical degradation or destruction due to discontinued 
maintenance. 
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4.2.4 Collective wells 
Sharing deep wells is a natural response to the high-cost of drilling such wells, and to the fact 
that the capacity generally exceeds the needs of one particular farmer. Such arrangements can 
typically be found in southern Algeria, Tunisia, or in the oases of Egypt. This is akin to what is 
referred to as „water markets‟ in India or Pakistan, when the well owner sells his well water to 
neighbours. The well may belong to one person, or several individuals who have joined forces 
and budgets to drill it. Water allocation rules and whether/how they include financial 
arrangements will depend on each configuration. 
In Turkey, community-management of irrigation systems, particularly for groundwater irrigation 
or pumping from natural watercourses, amounts to about one-quarter of the irrigated area 
(Svendsen and Nott, 2000). In such systems, the muhtars operate as the coordinators of 
operation and maintenance activities. 
A different but related type of community-managed system emerges when a state, a donor or a 
development project intervenes in rain-fed, installs a tube-well with an irrigation network (or 
sometimes rehabilitates an earlier well) and then transfers this infrastructure to a newly 
established organization, for example a WUA. This type of systems can be found in the 
Maghreb (Faysse, 2011), Yemen, Sudan and other countries. 
For example, in Tunisia small scale systems have been created around collective tube-wells in 
Central Tunisia (Sidi Bouzid, Kairouan, Gafa, Siliana, Zaghouan). Almost all of these types of 
„Public Irrigation Schemes‟ (Périmètres Public Irrigués; PPI) are presently operated and 
managed by GDAs (Al Atiri, 2007). In the Sidi Bouzid governorate, GDAs were introduced in 
1992 in small-scale systems (Ben Salem et al., 2007). Many IFAD projects in Tunisia addressed 
the creation and rehabilitation of such small scale systems served by collective wells, in addition 
to spate systems and small scale systems created around small dams. 
In Algeria, collective pumping stations have been implemented since the 1940s in collective 
farms of the Mitidja valley located in the Central North (Potin, 2007). In Central Algeria, oases 
such as Ziban, El Oued Mzab, El Goléa flourished in the late 19th century thanks to collective 
deep artesian wells (Bouzaher, 1990). In the North East, for example the Ouargla oasis with 
over a million palm trees, shallow wells have been progressively replaced by more sophisticated 
deep tube-wells (Zella & Smadhi, 2007). Although the legal status of the management of these 
collective deep wells is not always clear from the literature, it is likely that communal 
management with strong public influences informally plays a major role. 
In Morocco, the exploitation of groundwater is mainly the initiative of private farmers (Arrifi, 
2012). However, collective deep-well projects have been constructed for small-scale irrigation 
systems. The policy that promoted WUAs or cooperative societies to take over these 
infrastructures is said to have failed, mainly because of the top-down implementation and 
insufficient financial support (Houdret, 2006). 
4.2.5 Other forms of collective action 
Many forms of community collective action become part of, or are subjected to government 
control, as part of the process of centralization of state power. This is an example where large 
irrigation systems come to overlap with community irrigation (see also §‎3.2 on Egypt). For 
centuries, inundation canals in Egypt diverted the Nile‟s annual floods onto farmers‟ lands via 
below-grade canals. From such canals, farmers have grouped themselves into informal groups 
for operating Sakias, water-wheels, to lift water into their fields. One type was driven by animals 
and another by the existing head-loss in the system. A well-documented example of farmer 
organization is the Fayoum gravity-based irrigation scheme, which lies in a natural depression 
of the Egyptian Western Desert with a total irrigated area of 145,000 ha. Farmers have a long 
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tradition of management in their own tertiary units, called mesqas, where water is distributed 
proportionally by rotational turns. Until recently, informal farmers‟ organizations were functioning 
in the Fayoum scheme (Mokhtar et al., 1996). A local chief oversaw that farmers respected the 
established schedule based on time shares. When farmers could not solve problems within their 
own mesqa, they approached one of the village leaders (Badawy, 2005). However, due to a 
reduction in supply, delayed maintenance, and other factors the system is facing equity, 
durability and environmental concerns. Since a number of years the state and the Dutch 
Cooperation have promoted WUA at the secondary and district levels (water boards), in an 
attempt to improve interfaces and coordination between the state and users (see section 5). 
4.3 State interventions in community-managed systems 
Until the 1970s, many farmer-managed irrigation systems were limited to subsistence 
agriculture and remained relatively autonomous from state intervention. National governments 
and International financial institutions focused their efforts on developing large and medium 
scale irrigation infrastructure. Since the 1970s, however, NEN countries started to develop 
modernization and rehabilitation programmes for these community managed systems. A large 
number of the IFAD projects reviewed fall within this category. From the 1980s onwards these 
programmes started to systematically include the formation of WUAs to administer the 
resources and infrastructure after the interventions. International donors and development 
organizations supported these programmes with loans and grants. Some of the main reasons 
behind such interventions were: 
 to expand irrigated areas 
 to make a better utilization of water and improve networks to achieve water savings, to 
compensate for resource decline 
 to protect the land (from erosion and degradation) and infrastructure from destruction 
(lining of canals, river weirs, etc) 
 to ensure better equity among farmers (Bahamish, 2004) 
 to enhance water and soil productivity and farmers‟ incomes (Ghazouani et al., 2009) 
These packages of technical interventions together with organizational efforts to formalize a 
WUA had various effects. In some case the effect was disruptive because the intervention 
weakened the customary system of rights and responsibilities, or the social capital of the 
community. Other cases, however, led to more synergetic relations between the communal 
organization and the WUA, because the community has been able to accommodate change for 
its own benefit. This section illustrates these different cases. 
To prevent decline or to improve the potential of farmer-managed irrigation schemes (FMIS), 
state intervention was indispensable, it was often argued, but this had some unexpected 
consequences, as an example from Tunisia shows. Since the 1970s, the Southern water 
resources Plan („„Plan Directeur des Eaux du Sud‟‟, PDES) developed the large-scale use of 
fossil groundwater resources from the Complex Terminal aquifer and the underlying Continental 
Intercalaire aquifer. The increasing availability of water resources helped prevent water 
shortages in oases, but also favoured the expansion of irrigated areas, which increased ﬁve-fold 
from 1963 to 2007. However, this expansion exceeded government plans because of the 
development of „illegal deep wells belonging to private farmers and the continued planting of 
palm trees at the edge of existing oases. More recently, between 1997 and 2005, the APIOS 
project (Amélioration des Périmètres Irrigués dans les Oasis du Sud) aimed to enhance water 
productivity through water saving and improving irrigation and drainage networks in 88 oases. 
These successive interventions have affected the customary arrangements of rules and rights 
that were previously well established. The rehabilitated irrigation networks and water-saving 
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devices required new collective rules and irrigation scheduling at the field level (Ghazouani et 
al., 2009). In the Fatnassa oasis, a local WUA was established as part of the government 
interventions and currently manages irrigation. However, the WUA was unable to enforce the 
collective rules for the distribution of water or prevent the irrigation of new plantations outside 
the former boundaries of the oasis. Only a few powerful farmers managed to expand their 
plantation through illegal wells (Ghazouani et al., 2012). In addition, the oases are currently 
facing overexploitation and degradation of groundwater resources and soil degradation due to 
waterlogging and salinization. The government interventions have thus unexpectedly generated 
equity, sustainability and environmental problems, by changing the rules and rights of the 
existing communal systems without being able to control deviant behaviours and enforce new 
rules. 
In Morocco the impact of government interventions on equity in WUAs is a crucial issue. The 
government established a programme to modernize hydraulic networks in small and medium 
systems. In regions with hydraulic and social complexities (e.g. the Nfis, near Marrakech), 
farmers‟ commitment to participate in water management through WUAs was very weak. 
Farmers did not ask for the establishment of the associations, were not involved in their 
formation, and in the manner in which they were grouped under a particular WUA (Keita, 2006; 
Raki and Ruf, 2006; Valony, 2006). This situation jeopardizes the social organization of water 
management and intensifies inequity between farmers. 
A classic example of the destruction of community-based management is the result of 
government decentralization in Yemen (Osmani, 2001). The government modernized and 
rehabilitated a large number of spate systems in the 1980s. As a result, the operation and 
maintenance of the spate irrigation systems was taken over by government employees and staff 
in the agricultural cooperatives (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). Modernized spate 
irrigation currently amounts to about 90,000 hectares, while traditional spate schemes only 
make up around 30,000 hectares (Kidane, 2009). The rehabilitation consisted of the 
construction of permanent diversion weirs, excavation and sometimes lining of canals, and land 
levelling. However, when the designs were not compatible with communal water rights, these 
interventions had a number of drawbacks. For example, the construction of permanent diversion 
structures at the head of the systems gave upstream farmers control over a large proportion of 
the available flows, to the detriment of downstream irrigators. Increased conflicts between 
upstream and downstream users occurred also related to the decline of traditional rules 
concerning the distribution of spate and base flows (Al-Eryani and Haddas, 1998 cited by 
Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). In addition, some modernized spate systems suffered 
from sediment accumulation, which accelerated sedimentation of the command areas and flood 
channels (Lawrence and van Steenbergen, 2005). 
In Wadi Zabid, the modernization of the irrigation system of intended to improve the living 
conditions of the downstream users and small farmers. The traditional systems of earthen weirs 
were replaced by permanent diversion structures and canal networks. The main consequence 
of this intervention was to weaken the Sheiks‟ authority in the maintenance of channels and in 
sanctioning farmers who violated customary rules. Another consequence was the shift to more 
water consumptive crops such as banana in upstream large fields belonging to entrepreneurs, 
undermining equity (Bahamish, 2004). They also undermined traditional community roles and 
authority in labour mobilization and the sanctioning of free riders. 
State interventions and government policies also contributed indirectly to the decline of Qanat 
irrigation systems. Qanat networks have been undermined by new technologies, namely tube 
wells and modern dams, which altered the basin‟s natural water regime and changed not only 
the community, but also the environment on which it depends. For example in Morocco, tube 
wells subsidized by the government continue to displace the few remaining Khettara (qanats). 
Such a proliferation accentuated the drop of water table levels especially in South Tafilalt, where 
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even some deep wells are being abandoned, resulting in a loss of local control over water 
resources and rural migration (Lightfoot, 1996a). 
However in some occasions, the modernization efforts and the introduction of WUAs by the 
state revitalized communal systems (See Box 4.1). The following example from Morocco shows 
this. In the Northern and Rif region of Morocco some small and medium-scale systems show 
that successful WUAs built their new formal organizations around existing informal ones and 
stakeholders sought to reposition themselves in terms of power and decision making (Romagny 
and Riaux, 2007). The coexistence between WUAs and the original communal organizations 
also occurred in the rural community of Ain Leuh, where water inspectors (amghar) were often 
chosen to be WUA presidents of the small irrigation systems that depend on water from the 
mountains (Kadiri et al., 2009a). This resolved the constraint of dysfunctional community-
management, observed in other systems. The new WUAs have different roles as the simple 
task of managing irrigation turns and also serve as a legal protection for irrigators‟ rights 
(Bekkari et al., 2008). That formal associations revitalize the community-management is also 
noticed for the Moyen Sebou irrigation scheme of the Middle Atlas in Morocco. A group of young 
professionals put in place rigorous and straightforward procedures for water demands and 
irrigation scheduling to ascertain an equitable water share in a context of water scarcity (Bekkari 
and Yépez del Castillo, 2011). Similar projects in Jordan tried to build formal WUAs on 
traditional and informal cooperation structures (Salman et al., 2008). Coward (1976) already 
argued that “indigenous roles can be used for articulating bureaucracy and locality if 
accountability for job performance largely remains with the local water user groups”. Hence, 
introduction of WUAs can revitalize communal systems, when communal actors are able to 
appropriate and trasnform this new organizational form to their needs and to fit local conditions 
(Kadiri et al., 2009). 
Box 4.1: IFAD case study in Taourirt-Taforalt (Morocco): Appropriation of formal WUAs by 
community organizations 
In community-managed irrigation systems, formal WUAs (AUEAs) have been shaped according 
to the ancestral rules defining water rights and distribution, e.g. in Farcia, Taghsrout, Irsane, 
Fath Al Kasmia, Aharrach. 
Community-management of irrigation systems has always prevailed over formal management. 
Indeed, from the most successful WUA, in Farcia, to the less successful WUA, in Irsane, 
traditional water rights are the basis of formal organization. The case of Irsane showed that 
even though a formal WUA existed on paper, irrigation management was still done in the old 
way, i.e. following traditional irrigation turns. Every farmer in each village knows his water right 
and elder persons mediate conflicts. In addition, maintenance of main canals known as séguia 
and weirs are done in the traditional way: during the market day, a call is made to mobilize 
people for collective maintenance. Those who cannot take part in the works have to pay a 
worker to replace them. Nevertheless, the duration of irrigation interval decreased (e.g. in 
Aharrach a turn that used to irrigate 10 olive trees, now irrigate 30). Such change is related to 
the improvement of the irrigation infrastructure (lining of seguia). 
The case of Taghsrout (50 ha) showed the revival of water rights and community management 
of irrigation after their disappearance. Indeed because of the depletion of the spring (as the only 
water resource), the irrigation system had been abandoned. In 1990 a well was dug, and later 
1400 meters of canal were lined within the IFAD project. The well feeds two villages with many 
branches in each village. A conflict situation emerged when the two villages were merged in the 
project, as only one village had, in the past, right to the spring. After one year, the other village 
installed its own pump and deep well and formed a separate formal WUA.  
Source: field visit to the PDA de Taourirt-Taforalt, Morocco (2012) 
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A critical feature of successful interventions in collective action is therefore to have farmers 
participate from the start. The case of Oued Zguifah in Tunesia (see Box 4.2) shows the failure 
of collective action in a spate irrigation system, especially because of a weak involvement of 
farmers in the implementation of the designed technical intervention. A similar case Taourit-
Taforalt in Morocco shows the success of farmer participation in the conception and 
implementation of a planned technical intervention. 
 
Box 4.2: IFAD case study in the PDAI of Siliana (Tunisia): Weakening of customary collective 
rules (GDA Oued Zguifah, 3 200 ha) 
A users‟ association was created in 1912 during the French protectorate for the management of 
a river diversion scheme. Colons regularly employed workers to dredge the spring feeding the 
river. An upstream section of the river was also dredged to allow the re-direction of floods to the 
lands. After independence, a cooperative managed the irrigation system. The formal GDA was 
created in 2006. 
The main technical interventions of IFAD in 2001 were the construction of a concrete weir and 
the creation of a distribution network to derive flood water to an additional area of 600 hectares. 
At low floods, irrigation is managed according to a rotation, starting upstream and moving 
downstream. But when the flood is sufficiently high, all farmers can open their seguias (field 
channels) at the same time. Members have to pay fees in advance –before the flood season, 
but without any guarantee to receive water with the expected duration and also without a 
reimbursement guarantee. Before each flood season, the GDA hires a backhoe to dredge 
sediments accumulated at the level of the weir and also to clean up the seven valves located at 
the foot of the weir. However, the GDA was surprised by the speed of silting up. Consequently, 
today the seven valves are completely buried under sediment and the weir is out of use. 
According to the farmers and members of the GDA, two main reasons led to the ineffectiveness 
of the GDA: 
First, farmers did not agree about the choice of the location of the actual weir. They argued that 
the location was chosen to serve the interest of powerful farmers located upstream. They 
believed that a location further down the river would decrease the speed of silting up. Second, 
farmers lost confidence in the GDA‟s capacity to provide the service they paid for, as they were 
not reimbursed when the GDA failed to operate the weir and distribute water as expected. 
Consequently, the number of members gradually decreased and so did the revenue. The GDA 
was not able to cover the dredging expenditures for more than 3 years. 
The farmers protested about these two issues although they confirmed the positive impact of 
the technical intervention, especially in terms of decrease in labour. 
 Source: field visit to the PDARI of Siliana, Tunisia (2012) 
 
4.4 Discussion and conclusions 
Communities often have a great deal of capacity and experience in dealing with their local 
environment. They demonstrate a great ability to provide water equitably, especially when it 
becomes increasingly scarce. Farmer communities have been able to handle O&M successfully 
without a formal legal status. Factors that contributed to community resource management 
include: 
- strong leadership 
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- the authority to resolve conflict 
- rules for equitable water distribution 
- customary rights systems to land and water 
- collective maintenance (hydraulic property) 
Several countries have modernized or rehabilitated community water systems through technical 
interventions such as the creation of deep wells, the rehabilitation of traditional spate irrigation 
systems or the construction of concrete diversion weirs. These engineering interventions were 
designed to improve water availability and were often accompanied by the formal establishment 
of WUAs to take charge of the new infrastructure after the project. While new diversion and 
water control structures may have succeeded in meeting „some‟ technical objectives, 
successive external technical and organizational interventions have also weakened the „social 
capital‟ of communities. Inappropriate infrastructural designs and the lack of participation of 
water users in the process had this effect. Further, local elite or power groups may manipulate 
external interventions such as the creation of a WUA to their initiative. This chapter discussed 
the following disruptive effects of state intervention on community water management: 
undermining of communal authority in conflict resolution, weakening of social organization, 
increasing upstream/downstream problems, engendering the violation of rules, and generating 
problems of equity, sustainability and environmental degradation. 
Some of these interventions were based on a romanticized version of collective action in 
communities or water user groups. The crudest versions of these images consisted in 
harmonious and autonomous farming communities that sustainably manage their natural 
resources in a traditional (i.e. unchanging) and equitable way without facing any internal power 
differences, resource conflicts or the intervention of external sources of power, expertise and 
interest. Then decline sets in for diverse reasons (increase in scarcity, economic diversification, 
conjunctive water use,...) and threatens the benefits of collective action for future generations. 
This decline of traditional community systems thus underpinned many state and project 
interventions in this field (Mosse, 1999). The technical interventions were frequently 
accompanied by organizational interventions to create WUAs. In many rural areas this has 
produced an overlap, mix and coexistence of state and communal forms of organization with 
varying degrees of formality. 
The threat to the social cohesion and capital of FMIS is thus also not simply external. In 
practice, many communal irrigation systems were never entirely autonomous, equal and stable 
in their structure, composition and boundaries. They encountered power differences, resource 
depletion and social conflicts. These may have led to inequity in water access, non-sustainable 
irrigation practices and overall underperformance of the system. For example, in this chapter we 
saw examples of the authoritarianism of leaders, their failure to prevent conflict, power, equity 
and environmental problems in collective action. The question is here whether community 
organizations have the capacity to cope with these negative internal or external trends. 
In some cases farmers demonstrated resilience and succeeded to cope with state-created 
WUAs, by appropriating and adapting them to their local circumstance and needs. In such 
cases formal associations that were imposed by donors and authorities can be gradually 
adopted and transformed to local objectives and capacities. This can vitalize the way in which 
the communities develop capacities to manage water, collect fees and develop agriculture. The 
example in Morocco (Bekkari and Yépez del Castillo, 2011; Kadiri et al., 2009) can be an 
inspiration for such irrigation management, where opportunities were created and appropriated 
by new young and qualified leaders to emerge and deal with the challenges of scarcity and 
water management in a new and more equitable way. 
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5 WUAs in public irrigation schemes 
In this section, following the three responsibility areas introduced in § ‎2.2, we first look broadly 
at where and how water management (arrangements, water savings, conflict resolution) has 
been changed by PIM/IMT policies, and then investigate issues of maintenance and financial 
management. Because of the sketchy nature of the evidence available, the examples given are 
mainly illustrative of the diversity of cases. 
5.1 Water management 
5.1.1 Water arrangements: adequacy and timeliness 
The quality of water supply from the point of view of the users includes adequacy (accessing a 
quantity of water that is sufficient to meet one‟s needs) and timeliness (getting the amount of 
water at the right time). Adequate timing and/or predictability of water supply are crucial in 
irrigated agriculture, and often more important than adequacy itself. From a system or social 
point of view equity (no user gets an excess of water to the detriment of others), water savings 
(supply is adequate but not in excess of needs, and losses are limited), and conflict resolution 
are additional important objectives. Water adequacy alone is not enough to guarantee good 
water productivity. 
These indicators are not unrelated. Schemes with sufficient and abundant water will more easily 
ensure adequacy and timeliness (irrespective of whether the WUAs are effective or not), often 
to the detriment of efficiency. In contrast water short schemes will not be able to ensure 
adequacy and coordination with users and enforcement of rotations and rules will be essential 
to ensuring a degree of equity and predictability. We will come back to this point in the following 
section. Head-end/tail-end inequity and more generally uncertainty in supply generates conflicts 
and also impacts efficiency: faced with uncertain supply farmers tend to over-irrigate their lands, 
for fear that water might not be forthcoming in the next irrigation rotation; a strategy, in effect, 
that aims at storing water in the soil profile, but which increases losses and may lead to 
environmental problems such as soil salinization or waterlogging. Evidence of improvement of 
water supply after PIM/IMT is quite patchy. 
After transfer of water management responsibility to farmers‟ organizations, three WUAs in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010) showed a low 
water delivery performance. But the Uzbek WUA was still performing better than the Kyrgyz and 
the Tajik WUAs, suggesting that self-governing organization is only partly a function of the 
institutional environment, and also influenced by the quality of maintenance of irrigation system, 
the size of the WUA, and other factors. The case of South Fergana canal in Uzbekistan 
(Abdullaev et al., 2009) some improvement occurred in terms of equity (tail-end farmers), 
transparency of water management, responsiveness of water managers to the water users 
complaints, and reduction of illegal water withdrawals. 
In Abdel Hakam Pilot Project in the Gezira Irrigation Scheme (Sudan), the quality of supply was 
improved after transfer especially in termers of equity (tail-reach was improved). The 
improvement in the quality of water supply was mainly related to the improvement in the quality 
of maintenance of the irrigation network and, more importantly, in the participation of farmers (in 
kind and in labour) in works (Adam, 2003). Abdelhadi et al. (2004) reported similar results in the 
Gezira scheme where a block did not suffer any water shortages after farmers took over the 
O&M of their irrigation canals, but it is not clear how much of this is due to collective action. 
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In the Gediz River Basin in Turkey (Yercan, 2003), some positive effect was found after the 
turn-over, where the area irrigated moved from 80 to 83% and from 56 to 69% in Menemen and 
Saruhanlı irrigation schemes respectively. Another example in Turkey showed that 79% of the 
farmers were broadly satisfied with the performance of WUAs in terms of adequacy, fairness 
and timeliness in the Karacabey irrigation scheme (Kuşçu et al., 2008). 
In Egypt, the improvement of the performance of the irrigation water system was expected to 
increase the efficiency of irrigated agriculture water use and services, and thus to have positive 
impacts on the quality of supply (water distribution, quantity, quality, equity and timeliness). In 
Bahr El-Nor branch canal area, where a BCWUA has been set up with the assistance of JICA, 
“surveys have shown that before the project 17% of the farmers had an adequate supply of 
water, 78% of the farmers claimed that the water was sometimes available, and 5% said it was 
not available. After the project, 97% of the farmers had availability of water during the scheduled 
period, whereas 3%indicated that water was only sometimes available” (Batt and Merkley, 
2009). Such improvements are due to a better coordination between managers and BCWUAs 
but it is not clear however how long they endure after the project intervention ends.  
5.1.2 Water saving 
More efficient and user-controlled management brought about by PIM/IMT is also expected to 
lead to water savings. Here too, very few studies –if any– document changes in a convincing 
manner. 
In Turkey, many WUAs were said to use excessive water in irrigation. Based on 1995-2002 
data, Yildirim et al. (2007) showed that the area managed by the state had a higher relative 
water supply (3.33 to 3.49) compared with transferred areas (2.05 to 2.45). This „inefficiency‟ of 
state-managed schemes was corroborated by Dadaser-Celik et al. (2008) who showed that a 
majority of farmers think that irrigation management is better in transferred than in DSI-
managed schemes. According to Kuşçu et al. (2008), the relative water supply in the Bursa-
Mustafakemalpaşa irrigation scheme, located in western Turkey, remained quite stable (from 
1.5 to 1.6) between six years before and six years after the transfer (1992-2004). The main 
reason behind the lack of improvement in relative water supply can be related to the rejection of 
IMT by farmers. Uysal and Atışa, (2010) showed an improvement in relative water supply after 
transfer (from 1.2 for pre-IMT to 1.4 post-IMT) in the Kestel WUA (18,158 ha), not due to a 
change in overall water supply but rather to improved maintenance and repair, which reduced 
losses. In contrast Yavuz et al. (2006) showed that in the Lower Seyhan Basin the most 
important reasons for not achieving the objectives of IMT in terms of water savings and 
improvement of the performance of irrigation management were the neglect of the physical 
infrastructure, as well as social dimensions of irrigation management. 
Another reason behind the excessive water use was uncertainty in irrigation scheduling (Easter 
and Liu, 2007). Many farmers indicated that they are aware of the problems created by 
excessive irrigation (waterlogging and unfair head-tail water distribution), but they also admitted 
that they intentionally irrigate more than necessary once water is available due to uncertainty on 
the next irrigation (Dadaser-Celik et al., 2008; an observation also made by Ghazouani et al., 
2009, in Tunisia). 
In Egypt, the central objective of the IIP and IIIMP projects were to reduce abstraction from 
canals and application at the field level. It was also expected that by applying continuous flow in 
secondary canals and making farmers would be encouraged to use water in „a more rational 
way‟ (El-Kassar and El-Fotouh, 2008). WUAs would manage collective pumps according to 
needs and would therefore save water. In practice, it has been difficult to identify any change in 
water abstraction, partly because of the difficulty in establishing continuous flow in practice, (El-
Kassar and El-Fotouh, 2008), and there are cases where the strategy might have even had the 
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opposite effect (Ezzat El-Agha, 2010). Like in many other places, water efficiency at both the 
plot and system level is heavily determined by the quality in supply ensured by scheme 
managers. 
5.1.3 Conflict resolution 
In large-scale irrigation schemes, conflicts may appear at all levels, between farmers of a same 
ditch or tertiary canal, between the WUAs of a same secondary canal, or between the 
secondary canals of a same main canal. Conflicts may also concern certain farmer groups and 
involve the agency itself. 
In PIM policies, the WUAs at the tertiary and secondary levels are often precisely set up as a 
means of providing coordination arenas and improved information in order to reduce conflicts at 
a certain level. The analysis of two BCWUAs in Egypt by Batt and Merkley (2010) showed that 
while the district engineer formerly had to intervene in all disputes at the secondary (branch) 
canal level, only 16% of the problems were handled by him after BCWUAs were established, 
against 84% by the BCWUA leader. But the decrease in the number of farmer complaints 
recorded by an irrigation agency does not necessarily show the success of the transfer 
programs, like in Turkey (Svendsen and Nott, 2000) where complaints seemed to be shifted to 
the local level, where the frequency of water distribution conflicts was reported to have 
increased (Kuşçu et al., 2008). 
But „modernization projects‟ associating hardware and software components may also create 
conflicts for newly set up WUAs. In Egypt the mesqa level WUAs, especially when the capacity 
of the pump turns out to be a constraint with regard to meeting needs, may be the place of 
substantial conflicts that did not exist when farmers formerly used individual pumps. The 
collective action anticipated and desired by some projects does not often materialize as 
expected and is eventually strongly linked to the status of water supply locally, itself a reflection 
of the situation higher up in the system. 
In Azerbaijan the conflicts were related to newly created WUAs which are still weak and the 
majority of farmers do not fully understand their tasks and responsibilities (Rzayev, 2007). 
WUAs are sometime not recognized by farmers as a means of resolving disputes. In 
Kyrgyzstan massive losses in the main system, associated water thefts, and the shift of 
monocropping collective farms to individual farming with diversified cropping patterns, many 
cases unresolved through informal negotiation, move along the administration hierarchies and 
eventually lead to top-down imposition of resolutions irrespective of WUAs (Ul Hassan et al., 
2004). 
In Jordan, the establishment of WUAs in the Jordan valley has taken 10 years of efforts to 
restore trust both between farmers of a same WUA, and between farmers and the JVA. As 
WUAs were empowered, one of the first benefits and actions that generated support from 
members was the removal of illegal connections. While it was believed that these had already 
been brought down to 5% of total supply, it was discovered that many farmers had made some 
private deals with some JVA staff and established illegal connections (Regner, 2012). By 
removing them the WUAs gained substantial credit with the farmers. Trust-building resulted in 
WUAs yielding several other benefits, including farmers abandoning the practice of over-
irrigation, giving up destroying meters, better maintenance of the pump, more predictable supply 
and no further need for intermediate farm-pond storage (Salman et al., 2008). WUAs have 
shown that they were able to handle most of their internal conflicts. 
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5.2 Maintenance and physical sustainability 
In most countries, ensuring the maintenance and the sustainability of hydraulic structures is one 
of the main responsibilities ascribed to WUAs (see introduction). Here again the situation is 
extremely varied, as illustrated by some examples from Turkey: in state managed irrigation 
scheme canal maintenance was better compared to WUAs managed schemes especially due to 
the availability of more funds, machinery and other equipment. In transferred irrigation systems, 
scheduling of maintenance activities became more dependent on fee collection rates. Indeed, 
water fees were generally said to be insufficient to cover operation and maintenance expenses 
at an adequate level. But an increase of water fees would be rejected by farmers (Dadaser-
Celik et al., 2008). 
Tekinel (2004) showed that the WUA in the Korkuteli irrigation system have generally 
demonstrated the ability to satisfactorily operate and maintain the transferred system at a cost 
generally less than that the earlier cost to the DSI. 
More than 79% of farmers were satisfied about the quality of maintenance after transfer Bursa–
Karacabey irrigation scheme (16 683 ha). 
The transfer of Bursa-Mustafakemalpaşa irrigation scheme did not improve the quality of 
maintenance (Kuşçu et al., 2008). 
In Sudan, Adam (2003) reported that the transfer of Abdel Hakam Pilot Project in the Gezira 
Irrigation Scheme improved the quality of maintenance. Farmers participated financially and, 
more important, physically (hours of labour), which globally reduced the cost of maintenance 
and improved the quality of supply. 
In Egypt, the full responsibility O&M of the tertiary level after intervention of IIP and IIIMP 
(„improved mesqas‟) was handed over to farmers and their associations. Because of the 
dependence of farmers on the pumping station, maintenance/repairs have to be done. In some 
cases, when the pump has been stolen or has broken down and could not be replaced, farmers 
have switched back to individual pumping. 
Maintenance is also an important objective of the programmes devoted to setting up Branch 
canal (secondary) WUAs. In the 4-year USAID-funded project on integrated water management 
districts (IWMD; see appendix on Egypt), BCWUAs were expected to participate in the planning 
and selection of maintenance and minor works, conduct one or more inspection of the branch 
canals and the drainage systems within the service area, with support from IWMD engineers 
and technicians; prepare a list of prioritized maintenance and minor works with support from 
IWMD engineers and technicians; and discuss the selection of maintenance and minor works 
with IWMD engineers and technicians (Barakat, 2009). Barakat (2009) reports that at the end of 
the project there was a strong cooperation between the IWMD and BCWUAs in all activities 
related to annual inspections, while maintenance and cleaning works had seen significant 
participation from BCWUAs in monitoring the cleaning process and participating in final 
inspection. BCWUAs rated the maintenance and cleaning works in their IWMDs as 70-100 
percent successful. 
In some countries farmers are used to contributing (in kind or in labour) to maintenance and 
repair works, like in central Asian countries (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010), or in the Gezira 
scheme (Adam, 2003; Abdelhadi et al., 2004, Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). But more 
frequently large-scale schemes were maintained by public agencies and it is expectedly difficult 
to convince farmers that they suddenly have to handle part of the work (e.g. in Morocco), 
especially when the government retains ownership of physical facilities. 
Some incentive needs to be found. Contributing to identification and prioritization of works (like 
Egypt‟s BCWUAs, see above) is helpful but might not be enough. IRG et al. (2001a) report that, 
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in Egypt, “all focus groups indicated that trash removal and preventing dumping trash and 
sewage in the canals, would be improved if BCWUAs had the authority to maintain the canals 
and punish polluters. Focus group session results indicate that farmers strongly believe they 
can do many of the branch canal O&M operations at lower cost than the current system of 
contracting these operations out to private companies”. Subcontracting some of the minor tasks 
to farmers‟ organizations (e.g. cutting grass) may be a source of income and build up a sense of 
ownership. 
In the Jordan valley, subcontracting of O&M to the WUAs has been a cost-effective measure 
for the JVA and has at the same time empowered the associations. One could think of 
transferring heavy equipment (e.g. backhoe) to WUAs, but there is in general reluctance from 
agencies to relinquish capital-intensive activities. One also needs to have transparent and 
democratic WUAs to avoid this equipment to be used for the private use of influential members. 
In practice, long-term maintenance (at the secondary level) is usually found to be beyond the 
financial and technical means of a WUA. This results in deferred maintenance. Unfortunately 
the same applies to the government, which finds itself facing the poorly anticipated but huge 
costs of maintaining large scale water infrastructures. In Azerbaijan, for example, hardly any 
maintenance was done during the 20 years after independence and even with the reform “It is 
still not clear to what extent the Government will adequately fund O&M at the main scheme 
level”, notably drainage. This is worrying when one considers the experience of the RCIDP 
project (Rehabilitation and Completion of Irrigation and Drainage Infrastructure Project) for 
which a survey by the IDA (which funded it) found “that around 80% of the infrastructure has 
been deteriorating in some form and needs urgent attention” (Appraisal Report of the NEDP, 
Azerbaijan, 2004). 
These mixed observations dovetail with FAO‟s synthesis study, stating that “the overall 
conclusion has to be that the willingness to undertake and to contribute to maintenance appears 
quite fragile in many schemes, possibly affecting the long-term sustainability of such schemes. 
The reasons for this appear to be reluctance, or inability, to make adequate cash payments to 
the WUA, possibly because the schemes are not producing sufficient returns, and the lack of 
acceptance of the responsibility for maintenance” (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). 
5.3 Financial management 
Financial management is a key issue of PIM/IMT, and this at two levels. First, the WUAs as 
associations need to be financially sustainable and to cover their running costs (these can vary 
substantially depending on whether, for example, the president and treasurers are paid by the 
association). Second they must also cover the expenditures related to their duties (e.g. O&M of 
tertiary level infrastructure). 
The choice is between giving more to the WUAs (eg through state subsidies or authorization to 
generate additional income) so that they be able to achieve more (eg improving and expanding 
their maintenance works), and adopting measures to increase farmers‟ direct contributions. 
5.3.1 Reduction of governmental expenses 
As mentioned earlier the most common reason behind IMT is the lack of public funds to cover 
O&M costs and the expectation that parts of these costs could/should be shifted onto farmers. 
The first objective for states is to reduce administrative costs, especially those related to staff 
salaries. In Turkey, for example, savings primarily came from reduced wage bill for system O&M 
personnel due to lower staffing intensity and operation expenses (Svendsen and Nott, 2000; 
Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001; Svendsen, 2001; Svendsen and Murray-Rust, 2001; Yercan 
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et al., 2004). Svendsen (2001) showed that O&M staff levels fell sharply, by 32% between 1993 
and 1996, and then stabilized. However the actual staffing intensity (staff/1000 hectares) was 
shown to be 30% higher than it was in 1993 (Svendsen, 2001). The irrigation agency in Turkey 
(DSI) maintains overall O&M responsibilities, especially of dams and main supply and drainage 
channels, technical assistance to WUAs, and monitoring and recordkeeping, which may explain 
such high staffing intensity. 
This decrease of state expenditures was paralleled with an increase in farmers‟ contributions 
(see Yazar, 2002; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007), as observed also in Mexico. Policy documents 
acknowledge that this is bound to happen but generally add that these O&M costs are expected 
to decrease as farmers deal with them at a cost lower than the agency‟s. There is no way to 
really corroborate what could just be wishful thinking: when costs decreased it was often later 
found that maintenance had been deferred (Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007); 
and in all cases full maintenance costs are never known with accuracy (see above note on 
Morocco). More generally the overall economic performance of public and private irrigation 
management, the total costs of irrigation management to both the government and WUAs, as 
well as what PIM or IMT change, are hard to ascertain (Salas and Wilson, 2004). 
5.3.2 Fee calculation and collection methods 
Establishing the amount to be paid by farmers is a perilous task. Economic orthodoxy exhibits 
different techniques to come up with different types of costs (from current costs to “full” costs 
that include social and environmental externalities, and opportunity costs). This sophistication 
(especially because the full costs calculated are invariably non-commensurate with farmers‟ 
incomes and ability to pay), always gives way to more mundane political arbitrages whereby 
water prices are a compromise between actual O&M costs and what farmers accept to pay 
(gauged by the political risk associated with a particular price). This political risk varies with 
circumstances. In Jordan, water prices in the Valley have not been updated for some years and 
current social movements in the country rules out any change in that matter. In Morocco, the 
announcement of a rise in water fees in 2010 triggered angry protests in the Tadla scheme. 
Some countries, like Turkey or Egypt, prefer to deliver bulk water at no cost to farmers, while 
expecting them to meet O&M costs, or part of it, in their own area. 
In Azerbaijan, O&M fees collected by the WUAs established at the beginning of the 2000s were 
limited to 25% of the amount required to be paid to the State for ISF. This restriction starved the 
WUAs for O&M funds, undermined their capacity to face expenditures and achieve the 
maintenance works required, and they ended up being seen by farmers as merely organizations 
that distribute water and collect ISF for the State (van den Boom, 2007). 
Water fees are calculated and recovered by WUAs in a variety of ways. The most common are 
area-based fees (Kazakhstan, Morocco, Egypt,..), sometimes with variations depending on the 
crop grown (eg Jordan Valley). Fees based on volumetric consumption (Turkey, Central Asian 
countries, many cases in Morocco and Tunisia, …) are more equitable but require adequate and 
expensive water measurement infrastructure and field data collection; they can also be based 
on duration (as a proxy for quantity) when there is no volumetric meter (Yemen, Jordan, spate 
systems and oasis in Tunisia). 
In some cases, where it is difficult to mobilize cash from farmers, farmers are allowed to pay in 
kind, like in Kyrgyzstan for example (Ul Hassan et al., 2004). In the PIM pilot project in Sudan, 
farmers can pay either in cash or in equivalent bags of sorghum or groundnuts. The Irrigation 
Committee collected two bags of sorghum from each farmer, and the money received from the 
sale of these bags was used for summer maintenance and land preparation for the second 
season. The Revolving Fund itself was used to procure improved seeds and fertilizers (Adam, 
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2003). While such flexibility of payment improves the rate of fee collection, WUAs are left with 
the task (and risk) of marketing the produce collected. 
Another issue with irrigation fee is the timing of money collection. Payments can be frequent, for 
example based on monthly or quarterly bills in the case of pumping schemes that require 
energy costs to be covered, or in bulk, either before (in Kazakhstan, Wegerich, 2008, or spate 
system in Tunisia (Siliana), or Yemen), or after the cropping season. Paying in advance has a 
number of advantages (farmers who don‟t pay can be excluded and therefore the incentive to 
pay is high; expenditures during the season can be covered, etc) but also drawbacks (if WUAs 
fail to provide the requested irrigation service, farmers cannot obtain any form of compensation 
nor get their money back (Merrey, 1996; Wegerich, 2008)). Payment of fees after the irrigation 
season, on the other hand, may leave WUAs short of funds, prevent necessary maintenance 
activities, and sometimes delay payment of salaries, as observed in some case in Turkey (see 
Dadaser-Celik et al., 2008). 
5.3.3 Low recovery 
Recovering costs in large scale irrigation schemes is an uphill battle. There is hardly any 
example of developing country where full cost-recovery is observed (for a global analysis see 
Cornish et al., 2004; and Molle and Berkoff, 2008). The three countries in the NEN region which 
did get some recognition for substantially raising irrigation fees, achieving high levels of 
recovery, and at times claiming to cover O&M costs were Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. It later 
appeared, however, that Morocco had not fully computed the costs of maintenance of the main 
system, resulting in deferred maintenance and needs to later catch up with maintenance works.6 
In practice, almost all the reviewed cases have faced financial shortfalls because a) the fees 
were set too low to cover actual costs, and b) the rate of recovery/payment was low. Reasons 
for suboptimal recovery include: 
 lack of willingness/authority to set fees and to take appropriate collection measures 
(Tunisia); 
 lack of will to apply sanctions, especially when powerful farmers are concerned, thus 
encouraging free-riding; 
 not keeping promises on provision of subsidies by the state (Uzbekistan); 
 farmers‟ low ability to pay (Central Asia), in particular in years of poor or unsold crops 
(Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010); 
 religious reluctance to pay for water, where water is considered a gift of God, as in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan where fee collection remains a challenge for WUAs 
(Yakubov, 2011); 
 a „Soviet mentality‟, i.e. “the expectation that the state should put water at one's disposal 
for free” (Sehring, 2005), in some countries from the ex-Soviet Union like Kyrgyzstan, or 
Uzbekistan where, despite attempts to charge water since 2001, water is accounted for 
as a free resource (Gunchinmaa and Yakubov, 2010); 
 poor irrigation service, and dysfunctional infrastructure, with farmers unwilling to pay for 
a service that is more of a constraint than an asset per se (Azerbaijan, non-
rehabilitated). 
 farmers, as result of poor and inadequate service, making investments in conjunctive 
use (typically wells), or reverting to rain-fed agriculture, thus losing interest in surface 
water (Tunisia); 
                                               
6
 A senior Moroccan water specialist, personal communication 
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 degraded or non-functional metering devices where the state policy is to charge by 
volume (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia); 
 fees perceived as over-expensive and farmers dissatisfied with the charging system 
(Yercan, 2003; Kuşçu et al., 2009). 
 farmers being forced to pay for state investments („modernization‟, etc), against their will 
(Egypt, Morocco,…) 
 the political risks associated with raising water fees (Jordan, Morocco) 
In all the cases examined, the rate of ISF collection varied greatly, as for example in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan examined by Ul Hassan et al. (2004). 
In 1993, Turkey accelerated the transfer of the management of 87% of its 1.9 million ha of 
large-scale irrigation to Irrigation districts (IDs) (generally corresponding to a secondary canal). 
The program was successful in transferring costs to farmers (Yercan, 2003; Yercan et al., 
2004). Recovery was around 95% in 2003, against 32-50% in agency-managed schemes 
(Çakmak et al., 2004). This result was partly due to a policy of sanctions, which applied high 
interest rates for unpaid fees (Yercan et al., 2008). 
High collection fees are often achieved in the framework of aid/development projects, where 
injection of cash and palpable benefits in a controlled environment result in higher farmers‟ 
payments: in Sudan within the pilot IMT in the Gezira scheme fee collection rate reached 87% 
(Adam, 2003). In Yemen, of the total of 23 million YR of O&M costs during the IIP project, the 
WUAs in Wadi Tuban and Wadi Zabid have contributed about 19 million YR. Farmers 
committed to making regular contributions towards routine O&M works and were able to 
effectively maintain irrigation infrastructures during the five years of the project (World Bank, 
2009). 
In Azerbaijan, the IFAD project with 6 WUAs also achieved good results (see Box 5.1). In other 
WUAs developed under World Bank projects, charges vary between 5 AZN/ha (in low value 
agricultural areas, especially in the south) and 50 AZN/ha, with the higher WUA ISF occurring in 
areas with high value orchards and vegetables in the north. These WUAs increased their 
Irrigation Service Fees (ISF) by 3 to 5 times, with a collection rate of around 80%, thus enabling 
them to conduct most of the planned O&M of rehabilitated systems. The amount collected 
ranges from about 25% of actual needs for O&M to nearly 100% of requirement. It has been 
estimated that the average level needed for the WUA ISF to cover all O&M, fixed costs and a 
repayment rate for rehabilitation of 10% would be approximately $46 per ha. This would 
constitute only 3% of the net margin per ha in the Northern and Nakchivan regions and 4% in 
the Central Region (World Bank, 2011a, 2011b). 
Cases where WUAs are financially autonomous are generally found in small-scale schemes and 
are rare in public schemes. Irrigation systems based on pumps tend to have better cost-
recovery mechanisms because of the necessity to cover energy costs in order to access water 
(e.g. New lands and IIP areas in the Nile delta, in Egypt), but this does not necessarily extend to 
maintenance requirements. 
Box 5.1: Cost recovery for WUAs created within the Farm Privatization Project funded by IFAD 
in Azerbaijan 
Six WUAs have been established and are distributing water, managing water infrastructure, 
collecting water charges and enhancing cooperation on water issues among their members. 
WUAs have been able to levy and collect water charges at levels sufficient to cover the cost of 
water from SAIC (the state agency), as well as the on-farm irrigation and drainage system O&M 
needs of the WUA. The water charges collected covered 100% of the cost of WUA operations 
(though the price of water made available by the SAIC may be subsidized, and charges do not 
cover the full cost of water provision). However, when the government capped the fees that 
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WUAs can levy on their members, their ability to adequately discharge their responsibility for 
system O&M was significantly undermined. 
--------------------------- 
“The majority of the six WUAs achieved good repayment rates of water charges, but the current 
levels of irrigation fees paid by members while sufficient to cover immediate O&M costs, do not 
provide for the replacement costs of O&M capital equipment. While the legal framework for 
effective WUAs exists, its implementation is still incomplete and the WUAs current water price 
policy must evolve overtime, with support from SAIC, to allow for appropriate increases in water 
charges that would result into fully financially viable WUAs”. 
--------------------------- 
Farmers may refuse to pay increased water charges to the WUA, thereby undermining the 
financial viability of WUAs. Financial analyses of farm models clearly indicated that farmers can 
afford water charges that will enable WUAs to be financially sustainable. Furthermore, 
experience indicates that if WUA deliver water adequately farmers will normally pay. There is a 
risk, given the legacy of the command economy, that the WUAs will not operate as transparent 
entities and that farmers will not receive the required amount of water. To counter this risk the 
project financed a large amount of awareness building and undertook intensive public relations 
campaigns to convince farmers of the imperative of paying their water fees, as well as training 
and related activities both for the WUA membership, managers, staff and governing board. 
Source: Appraisal Report of the NEDP (2004) and Supervision Mission of the NEDP, Azerbaijan 
(2010) 
 
Box 5.2: Low cost recovery for WUAs created within the Farm Privatization Project funded by 
IFAD in South Tunisia 
The durability of infrastructure is threatened by the insufficient financial resources of GDAs and 
the limited outlays provided by the administration. GDA rely on subsidies to ensure maintenance 
tasks and these are insufficient. Revenue from water fees only covers energy costs. It is 
apparent that a long-term strategy ensuring the sustainability of the investment made requires a 
higher mobilization of funds, that neither side seems to be able to ensure at the moment. 
Source : Rapport d‟achevement of the PRODESUD, Tunisia (2010) 
 
In contrast, in Tunisia, but this covers both farmer and state-managed systems, only 27% of 
WUAs succeeded in covering their entire O&M costs, while 28% of them covered even less than 
50% of those costs and were still subsidized by the government during 2003 (Frija, 2009). In 
Azerbaijan, as a whole, only 12% of irrigation water fees were collected (Rzayev, 2007). 
Water fees are sometime imposed by projects. In El-Ibrahimia branch canal area, Egypt, where 
IIP collective pumps have been installed, a survey showed that almost 100% of the farmers in 
the survey were not asked about whether they wanted a project in their area or not, and that it 
was all done exclusively by government decision (Batt and Merkley, 2009). Likewise, Bergh 
(2007) analyses a project in Southern Morocco “where the state contributed 60 percent of total 
costs, and the farmers the remaining 40 percent in the form of „direct (financial) participation‟ to 
be paid over 20 years, with an open-ended fee for irrigation water to cover the investment and 
operating costs of the irrigation networks. Hence this contractual partnership was not entered 
into by the partners‟ free consent, but was decreed by law based on national interests”. 
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Insufficient supply and/or high fees may push farmers to revert to rain-fed irrigation or invest in 
private pumps and use groundwater, as observed in Tunisia and in the sprinkler section of the 
Gharb scheme, Morocco, where the tariffs was €0.03/m³, twice the tariff in the surface irrigation 
sector (Doukkali, 2005). 
5.3.4 Managing accounts 
What is the performance of WUAs regarding accounting and financial management? Oddly 
enough, while it is emphasized that this function is the one that most requires capacity-building, 
hardly any report/article dwells on how WUAs effectively manage their finance. We also know 
little about the transparency of management and whether wrongdoing is frequent or not. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This review of the performance of WUAs is disappointing. One of the reasons is the high 
diversity of situations and reporting. There is a mixture of data that relates to ongoing projects, 
projects that have just been completed, as well as more general country level analyses. As 
indicated in the introduction of this section, most of the literature available is very sketchy in its 
description of how operation and maintenance are conducted in practice. 
What transpires from the preceding three sections, even taking into account the lack of in-depth 
studies, is not altogether very engaging. Merely improving coordination and management by 
users at the tertiary level, where they were in general already active, does not radically improve 
the efficiency and the equity of water distribution. Where collective action has not occurred 
before it is very rare that institutional building by a given project is able to come up with an 
efficient organization. In the absence of an improvement in the manner water is distributed to 
the different user groups, which refers to management by the agency and not by the farmers 
themselves, it is very hard to improve local water management. Instances where management 
transfers have resulted in commitments from the agency, and therefore in creating a degree of 
accountability, are very rare in the region. Even transfer agreements in Turkey do not mention 
the bulk amount of water that a given WUA is supposed to receive. Likewise, the local 
maintenance that can be done through farmers‟ collective action (typically cutting grass and 
cleaning small canals) is hard to elicit through an external intervention if farmers have not been 
able to organize in the past. 
A key element of physical sustainability, improved management, but also accountability 
mechanisms is the structure of financial flows (this point will be examined in more detail in §‎8.3), 
often limited to payment directed to the state, with very little left to support WUAs activities. 
Consequently, and also expectedly, cost recovery has been improved only in the situations 
where a project as bringing substantial benefits, or when the state had the means to impose 
high rates of cost recovery. Most of the policies deployed in the region chiefly attempt to raise 
the financial contribution of farmers. 
As there are very few, if any, both performing and enduring WUAs in large-scale public irrigation 
schemes, it is virtually impossible to identify conditions or contexts, conducing to successful 
comanagement. In the next section, however, we review a number of internal and external 
factors that are typically correlated with the performance of associations. 
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6 Internal factors 
Just like farm performance depends on the quality of the individual farmer, WUAs‟ fate depends 
on a number of internal characteristics (as well as external factors, reviewed in the following 
section). The literature on IMT has long identified a number of key (sometime interrelated) 
factors including: 
 the size of the association 
 social cohesion and social capital 
 the existence of leadership 
 the administrative and technical capacity of staff (more generally the level of education) 
 the importance of farming in local livelihoods (economic diversification leads to 
differential interests in maintaining the systems and weakening of individual 
commitments) 
 the necessity of collective action for ensuring supply (typically pumping schemes do 
require permanent mobilization of funds to pay for energy and repairs) 
 the production of high-value cash-crop dependant on water supply 
Some of these factors, and how they played out in the NEN region, are illustrated in this section. 
6.1 Elections, board nomination and political interference 
A democratic process for the selection of user representatives and a directive board seems to 
be a desirable feature of legal WUA frameworks. These almost invariably have provisions for 
the election of user representatives as General Assembly members and for board positions 
(president, secretary, and treasurer). Democratic procedures for choosing and removing leaders 
and staff members are important in creating healthy relations between farmers and formal 
organizations, and increase the legitimacy of the latter (Rzayev, 2007; Bruns and Taher, 2009). 
Yet, in many irrigation systems in Tunisia (Canessa, 2010; field visit to IFAD projects in Siliana 
and Zaghouan; see Box 6.1), Kazakhstan (Wegerich, 2008) and Morocco (Bergh, 2007), heads 
and staff members of WUAs are in fact appointed by the higher administration (e.g. local 
representative of the Ministry of Interior) or the cells of the ex-ruling party (in Tunisia). Elections 
are held but candidates often have to be anointed by the state. In Morocco, control over WUAs 
is also exerted through the obligatory nomination of a 7th board member (dubbed „the seventh 
man‟) by the Administration, as a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture according to the 
Article 12 of the Law no 02-84. In addition, Article 15 stipulates that other representatives of the 
government can have advisory roles if they wish so. The official reason for this dispositive is to 
facilitate communication with the government, whereby WUAs can raise questions, make 
inquiries, and ask for advice from technical staff. But in practice it was used as a means of 
imposing governmental decisions, and often as a means of serving the private interests of those 
at higher levels instead of the farmers‟ needs and interests. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
WUAs‟ decision-making is also somewhat dominated by local government structures (Kangur, 
2008). 
As could be expected, WUAs dominated by local or higher political power tend to lack internal 
legitimacy and be ineffective. Hellegers et al. (2007) observed, in the Tadla irrigation scheme, 
Morocco, a complete absence of communication between members and their representatives, 
and no visible difference in irrigation management between a sector managed by a WUA and a 
sector without a WUA. In the same scheme van Vuren et al. (2004) “observed that strong local 
leaders serve their own personal interests in disfavour of the “common” farmers”. 
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The election of WUA boards is therefore not unproblematic. The democratic nature of elections 
is affected by the high rate of illiteracy of farmers. More than 70 % are illiterate in the Tadla 
case, Morocco (van Vuren et al., 2004). In some cases WUA board members used their new 
position and power as springboards to political positions. In addition, interference from powerful 
people may jeopardize the performance of WUAs, which become „puppet organizations‟ (Bruns 
and Taher, 2009) serving the interests of the elite. In such organizations, elections may take 
place only to conform to the requested formal procedure. They are perhaps often a necessary 
step, but clearly not sufficient to ensure proper management of the WUAs and their 
representativeness. 
Box 6.1: IFAD case study in Siliana and Zaghouan (Tunisia): Political aspect of water 
management and its effect on the performance of WUAs 
The performance of GDAs (WUAs) in Tunisia is influenced by political interference. At the local 
level, El-Omda, who is a representative of the government, is the main link between the 
government and the farmers. He is involved in the management of natural resources and also in 
the political, social and economic life of the community. 
Before the revolution of 14 January 2011, local representatives of the ruling RCD party 
(Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique) had a determinant role in the decision-making 
and management of any activity related to the functioning of GDAs. They were also taking 
advantage of their administrative and political position to influence the decisions of the local 
representative of the Ministry of Agriculture (CRDA). The GDA‟s budget was also under the 
control of the RCD delegate, who would sometimes use its funds for some unrelated activity. 
This represented a significant drain on resources for WUAs, which already had financial 
difficulties. Many farmers attested that the main source of financial difficulties of the WUAs was 
related to corruption and abuse of power from the directors and managerial board, who served 
the interests of those at higher levels and their own interests, instead of representing the 
farmers‟ needs and interests. 
The RCD delegate and el Omda played also a role in appointing the heads and administrative 
committees of WUAs, proposing candidates which would support the interests and the 
orientations of the party, irrespective of their management capacity. They also interfered in the 
choice of potential beneficiaries of credit and financial subsidies. The GDA‟s board was rarely 
renewed. Consequently, the RCD delegate and el Omda ensured a control over the irrigation 
sector by exerting various pressures and intervening in the electoral process and the day-to-day 
management of the WUAs. After the revolution, farmers dismissed the GDAs in four of the 
projects visited. 
Source: field visits to PDARI of Siliana and Zaghouan, Tunisia (2012) 
6.2 Social homogeneity and ‘social capital’ 
Social capital and cohesion is found to be essential in the management of water resources from 
small to large irrigation systems. Some WUAs took root in a special environment characterized 
by a great tradition of social cohesion and mutual trust, e.g. the GDA of Jradou in Zaghouan 
(Tunisia). Although this reading may actually obscure the fact that cohesion was also related to 
the political control of the party in power, as identified in the last box (see Box 6.1). 
As evidenced also in chapter 4 about community systems, there is more diversity between 
farmers than often expected. Water users within a command area are usually considered as a 
homogenous group of people with similar interests and stakes in the system. This is not true 
given for example the very different stakes that the head-reach and the tail-end farmers have 
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and hence the difficulty in engineering successful farmer management in public irrigation 
systems (Facon, 2010). In Turkey, even though the heads and members are elected, big 
farmers close to political power are favoured by WUA management (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 
2011), which may not benefit social capital. The absence of „social capital‟ and the relatively 
new social fabric of settlements developed in new large-scale irrigated systems as in Egypt 
(West Nubaria) or in Jordan (Jordan valley) are a crucial obstacle to the establishment and 
durability of WUAs. 
Another well documented collective action problem is the impact of economic diversification on 
the individual incentives to contribute to collective action. It is difficult, for example, to obtain 
contributions in kind, like labour for cleaning grass and dredging small canal, from water users 
who are „Sunday farmers‟ and have another major economic activity. They will often pay money 
to the WUA instead of participating physically. The trend, anyway, is that most works are more 
easily done by machinery and this contributes to generalizing cash contributions instead of in-
kind ones. 
But absentee or disinterested farmers also impact water management because they are not 
always present to manage water when it is available. They may care less about the impact on 
yields because farming is simply not so important to them. Farmers in the Jordan Valley, for 
example, are quite heterogeneous, ranging from subsistence farmers to high-tech investors 
growing crops for exports, throughout to urban owners (Sunday farmers) who adopt extensive 
and labour-minimizing crops (e.g. citrus), and care more about the small house and swimming 
pool they have built in the middle of the grove for their week-end. 
Another factor that contributes to undermine social cohesiveness is the conjunctive use of 
water. Faced with insufficient and uncertain supply, farmers look for other water sources from 
which they can pump such as waterways, wetlands, and groundwater. Most large-scale 
schemes are now peppered with wells and individual pumps that provides farmers with a means 
to obviate the need for collective action. Often farmers who can dig deep wells or can pump 
directly from a drain, tend to detach themselves from the group and seek their autonomy. This is 
also very clear in Egypt, where groundwater use is quite frequent in the upstream part of the 
delta and where the use of drainage water increases as one moves downstream. In Morocco 
irrigation schemes accommodate thousands of tube wells and differential access to alternative 
sources translates in differential motivation to contribute to collective action. 
Another issue that pertains to social differentiation is how land owners and land users are 
considered in the official statuses of the WUAs. If only land owners are considered eligible as 
members then all tenants are excluded from the group, and this may undermine its functioning. 
If all cultivators are able to be member, irrespective of whether they own the land (e.g. 
Morocco), then difficulties often arise with regard to paying the membership or water fees, when 
it is not clear to whom and what these payments correspond. In case of short-term contracts 
too, it is difficult to have tenants adhere or contribute to collective action. 
6.3 Leadership 
In communal irrigation systems the quality of management is often closely dependent on the 
personality and level of initiative of leaders. The success and sustainability of WUAs were found 
to depend largely on the “right kind of multiple local leadership” (Pant, 2008). According to Pant 
(2008), leaders are “such rural elites who had local influence, high socio-economic status but 
who had a propensity to come forward to work for a common good where they could derive 
advantage for themselves also in some common good”. 
In Sudan, the presence of a strong local branch of the farmers' union and supportive political 
leadership were factors of success of farmers-managed systems (Samad, 1996). For 
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Kazakhstan also the strong leadership in some WUAs in Osh Province contributed to their 
relatively better performance (Kazbekov et al., 2009). In the Nubaria project, Egypt, three of the 
five WUAs considered as successful (see Box 6.2) displayed very strong leadership. Likewise, 
the three WUAs (out of 11) of the Tadla scheme, Morocco, found by Freitas (1996) to show 
some activity and to be promising were all characterized by a strong leadership. 
In contrast, poor leadership may jeopardize WUAs‟ performance when direct farmer 
participation in WUAs‟ governance is weak and when political appointees are elected as 
“leaders”. 
What is important is that the authority to exercise strong leadership is derived from the 
community or the constituency of water users. When building on existing irrigation 
organizations, the source of authority that legitimates (strong) leadership ideally remains 
internal. However, in practice this kind of leadership is often dependent also on external actors 
such as the state, donors, projects or particular political and economic elites. Since the 
examples of strong leadership sometimes come from countries with an authoritarian political 
regime, it is possible that what some may see as strong leadership would, for others, qualify as 
authoritarian leadership. How to distinguish these depends on the source of authority but is also 
a matter of interpretation and depends on the observer. Of course, this will also influence the 
assessment of its beneficial role for improving the performance of a WUA or vice versa. 
6.4 WUA’s capacity and commitment 
The quality of WUA management is linked to the capacity and professionalism of the staff and 
the degree of commitment of the WUA‟s members to their organization. It is crucial for a 
management board to have management skills, know how to solve disputes, a technical staff 
that can deal with technical problems and an administrative staff that is responsible for fee 
collection. Hence, it is important to create new competencies among managers, technicians and 
administrators and capacity building and training therefore seems crucial (see also section 7.3). 
However, a main difficulty is to get qualified and committed personnel for leading positions, 
when they are paid little or nothing for the job (Sehring, 2005). In the case of technical staff this 
can be resolved more easily when their salaries are derived from the irrigation fees paid by 
members. These technicians have to work extremely hard to meet members‟ expectations. 
“Farmers want to see those whom they trust and hire for day-to-day management of their 
irrigation systems as somebody who can make their life easier” (Yakubov, 2011). 
The case of Tadla scheme in Morocco shows that WUAs which were inactive for years, became 
more active again when a younger and more informed generation became involved in irrigation 
Box 6.2: IFAD case study in the in West-Nubaria (Egypt): Strong leadership 
The key to the success of this WUU was building on an irrigation organization that was 
functioning before the IFAD intervention. Central was that the head of the WUU played a central 
role in the organization of irrigation rotations and the control over the pump station keys. To 
participate in the irrigation schedule, each farmer had to ask for the key from the head and give 
it back to him once finishing the allocated time. The authority for this position was legitimate, 
because the farmers recognized the importance of this agreed role to sustain the rules of water 
distribution. Because of the strong leadership and in spite of repetitive power cuts and water 
leakages from the lined but broken mesqa canals, water conflicts between farmers were very 
scarce. Before the establishment of the WUU and the decision to give this role to the leader, 
frequent verbal conflicts and heavy physical confrontations between farmers were reported. 
Source: field visits to WNRDP, Egypt (2012)  
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management (Faysse et al., 2010). Kadiri et al. (2009a) showed also that the competitive 
recruitment of young graduates had played an important role in the improvement of 
management in the Moyen Sebou irrigation scheme in Morocco. They simplified administrative 
procedures whilst maintaining a sufficient degree of freedom to adapt the rules in place when 
needed. Newly hired young technicians improved day-to-day management and learned to deal 
with routine management practices, but also reacted more quickly to emergencies (breakdowns 
of canals, pumps). 
However, the capacity and level of commitment of WUAs is also the result of the centralization 
of water management that undermined the role of local organizations in water management. In 
cases with a strong presence of central governments and their local representatives, farmers 
may have very little confidence in their own ability to perform the necessary tasks. For example 
in Egypt, water users strongly believe that the government is the most capable to perform O&M 
and does it more cheaply and do not want to be responsible for it (Moustafa, 2004). This form of 
dependence is clearly a product of state intervention and centralization in water management, 
because farmers were capable of local irrigation management before, but were increasingly 
made dependent on external sources of expertise, technology and authority. A lack of 
confidence is also noticed in Kyrgyzstan where farmers were uncertain about how to form and 
operate a sustainable WUA, because of the lack of experience with independent farmer 
organizations in the Soviet era (Johnson III et al., 2002). 
Box 6.3: IFAD project in Azerbaijan: Fee collection for the government? 
Are WUAs created for water users or for the government? In the North-East Development 
Project (NEDP) of Azerbaijan, the general level of knowledge of the members about WUAs is 
limited. Even though WUAs have already shown to be quite effective in collecting water fees, 
they have been less effective in informing members about the purpose or use of the fees. This 
will become increasingly important as fees are increased over time. As a consequence, the 
WUA is mainly seen as an organization to distribute water and collect the water fees for the 
State Amelioration and Irrigation Committee (SAIC), rather than a genuine farmer-led 
organization with the mandate of managing irrigation and drainage infrastructure. In this case 
the need for a WUA is thus more externally driven than internally. 
Source: Appraisal Report of the NEDP, Azerbaijan (2004) 
Instead of becoming strong autonomous organizations, many WUAs remain dependent on 
external sources of finance, expertise and authority. They continue to depend on project 
activities and financial resources particularly subsidies for capital investment costs of building 
and improving major infrastructure. Many experiences showed that WUAs that were created 
with donor support became inactive or disappeared a few years after the end of the project. In 
such cases, organizations exist only on paper with little or no commitment and support from 
members. 
In many cases that we have reviewed, the formal creation of WUAs is just as instrumental to 
external interests as reflecting an internal urge for collective action. In several cases WUAs 
helped the achievement of projects‟ objectives. Bruns and Taher (2009) reported that in surface 
and groundwater irrigation projects in Yemen “WUOs have initiated requests, mobilized 
resources, and taken part in planning and implementing projects for rural water supply and for 
surface irrigation. For groundwater irrigation, WUOs have facilitated provision of pipes and other 
subsidized irrigation equipment intended to reduce water consumption, and helped improve 
awareness that groundwater resources are limited and being depleted”. In the case of Gezira 
project in Sudan, the farmer‟s unions supported the project and provided effective support to the 
farmers‟ training. Successive participatory approaches are believed to have built farmers‟ 
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confidence and proved that they can successfully handle the O&M provided that they received 
adequate training (Abdelhadi et al., 2004). 
In such cases it is hard to judge the actual level of activity of WUAs. The frequency of formal 
meetings (most of formal farmers unions have to organize an annual general assembly, elect 
WUA office holders, approve budget and work plan) does not reflect actual collective action. In 
the PDARI of Siliana and Zaghouan, Tunisia, informal interactions were shown to be very 
important (see Box 6.4). 
Box 6.4: IFAD case study in Siliana and Zaghouan (Tunisia): Formal and informal meetings 
What does the number of formal meetings really reflect? GDAs (WUAs) in Tunisia have to hold 
at least an annual meeting to establish their budget and plan their main O&M activities. The 
regularity of formal routine meetings varies widely within the different GDAs from monthly, to 
quarterly, or half yearly or yearly, and may depend on the willingness to follow the Ministry of 
Agriculture‟s rules. Formal meetings are also called and aimed by the RCD party representative 
and el Omda for the approval of the budget, and especially for decisions in political matters. 
There are also meetings called by the Ministry for the training of board members, or sensitizing 
farmers to the importance of issues such as paying water fees to allow the WUAs to pay 
invoices of the company of electricity (STEG). Generally it is the president, the treasurer and 
few other members who regularly attend the formal meetings. 
The decision to call for a formal meeting is also triggered by problems such as conflicts between 
farmers, requests for the extension of the irrigated area, repair of big breaks on the pumps or in 
the irrigation network, etc. and these matter more to farmers in general. But such indicator can 
be misleading, and informal meetings at cafés and other places, or even phone calls, be more 
important than the formal gatherings. In the seventeen GDAs visited, the number of informal 
meetings was found to be much higher than formal ones. 
After the revolution in 23% of visited GDAs farmers have broken with board members due to the 
declared corruption and abuse of power. 
Source: field visits to the PDARI of Zaghouan and Siliana, Tunisia (2012) 
6.5 The origin of the WUA 
A history of „informal‟ farmer-managed irrigation has a strong impact on a WUA and its 
performance. Formal WUAs often build on the basis of customary organizations, in which rules 
for equitable water distribution often existed. These are more likely to be more effective than 
those built during and after soviet times in Central Asia, without any direct local experience in 
water management and replacing centralist structures of water management. For example, in 
the Province of Khorezm in Uzbekistan, associations were not participatory, with neither 
collective decision-making on water allocation nor equal water distribution. As a consequence, 
the WUAs tended to keep relying on the old structure of the collective farm which was still 
powerful (Wegerich, 2002). Another example comes from Azerbaijan (see Box 6.5). In contrast, 
Vidal et al. (2006) indicate that the management of modernized lined mesqa (tertiary canals) in 
Beni Ibeid command area situated in middle Egypt has been successful, mainly because 
farmers were informally organized before the modernization. 
Box 6.5: IFAD project in Azerbaijan: Influence of history and context on the WUA‟s performance 
The organization of farmers in the six pilot areas into WUAs was successfully achieved and the 
WUA model was replicated outside the pilot areas. Nevertheless, the adoption of WUAs is not 
without problem. One issue is the capacity of ex-farm workers turned farm owners to take 
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appropriate farm management decisions. Another issue is the impact of the power structure and 
operating procedures of the former authoritarian farm management on the WUAs. The people in 
positions of power have become important interest groups that continue to play a role. 
Nevertheless a sense of ownership of land and irrigation facilities is developing among 
members of WUAs. 
Source: Country strategic opportunities Programme (COSOP), Azerbaijan (2003) 
6.6 Accountability and transparency 
Successful and sustainable WUAs need to keep transparent and accountable records of 
irrigation service fees. This is crucial for the legitimacy of the WUA and to ensure farmers‟ 
willingness to pay for services. In some cases in Kazakhstan farmers complained that the fee 
system was not transparent and that irrigation tariffs may vary from turn to turn or from farmer to 
farmer.  
In Tunisia, the actual institutional framework makes the control of WUAs‟ revenues and 
expenditures a difficult task, allowing for financial irregularities and the forging of bills (Field visit 
to IFAD projects). Transparency also involves a „right to know‟ about the relevant details of 
organizational action, which requires record keeping especially regarding the flow and 
distribution of water, services and money (Ul Hassan et al., 2004). 
Box 6.6: Lack of accountability of the WUA‟s Executive Committee in Gash, Sudan 
The Executive Committee (EC) of the WUA of Tendelai is reported not to be accountable to its 
constituency and to mismanage the WUA‟s land. This occurs in the context of a project to 
improve spate systems around the Gash river. The EC was accused of alienating land from their 
members. It allocated 570 feddan covered with mesquite (an invasive shrub) for the Association 
members, but reserved and captured 685 feddan of good land for themselves (season 
2007/2008). This problem of power abuse was discovered during the harvest season and the 
case is now in court. 
Source: Mid Term Review Report of the GSLRP, Sudan (2008) 
6.7 Diversification of activities and horizontal integration 
WUAs can improve their financially viability by diversifying their activities and integrating 
horizontally in a wider market. The extension of services by WUAs beyond irrigation can include 
other services such as input supply, credit, storage and marketing to generate extra revenues. 
This is widely believed to strengthen the WUAs through the provision of additional incentives to 
their members (Meinzen-Dick, 1997). A WUA with strong leadership and social cohesion can be 
able to innovate and diversify its activities (case of Jradou in Tunisia, see Box 6.7). 
Most of the WUAs in the NEN region are still single-purpose organizations. Nevertheless, there 
are several examples of WUAs taking up other commercial activities to diversify their sources of 
income and meet the needs of members for other services. For example in Morocco, some 
WUAs started to supply water to farmers located outside the official irrigation system, while 
charging them higher fees, although this practice remained informal and even illegal (Errahj et 
al., 2009). Another example in Tunisia, in the IFAD project of Zaghouan, showed the importance 
of additional revenues for full cost recovery and also in getting lower cost services, like inputs 
and seed provision closer to the farmers (see Box 6.7). The staff of this WUA as well as the 
Ministry of Agriculture underlined the importance of such commercial activities in the financial 
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viability of the WUA, since it is the only organization which has been able to accumulate reserve 
funds to solve future needs for major repairs and renewal. 
International organizations also promote successful examples of horizontal integration. The 
Gezira scheme is an interesting case where the FAO deposited seed money for a revolving fund 
used to buy various inputs. The willingness to pay back, to keep the revolving fund alive for the 
next season, was estimated to be 80%. The high recovery rate was achieved thanks to 
measures like grants for farmers with satisfactory field performance, and the financial committee 
had the right to recover the money from the payment for cotton production directly from the 
Gezira scheme administration office (Abdelhadi et al., 2004). From a donor perspective, the 
emphasis on WUAs and their economic diversification is to improve their sustainability after a 
project. To survive under post-project conditions, the development of a different mix of 
commercial activities can be considered as a means of getting farmers and their organizations 
more independent from project activities and resources. 
One of the reasons why only few multi-purpose WUAs are operating in the region is related to 
the legal framework. Indeed, not many countries provide a legal framework that enable WUAs, 
or Federations of WUAs, to receive extra revenues. For example in Turkey there was a lack of a 
legal basis for forming Federations of WUAs for joint purchase and supply of maintenance 
equipment or inputs (Svendsen and Nott, 2000). In Egypt, while some BCWUAs could act as 
service providers for small maintenance works, this was not generalized and only made 
possible for pilot projects, with an ad hoc provincial decree. In the Jordan Valley, the WUAs 
enjoyed more flexibility since they were built as entities under the Cooperative Law. 
Box 6.7: IFAD case study of Jradou, Zaghouan (Tunisia): Successful diversification of revenues 
The GDA of Jradou manages 60 hectares divided into two irrigation schemes (Jradou and Aïn 
Faouara) each served by a tubewell. Noteworthy in this case is a tradition of social cohesion 
and mutual trust that enables the organization to expand its activities. 
The WUA of Jradou is involved in buying agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers and 
selling them at preferential rates to members. The WUA is also involved in applying for a loan 
from a local NGO to provide input loans to WUA members, especially for buying livestock, 
sheep and cattle or material for making handicrafts. The rate of loan reimbursement exceeds 
95%, with 150 beneficiaries in 2010. Other commercial activities include selling irrigation water 
to other WUAs, selling water to the drinking water municipal company, renting a plot for the 
deposit of olive residues, exploiting a quarry, running a plant nursery, etc. 
The GDA also grants other incentives to farmers, for example prizes for the best sheep 
breeders and training activities for farmers on topics such as beekeeping, sheep breeding and 
pruning of olive trees. These trainings have been initiated within the IFAD project. 
The board also found a strong incentive for farmers to pay irrigation fees, as only farmers who 
do not have debts with the WUA can apply for loans. For example, a farmer sold a sheep to pay 
his irrigation bill in order to be eligible for loans. 
The local representative of the Ministry of Agriculture (CRDA) attested that the WUA of Jradou 
is the only WUA, among a total of 120 (of which 19 were created or strengthened by IFAD 
project), which covers all its O&M running costs and even unexpected expenditures. The 
financial report of 2010 showed a net gain of 20,279 Tunisian Dinar (~$13,000). The 
diversification of activities thus strengthens WUAs by providing a more regular income, not 
exclusively linked to irrigation activities. 
Source: field visit to the PDARI of Zaghouan, Tunisia (2012) 
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Investment in marketing improvement to ensure higher profit margins for producers is needed to 
escape from the vicious circle, whereby farmers who cannot make money from irrigation will not 
pay their fees, WUAs will not be able to take on O&M tasks due to the low rate of collected fees, 
the infrastructure will deteriorate continuously causing more pressure on the resource, which in 
return will impact farmers‟ income. In Azerbaijan farmers and WUAs concluded agreements at 
the beginning of the vegetation period on the marketing of their agriculture product, which would 
then also secure the payment of their fees (Rzayev, 2007). This is a solution to escape from the 
vicious circle. However, WUAs must also have adequate infrastructure and markets, information 
about price policies of agricultural inputs, energy and outputs to be able to diversify their 
activities (see Box 6.8). 
Box 6.8: IFAD case study in Zaghouan (Tunisia): Necessity of market infrastructure in Tunisia 
WUAs and farmers reported the difficulty of accessing markets to sell their irrigated produce, 
mainly because of a lack of marketing infrastructure (like roads and refrigerators) and the 
inexperience of farmers. The difficulty of selling vegetables together with a high price for water 
and inputs put the farmers in a difficult financial situation. Most of them become indebted to 
agricultural banks and their WUAs; and thus cannot benefit from new loans. The key issue for 
them is the necessity to improve input- and output- markets. 
All WUAs established within the IFAD projects in Tunisia, reported that marketing of irrigated 
products especially perishable ones was one of their major concern and expressed a pressing 
need for such services. 
An example of successful diversification through the marketing of pumpkin seeds comes from 
Sidi el Fawar. The GDA there irrigates 44 hectares based on a tube-well system and three 
separate distribution networks. Six years ago the former president (a retired engineer) contacted 
the Baddar company which buys pumpkin seeds produced in the scheme. Because most of the 
scheme is planted with olive trees, whose shade is not favourable to pumpkin cultivation, the 
scheme area was expanded in a controlled manner, with additional plots duly registered and 
monitored, and water allocations defined and controlled by the GDA. Although some restrictions 
in water supply must sometime be implemented, farmers abide by the regulation because they 
depend on the GDA to market their seeds. 
Cultivation, harvesting, and collection of seeds are done in coordination with the GDA which 
store bags bearing the name of each producer in silos. Their content is transferred (within a 
maximum of three days) to the company to be washed and conditioned. The rest of the 
pumpkins is given to cows or transformed in organic fertilizer. Farmers can only be member of 
the scheme if they adopt micro-irrigation (with 60% subsidies). The system is fully operated and 
maintained by the GDA, but in case of emergencies, voluntary additional contributions are 
made. Each farmer is also responsible for maintaining the part of the network in its plot. 
Meetings at the GDA are quite frequent (~once a month). 
After IFAD‟s intervention yields and irrigated areas have increased, and labour needs have 
decreased thanks to a better and more predictable water supply. Contracting with the Baddar 
company allowed for an increase in farmers‟ as well as in the GDA‟s income. 
Source: Field visits to Zaghouan and Siliana, Tunisia (2012) 
The multiple commercial services that WUAs can offer can include fertilizer, pesticide and seed 
supply, sale and repair of on-farm irrigation equipments, animal husbandry, transport facilities 
(e.g. refrigerated vehicles), crop processing and storage, marketing, contract farming, loans, 
incentives, etc. However functional diversification generates its own risks and requires 
professional management and considerable knowledge of purchasing and marketing practices, 
but also strong social capital among the members of the WUAs, and transparency in financial 
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management, with rules and legal frameworks to regulate services and help prevent financial 
abuse. 
Financial management is a very important issue (for more details see Pradhan, 2002b). Most 
single-purpose organizations already have problems in this area and lack managerial skills. 
Many factors may govern the effectiveness of multi-function organizations especially the 
capacity to provide the requested services at the right time and with an attractive price, ensuring 
farmer‟s trust and willingness to pay for these services. In conclusion, WUAs need to be fully 
developed and to possess strong managerial and financial skills before diversifying and 
expanding their services. 
Box 6.9: IFAD‟s project in Azerbaijan: The need for marketing and credit facilities 
The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the centralized marketing and credit channels. 
Experience under the Farm Privatization Project (FPP) shows that the limited marketing 
possibilities and poor links to markets are impoverishing the rural sector. The farm sector suffers 
from both a weak demand from local markets (with competition from high-quality imported 
goods as a result of the expanding oil sector and liberalization of import policies) and the failure 
to export to international markets. Subsistence production reduces the scope for marketing 
agricultural produce, limits potential farm investment, and may lead to severe indebtedness. The 
sector should be helped to improve its competitiveness through increased productivity, better 
quality and reduced costs. Product processing would also help add value to the production. 
Establishing farmer organizations and other rural institutions (WUAs, credit unions, etc.) and 
supporting these through business training, skills transfer and credit would allow farmers to 
exploit economies of scale in production and marketing and improve their negotiating power 
both on the market and with the Government. 
Source: Country Strategic Opportunities Paper, Azerbaijan(2003) 
 
Box 6.10: The introduction of cash crops in Sudan 
“The introduction of cash crops should be supported: Introduction of cash crop is highly in 
demand from all farmers and their organizations. Such cash crops include hybrid/high yielding 
sorghum varieties instead of the local variety aklamoe with limited market options, sunflower, 
sesame, groundnuts. PCU should commission a study to assess the farming profitability using 
alternative crop mixes as well as marketing margins. Based on the results of study, the 
extension service of SMOA will communicate the message to the WUAs and farmers. SMOA 
and GAS will then assist with marketing promotion. Microfinance should also be used to support 
the cash crops introduction plans for the farmers. However, given the marketing risks of cash 
crops, the microfinance portfolio for this activity should be developed cautiously. In this context, 
warehouse receipts system should be explored by the Project and ABS, to ensure credit supply 
by mitigating the marketing risks associated with cash crop. Depending on the nature of cash 
crops which are introduced the possibility of supporting processing units should also be 
explored”. 
Source: Midterm Review Mission (Discussion Paper-Draft) of the GSLRP, Sudan (2008) 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed a number of internal factors that determine the performance of 
WUAs. It has looked at the role of: 
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- elections, board nominations and political interference, 
- social homogeneity and social capital, 
- leadership, 
- the capacity of WUA staff and commitment of members, 
- the origin of the WUA 
- accountability and transparency 
- diversification and horizontal integration 
These factors revolve around basic issues concerning the organizational set-up of WUAs and its 
structural organization, membership criteria, group dynamics and origin that are also discussed 
in the literature (see section 3.4) (Jordans, 2001; Hodgson, 2003; Wegerich, 2010). 
The chapter emphasizes the need for WUAs to build on an existing organizational basis and 
social capital, have democratic and transparent organizational structures, recognize informal 
capacities, relationships and meetings, diversify its revenue sources and horizontally integrate 
into a wider market. 
From an operational focus on internal strengths and weaknesses of WUAs, this chapter has 
emphasized that in the process of reform these internal factors are strongly associated with 
external factors. This may enhance but also hamper the development of WUAs. A balance 
needs to be struck here, since the attempt to increase the WUA‟s sources of revenue, support 
and service provision, may also increase its dependence on external sources of financial 
resources, power and expertise. When external interests start to dominate the internal 
organizational dynamic, this does not favour WUA‟s internal accountability, organizational 
performance and long-term sustainability. Several examples have illustrated this: 
 the interference the state official and political bodies in the WUA elections and 
management 
 when strong leadership depends more on external actors such as the state, donors, 
projects or particular elites than on an authority derived from the constituency of water 
users 
 a strong presence of central governments and bureaucratic agencies in local water 
management that undermined local competencies and commitment to collective action 
 when the WUA is seen to serve the state‟s interests more than being a farmer-led 
organization 
 the WUA reinforces the status quo and serves interest of existing power groups and its 
beneficiaries that already have inequitable access to water and other resources 
 WUAs remain dependent on external project activities and financial resources, rather 
than becoming financially autonomous organizations 
 the diversification strategy and horizontal expansion into wider markets also implies an 
external dependence 
The dominance of external over internal factors that we have observed in many cases reflects 
the fact that WUAs are often created or formalized to serve external interests, rather than 
offering an enabling framework for internal collective action. 
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7 External factors and policy implementation 
It is well identified that the effectiveness of WUAs depends on its institutional environment, how 
the PIM/IMT is implemented, the attention given to physical rehabilitation, capacity-building, the 
attributions, tasks and rights of the associations. The external environment also includes the 
wider waterscape –often a river basin- where water is produced, captured, diverted and 
conveyed to the head works of the irrigation scheme. 
7.1 Legal framework and definition of roles 
The legal framework (or the lack thereof) is seemingly a key factor determining the success of 
WUA development. At least this is an ubiquitous statement in the IMT literature (McCornick and 
Merrey, 2005; Vermillion 1991; Svendsen and Vermillion 1996; Hodgson, 2007; see Box 7.1 on 
Azerbaijan, for an illustration). This framework must clearly define the procedures for creating 
WUAs, their membership, financial autonomy, right to open a bank account, the manner in 
which activities should be regulated, the rights and duties of each party, the rights to water, the 
ownership of irrigation facilities, whether economic diversification and revenue generation is 
possible, etc. It is crucial, for example, to know who is eligible to be a member and, in particular, 
the situation of those who farm the land but have no legal rights to the land (tenants), ethnic 
groups, other water users, etc. WUA membership is sometimes restricted to landowners. 
Simple and transparent operating rules that everyone knows, understands and accepts are 
believed to be key to a successful framework (Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001). But the legal 
framework also needs to be flexible enough to allow farmers to adapt their formal organizations 
to local conditions (Meinzen-Dick, 1997). In contrast we often observe situations where multiple 
formal institutions overlap and conflict with one another (see Box 7.2, for an example from 
Sudan). 
Box 7.1: Inadequacy of the legal framework in Azerbaijan 
“One of the major reasons for WUAs not to function satisfactorily is the lack of a proper legal 
framework for the establishment and sustainable operation of WUAs. There is no specific legal 
framework for WUAs in the current legislation. There are only a couple of references to WUAs in 
the Law on Amelioration and Irrigation (Law No. 116-IQ, dated June 5, 1996) and others 
subordinate legislation. The Law on Amelioration and Irrigation makes a provision (Article 24) 
that farmers could establish WUAs to manage irrigation facilities within the boundaries of the 
former State and collective farms. However the law provides no detail as to how WUAs are to 
be established or operated. The only other references to WUAs are in subordinate legislation 
and these too are little more than passing references. The existing WUAs are in fact companies 
or, to be more specific, limited liability enterprises established in accordance with the Law on 
Limited Liability Enterprises, dated December 29, 1998. From a legal perspective they are not 
'associations' at all and they are basically free to undertake any kind of lawful commercial 
activity. The standard model charter, which was developed with the assistance of the FPP 
(Farm Privatization Project) and has been approved by the Government, would not be adequate 
for the proposed project. Even if it was to be revised, the fact remains that the limited liability 
enterprise is not a suitable legal form on which to base the establishment of WUAs” (Azerbaijan, 
2004). 
----------------- 
“An appropriate legal framework was drafted in early 2003 and approved in June 2004. The 
amended Law on Amelioration and irrigation contains a special chapter, consisting of 15 
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articles, regulating the foundation, registration, organization and supervision of WUAs in 
Azerbaijan. The law also provides for the transfer in use of the former on-farm irrigation systems 
to WUAs and for the latter to be supplied with bulk irrigation on the basis of long term (20 year) 
water supply contracts” (World Bank, 2011). 
 
Box 7.2: Unclear roles and responsibilities in Sudan 
Confusion over roles and responsibilities is a prominent constraint to the reform process in the 
Gash area. “This is the result of the large number of actors (Gash Agricultural Scheme or Gash 
Development Authority (GAS), Gash Sustainable Livelihoods Regeneration Project (GSLRP), 
River Training Unit of the Ministry of Irrigation, WUAs , Farmers Union, Mahaliya, Coordinator of 
the WUAs) compounded with the absence of clarity over roles and responsibilities. One 
question continuously raised by members of WUAs is: who is responsible for WUAs and if there 
is a problem where to go? This is complicated by the situation of the GAS itself, and its lack of a 
clear job description, and the lack of relevant structures to implement the reform process. The 
boundaries between the WUAs and the Farmers Union are also very confused by the fact that 
most of the Farmers Union members have several hats, i.e., they are in most instances the 
leaders of the WUAs, the Block Committee and the very recently established Higher Council for 
WUAs. The WUAs Coordinator lacks a clear job description and his role and responsibilities are 
not clear; the institutional link of the job and its relevance within the existing structure of the 
GAS are not only confused but also questionable”. 
Source: Mid Term Review Report of the GSLRP, Sudan (2008) 
We may, however, use our sample of countries to revisit the relationship between legal 
frameworks and outcomes of the reforms. The situation with regard to the legal framework of 
WUAs in the different countries is summarized in the following table. 
Table 1: Legal framework for WUAs in different countries of the NEN region 
Morocco Participatory management of irrigation has its roots within the (often old) community-
managed irrigation systems. The Law no 02-84 of December 1990, complemented by an 
application decree in May 1992 (see details in Appendix volume), specifies the legal 
status of AUEAs. Their main duties are management and maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure, with a heavy emphasis on the definition of financial contribution and 
commitments to pay. No other activity is mentioned for WUAs, nor what the state 
provides in exchange. 
Algeria The Law n° 05-12 of 4 August 2005 calls for the inclusion of representatives of the 
administration, local authorities, and the different categories of users in the management 
of irrigation schemes. The 3rd article stipulates that the „different categories of users‟ 
need to support the issues related to the use and protection of water resources and 
water management at the level of the hydraulic unit they are responsible for. Since 2006, 
a monitoring committee has been created in each large scale scheme to promote 
participatory irrigation management. In small scale systems, user associations are now a 
prerequisite to any state intervention in hydraulic infrastructure (Belkateb, 2012). 
Tunisia In Tunisia, WUAs (GDAs) are under tutelage of three ministries (agriculture, finance and 
interior) which makes their operation a difficult task. Under the Law 2004-24 of March 15 
(2004), GDAs are supposed to be financially autonomous and responsible for 
implementing, operating and maintaining irrigation and water-supply systems. Each GDA 
is responsible for setting its own budget, fixing the water price and collecting fees to 
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cover the running costs of WUAs and deal with unexpected expenditures. GDAs can 
have diversified activities.. 
Egypt Initially WUAs had no legal status, which among other things constrained their ability to 
levy money and act as independent bodies with full private ownership of the mesqa level 
infrastructures. This changed in 1994 with the modification of the 1984 Law 12, wherein 
WUAs were defined as legal organisations at the mesqa level in the improved irrigation 
systems (IIP) in the old lands, while similarly Water Users Unions (WUUs) were made 
legal entities for the New Lands. The Bylaws of Law 213 (Decree No 14900 of 1995) 
detailed the rights and duties of the WUAs and WUUs (they can in particular collect fee 
and enter in contractual arrangements). A similar law for BCWUAs (at secondary level) 
has long been considered but has not yet been passed. 
Sudan Sudan started experimenting with WUAs in the Abdel Hakam Pilot project from 2000 
onwards. With the Gezira Act of 2005, the water management at tertiary level of the 
Gezira Scheme was turned over to WUAs. In 2010, a policy declaration replaced the 
Sudan Gezira Board and reduced the role of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Resources by transferring their responsibilities to a new Gezira Scheme Management 
Board, which outsources a number of O&M tasks to private companies. 
Jordan Jordan‟s Water Strategy 2008-2012 specifies that by 2022, “Jordan will have one service 
provider for irrigation water for the whole country, whereas the retail function for irrigation 
water will be privatized and/or handled by empowered farmers‟ associations”. After trying 
a number of informal but traditional forms like the “water council” and “water delegation”, 
associations were formed as “agricultural cooperatives for water users” under the 
umbrella of the Cooperative Law. This law requires fees and financial deposits before 
registration. A specific WUAs by-law is required to define their rights and duties; it has 
been drafted but not passed so far (Salman et al., 2008). 
Lebanon No formal status for WUAs. Existing ones are either informal and managing communal 
schemes, or set up under particular aid and development projects (either as 
cooperatives or without legal status). 
Syria Since 1969 the government promoted what it called a participatory system of association 
management (Kaisi and Yasser, 2004). Recently, the government has adopted a range 
of measures and polices, aiming at the sustainable development of water resources and 
the establishment of WUAs, as well as the activation of existing ones. The Presidential 
Resolution no 31 of the 6 November 2005 defines in the eleventh chapter the WUAs, 
their responsibilities and the process to be followed for their formation. Not much details 
can be found about these dispositions and how they are implemented. 
Turkey The transfer of small-scale and marginal irrigation systems was made possible under the 
Turkish Water Law of the 1950s. From 1993 onwards, most Irrigation Associations (IAs) 
were formed under the Municipal Law 1580. This implied that they fell under the Ministry 
of the Interior. After 2000, several law renovations were proposed but not enacted. In 
2005, the Local Administration Act 5355 dedicates a special section to IAs. Article 19 
specifically mentions the Irrigation Association for the first time in Turkish legal history. 
2011 saw the enactment of a new Irrigation Associations Law, which strengthened DSIs 
supervisory role over IAs by redefining their status from „local administration 
associations‟ to „public legal entities‟, subjecting them to an administrative and technical 
audit and opening the possibility of taking its management back or outsourcing it to the 
private sector. 
Kyrgyzstan The first legal foundation for WUAs was provided by the 1995 government decree 
“Regulations on WUAs in Rural Areas” and the 1997 “Statute of WUAs in Rural Areas“. 
The latter regulates the transfer of on-farm infrastructure to WUAs, allows water trading, 
stipulates bookkeeping and fees, and enables the WUA to impose sanctions in the case 
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of a breach of regulations. Based on these decrees the “Law on Water User 
Associations” in 2002 - provided the basis for WUAs to take over irrigation management 
and infrastructure development (Sehring, 2005; Kazbekov et al., 2009). The first WUAs 
were created in the mid-1990s with support of the ADB, FAO and the Japanese 
government and the subsequent rapid country-wide development of WUAs occurred 
under World Bank and ADB support. In 2000, Kyrgyzstan created a WUA support 
department at the Water Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. The “well-established” 
legal and institutional framework of Kyrgyzstan reflects the accepted wisdom among 
donors at the time, but it is difficult to assess what the practical value is of water trading, 
infrastructural development and contracts by WUAs and farmers, given their actual 
financial, infrastructural and water access conditions. 
Uzbekistan The most important legal document in relation to WUAs is the Decree no. 8, which was 
enacted in 2002. This piece of legislation concerns Agricultural Enterprises in general, 
but identifies the WUAs as responsible entity for IMT, clarifies who are the water users 
and what are WUAs, and defines the rules and relations regarding water use. The legal 
basis of WUA establishment and operation, as well as its rights and obligations are 
further based on a long list of legislative documents including the Constitution, Civil 
Code, the Law on Individual Farms and the Law on Water and Water Use, several other 
laws and a set of Model WUA Bylaws, Agreements and Contracts. There is no 
comprehensive law specifically related to WUAs, clearly defining them as specific legal 
non-governmental and non-commercial entities, which weakens their actual 
organizational status. It is also not clear up to what level of the irrigation systems, WUAs 
become fully responsible for operation, maintenance and fee collection. In 2006 ADB 
made a set of recommendations to the government to renew the legal situation of WUAs, 
but we were unable to ascertain to what new legislation this has led (ADAS, 2006, 
Sputnikmusings, 2010). 
Azerbaijan WUAs are mentioned in passing in the Law on Amelioration and Irrigation (Law No. 116-
IQ, 1996). WUAs were first established as limited liability enterprises established in 
accordance with the Law on Limited Liability Enterprises, dated December 29, 1998. 
From a legal perspective they are not 'associations' at all and they are basically free to 
undertake any kind of lawful commercial activity. To put them under an elected board 
accountable to members, an amendment to the 1996 law was passed in 2004 (as part of 
a World-Bank supported project). All WUAs were subsequently re-registered under the 
new Law. 
Yemen Following the 2002 water Law, a 2011 bylaw defines WUAs/WUGs as “assembly of 
water users who organize their efforts with the purpose for participation in water 
resources management and contribution in finance, management, maintenance and 
operation of water and irrigation projects and structures” which is required „to assist 
NWRA (National Water Resources Authority) in implementing water rules through 
dealing with a single community based organization‟. Other articles strengthen the fact 
that they are under state authority and do not recognize the self organizing power of 
local communities. Many types of community organizations exist and varied community 
initiatives in local water management are observed. Whether formal WUAs will make a 
difference remains to be seen. 
 
While there is a wide consensus that reforms need to be firmly based on a specific WUA law, it 
is apparent that a country like Jordan has been able to use the existing Cooperative Law to 
develop partly successful WUAs in the Jordan Valley. Likewise, in the absence of specific 
status, a few associations were created in Lebanon using the status of Cooperative (although it 
is not reported whether this was suitable or generated constraints). Furthermore the situation in 
the New Lands of Nubaria, in Egypt, (see Box 7.3 and case study in Volume 2) illustrates that 
most of the tasks that are supposed to be carried out by WUAs are indeed handled by the 
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Cooperative, which wields more power to make farmers pay for services (see also § ‎5.3). This 
strongly suggests that instead of creating new associations, that quickly become dysfunctional, 
it might have been wiser to make use of exiting Cooperatives and help them widen their 
attributions. 
Box 7.3: IFAD case study in Nubaria, Egypt: Lack of power 
Many WUAs have been established at the tertiary level in the New lands of Nubaria, in the 
western part of the Nile delta. WUAs have no power to apply sanctions on individuals who 
abuse water distribution, do not pay their subscriptions to the WUA or their electricity bills. Such 
tasks are normally the main responsibilities of WUAs but, in practice, they are taken care of 
by/through the Agricultural Cooperatives. The cooperatives clean mesqas, carry out some 
maintenance work or emergency repairs, pay for electricity expenditures. They then collect 
corresponding fees from farmers. Cooperatives are able to ensure compliance and repayment 
from farmers because of their central role in input provision. Farmers need the fertilizers, seeds, 
pesticide provided by the Cooperatives but also certificates of payment for a number of 
administrative procedures. This confers power onto the Cooperatives which are in a better 
position to deliver the services that are theoretically to be delivered by the WUAs. 
Source: field visit to the WNRDP, Egypt (2012) 
On the other hand countries like Morocco can boast a law and a decree issued specifically for 
regulating AUEAs but the content of the decree can be extremely restrictive and not conducive 
to either participation or successful WUAs. Indeed the Moroccan decree reads like a detailed list 
of all the duties and incumbencies these associations have to comply with, with no mention 
whatsoever of the benefits they would get in return. The law specifies that an agreement must 
be signed with the state, expressing “the commitment of the association to mobilize the funds 
needed to cover all the expenditures associated with the administration of the association, water 
distribution, and the maintenance and conservation of infrastructures (…) and the obligation to 
carry out regularly the maintenance works needed to keep all facilities in good working 
conditions”. It also imposes a so-called “seventh member” in each WUA, who is to be an official. 
Likewise, in Egypt, the 1995 decree defining the roles and attributions of WUAs in areas of the 
Nile delta‟s Old Land reads like a list of obligations of beneficiaries of Irrigation Improvement 
projects (IIP/IIIMP) and is focused on ensuring O&M operations, cost recovery, and the financial 
and physical sustainability of the collective pumps and networks (PACER, 1995). 
In Yemen, the recently passed bylaw on WUAs makes clear they are under state authority and 
does not emphasize or delineate their power and authority. If properly empowered they might 
play a role in local groundwater management, but in the opposite case it is not clear whether 
they will add something to, or allow to enhance, the initiatives taken by different communities to 
tackle overexploitation (van Steenbergen et al., 2012). 
The 2011 bylaw defines WUAs/WUGs as “assembly of water users who organize their efforts 
with the purpose for participation in water resources management and contribution in finance, 
management, maintenance and operation of water and irrigation projects and structures” which 
is required “to assist National Water Resource Authority in implementing water rules through 
dealing with a single community based organization”. Other articles strengthen the fact that they 
are under state authority and do not recognize the self organizing power of local communities 
(van Steenbergen et al., 2012). 
In some other contexts, there might be a reluctance to issue a law that would be conducive to 
transferring too much power or autonomy to non-state parties. It can be hypothesized that is 
probably one of the reasons why the Law on secondary-level WUAs has never been passed in 
Page | 67 
 
Egypt; and why the law in Turkey has only very recently been issued. It is somehow ironic that 
Turkey, once branded as an IMT success story, did not issue any specific law during 20 years. 
The text voted and approved in 2010, instead of asserting the autonomy of WUAs, seem on the 
contrary to reinforce government‟s control over the associations, giving it in particular the right to 
re-takeover or privatize the areas managed by non-performing WUAs (Ozerol, 2012). 
Another important dimension of WUAs is whether they are legally allowed to perform other 
activities than their core business and therefore generate income from other sources (see 
earlier discussion on horizontal expansion in § ‎6.7). To the best of our knowledge (and with the 
limitation that it was not possible to gather versions of all legal texts) this seems to be quite a 
rare instance. The decree on the GDAs, in Tunisia, is quite open, and more clearly provides for 
the possibility to develop other activities, for example with regard to buying input for farming or 
to marketing. For some reason, however, these dispositions are not well known (and many think 
this is actually not allowed). 
Another important legal aspect of WUAs is whether they are allowed to hire staff, which is also 
not always clearly spelled out. For example, Freitas (1996) notes that, in Morocco, Article 29 
entrusts the elected council with implementing the decisions taken by the Assembly, establish 
budgets and submit them to the General Assembly, and to nominate agents and establish the 
conditions of their function (“traitement”). It does not clearly spell out that it has the right to hire 
and dismiss employees. 
In Central Asia, the legal framework for WUAs is either based on a new comprehensive law or 
on multiple existing laws. Donors promote and support the first option for the sake of clarity and 
legal security of WUAs, yet donor influence does not always lead to practical legal solutions. 
The “well-established” legal and institutional framework of Kyrgyzstan clearly reflects the 
accepted wisdom among donors at the time, but it is difficult to assess what the practical value 
is of water trading, infrastructural development and contracts between WUAs and farmers, given 
their actual sub-optimal financial, infrastructural and water access conditions. In Uzbekistan, the 
legal basis of WUA establishment and operation, as well as its rights and obligations are based 
on a long list of legislative documents. There is no comprehensive law specifically related to 
WUAs, clearly defining them as specific legal non-governmental and non-commercial entities, 
which weakens their actual organizational status. It is also not clear up to what level of the 
irrigation systems, WUAs become fully responsible for operation, maintenance and fee 
collection. 
7.2 The predictability of water supply 
The, perhaps, most crucial aspect of successful co-management in large-scale scheme is 
frequently, and conspicuously, given limited attention. This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that 
IMT policies tend to be primarily focused on the physical and financial sustainability of the 
schemes and of WUAs, and somehow less by water management itself. Indeed the quality of 
the supply of irrigation water at the interface between the agency and farmers strongly governs 
the possibility of developing collective arrangements for sharing water within the downstream 
area that is under the responsibility of WUAs. Collective action cannot develop around a 
resource whose supply is too unpredictable and variable. The predictability of water supply is a 
major factor determining the success of irrigation management. As Depeweg and Bekheit 
(1997) argue, a system with reliable but inadequate water supply will be more desirable than a 
system with an adequate supply but in unpredictable way. 
While the blame for the failure of WUAs, or low distribution efficiency, is often placed on 
farmers, this conveniently deflects the attention from the kind of „service‟ they get and obscures 
the fact that, often, “central officials remain remote from the problems of local control and 
Page | 68 
 
farmers are too often left in a debilitating organizational vacuum or, equally bad, in capricious 
organizational settings where the only norm is unpredictability” (Freeman and Lowdermilk, 
1991). 
Accordingly the literature does not offer much estimate, and even mention, of the quality of 
supply. Gunchinmaa and Yakubov (2010) considered this indicator in Central Asian countries, 
Kuşçu et al. (2009) in Turkey, Ezzat El-Agha (2010) in Egypt, Adam (2003) in the Gezira 
scheme in Sudan. Except for this latter case, the data point to un-reliable irrigation scheduling 
and thus un-satisfaction of farmers with regard to the timing of water supply and the adequacy 
between demand and supply. 
Likewise water managers in the Nile delta in Egypt have so far failed to establish continuous 
flow in secondary canals (who are traditionally managed on a rotation basis) (see El-Kassar and 
El-Fotouh, 2008; Ezzat El-Agha, 2010). Engineers anticipated that continuous flow would put an 
end to unpredictable supply, which was considered as the main cause of farmers‟ “over-
pumping” during their „on‟ turn. It was also the most attractive feature of the IIP project for 
farmers, who saw the prospect of a continuous supply and the end of water shortages, and 
rightly seen as “important to assure the success of the [IIP] project” (Metawie, 2002)(see more 
in the appendix). 
In Tunisia, Frija (2009) showed that farmers were willing to pay higher water fees if they could 
have more reliable supply or transferable irrigation rights. However, the issues related to the 
agency‟s responsibility to deliver the water needed by WUAs and to the interface through which 
managers and WUAs can exchange information and coordinate their action are often left 
unattended. We will go back to this crucial point in the next section. 
Typical gravity irrigation schemes include a primary and a secondary level under full control of 
the agency, a tertiary level that is often left partially or fully to farmers (but not always) and a 
quaternary level (farm ditch or small group of farms) managed by farmers. But there are many 
situations where distribution to farmers requires some pumping operation(s). The role, position 
and size of the pumps may vary; four situations can be distinguished (Figure 4). 
A first peculiar case is that of the Nile delta in Egypt. Water is distributed through a maze of 
40.000 km of waterways ramified down to the mesqa, a tertiary-level excavated open canal. 
Farmers use individual pumps to abstract water from mesqa (and from drains) and convey 
water to their fields through a quaternary called marwa, which can serve either only one farmer 
(e.g. when his fields are located along the waterway) or a group of farmers (in which cases 
several individual pumps share the pumping bay where water is abstracted to fill the marwa) 
(see Figure 2). Each farmer operates his pump in turn and delivers the water to his own field. 
 
Figure 3: Individual pumps in the Nile delta 
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A second situation occurs when groups of farmers along a same tertiary share a collective 
pump. A typical case is that of the Bustan-extension and Tiba projects in the New Lands of the 
western delta in Egypt. The design adopted in these areas includes electric pumping stations 
that serve 8 ha units allotted to 4 or 8 farmers. 
Further aggregation of farmers at the tertiary level leads to bigger pumping stations which can 
deliver water to several valves (like in Egypt‟s IIP project, where they supply water to marwas), 
or under pressure down to individual farmers (with a connection to sprinklers or drip farm-level 
systems). This is also the case in Canal 900 scheme in the Beqaa valley, Lebanon. The (main) 
„Canal 900‟ has no real secondary branches and merely supplies (by pumping) a number of 
elevated open reservoirs (4 at the moment), from which water is redistributed under pressure to 
areas of around 150 ha. 
Last it is possible to aggregate farmers at the secondary level, where they are supplied by a 
larger pressurized network, as can be seen in the Jordan valley for example. The management 
of pressurized systems over several hundreds hectares of land is not as easy as sometimes 
believed. What one farmer gets usually depends on how many other farmers irrigate (and how) 
and it is therefore also necessary to implement turns. 
These different configurations come with quite different management and organizational needs, 
and correspond to different interfaces between the agency and farmers. If the pumping stations 
are to be under the control of the farmers then the size of the area served by the pump matters. 
In the first case, farmers are fully independent; as the area grows, collective action requirements 
also increase, not only because of the size but also because of the growing complexity of 
operating a pressurized network while maintaining a more or less homogenous pressure. On 
the other hand, as the area served by the pump and managed by farmers grows, the point 
where water is sourced also goes up higher in the system. This means that the area under 
control of the agency is reduced, but also that uncertainty in supply will be more easily 
controlled. In the fourth situation, the agency only has a main canal to manage. In the Jordan 
Valley, supply of water in the canal is continuous and ensured by a dynamic regulation system. 
In other words the burden of ensuring coordination across levels shifts from the agencies to 
farmers; more control comes at the cost of more collective action. 
From the point of view of farmers the first situation is optimal if the agency is able to ensure 
delivery of water down to the plot level. If the distribution network becomes dysfunctional and/or 
available supply drops under demand, then this is the worst situation. It is interesting to note 
that the design used for the expansion of irrigation in Egypt‟s new lands (in Nasr canal) was 
initially of the third type. But because of management problems within the area served by the 
pump the design was changed to the second type. It is interesting to note that in the old lands 
an opposite change has been favoured, whereby individual farmers are obliged to group at the 
tertiary level and to share a collective pump. As mentioned earlier many interventions do not 
factor in the cost of collective action and assume that, because it is in their interest, farmers will 
naturally organize. An assumption that often proves painfully wrong. 
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7.3 Early participation of users in projects 
The way IMT reforms are planned and implemented has a strong bearing on their outcomes. 
For example, several studies provide ample evidence of the need for an early involvement of 
farmers and their organizations in the process of IMT/PIM, particularly in large-scale irrigation 
systems where farmers traditionally have limited involvement in the management of water 
beyond the farm gate (e.g. Osmani, 2001; Hamdy, 2007; Hussain, 2007; Kuper et al., 2009; 
Hamada and Samad, 2011). 
Bergh (2007) (evaluation of IFAD‟s project in the Mountain Zones of Al Haouz Province in 
Morocco) and Pant (2008) showed that lack of openness in the preparation of development 
plans and planning phases, as well as project implementation, was an main impediment in the 
successful execution of IMT/PIM programmes. Indeed, these programmes were apparently not 
widely discussed nor shared with farmers‟ representatives, farmers‟ points of view were not 
incorporated, and works were usually undertaken without any involvement of local 
representatives. Thus, technical design must be conducted in a way that it is effectively 
responsive to farmers‟ concerns and knowledge of the terrain. 
In Azerbaijan the rehabilitation works carried out as part of the strengthening of WUAs (World 
Bank, 2011) have been designed with the contribution of farmers and has led to a high level of 
satisfaction. 
In contrast, the PAGI project, the Programme d‟Amélioration de la Grande Hydraulique, funded 
by the World Bank in Morocco, was conditional upon the establishment of WUAs. This was 
done on paper but most of these WUAs remained dysfunctional or non-existent, partly because 
of the non-implication of farmers in the design of both infrastructural and institutional 
interventions, partly because of the lack of interest by managers (Field visit to the DR of Taourit-
Taforalt, Morocco, 2012). Belghiti (2005) acknowledges that “the integration of human 
dimension in the design of the projects makes them sometimes more difficult and costly in time 
and effort because it is complicated in term of choice of standards design and of process of 
implementing. But the integration of human dimension and PIM as of the design step of the 
projects, give them more chance of success and of durability”. 
IFAD interventions in Tunisia and Azerbaijan (see Box 7.4) were also negatively affected by the 
lack of early involvement of beneficiaries. It can be hypothesized that the failure of many 
interventions and development of projects in involving beneficiaries is related to the tight time-
farmers imposed at the beginning of projects: works on the ground (excavation, earth-moving, 
etc) are more quickly initiated than institutional interventions, especially when there is no earlier 
experience and trained people in the area, which creates a disconnect between the hardware 
and software components of the project. 
Box 7.4: Early involvement of beneficiaries lacking 
In IFAD interventions in Siliana, Tunisia (PDARI: 1997-2005), the evaluation report of May 2004 
identified the weak implication of farmers in the design and planning of technical intervention, 
together with the limited capacity-building and technology transfer, as the main impediment to 
establishing a gradual take-over of maintenance by farmers and a sustainable management of 
the works carried out by the project. 
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Box 7.5: WUAs‟ participation in Azerbaijan 
“Farmer participation in irrigation rehabilitation works is the key for successful establishment of 
sustainable Water Users' Association. Rehabilitation works should be implemented in 
coordination with the activities of establishment of WUAs. The project implementation should be 
planned to address this need, and the project organization and management should be set up to 
ensure proper coordination during the project implementation period. 
The Water Users Associations must be formed first, and used as the main vehicles for ensuring 
beneficiary participation in the project activities. The rehabilitation works should be in response 
to their request and be contingent upon their participation in all stages of planning, design, 
construction supervision and eventual system transfer” 
Source: Lessons learned, Midterm review of the NEDP, Azerbaijan (2009) 
Bergh (2007) also observes this problem for participation in Morocco, where project 
implementation is done through contractors. Although villagers have to „participate‟ “the 
contracting companies feel obliged to take on the works that were supposed to be carried out by 
the population in order to avoid problems of quality and time delays. Contracting out also means 
giving less responsibility to the populations, and results in a lack of „ownership‟ of the project on 
their part, with all the negative implications in terms of sustainability”. More generally “the main 
constraint to participatory project planning is time: the normal project cycles of four to five years 
are not enough to ensure the necessary amount of interaction, trust, and knowledge of the local 
communities to plan and implement sustainable projects”. 
In Egypt, WUAs have been established at both the secondary and tertiary (mesqa) levels and 
confusion has been observed where they overlap: There now seems to be recognition that 
institutional development must come as the first step in the mesqa improvement process, before 
construction works (IRG et al. 1998). There has also be discussions about the timing of 
establishing WUOs, mesqa WUAs being established before, at the same time, or after BCWUAs 
(World Bank, 2005) according to different sources. Others also stress the need to first establish 
all integrated districts (IWMDs) within the larger hydrologic/organizational unit (Directorate) at 
one time, and then have IWMD staff organize and support BCWUA formation (El Atfi et al., 
2007), while still others promote establishing “water user organizations at the branch canal 
level, allowing for eventual expansion to the district level” (IRG, 1999). 
7.4 Capacity building and training 
Capacity building and training of both agency and WUAs staffs/members have also been widely 
proved to be essential steps to creating and strengthening WUAs. Commonly, PIM/IMT 
programmes provide training and other complementary activities to managers and/or WUAs 
staffs during project intervention; but it should be part of a long-term programme that eventually 
evolves into a consultative, problem-solving process. When programmes morph into long-term 
government policies then a special agency is often created to take care of supervision and 
training of WUAs. For example the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) was created in Egypt to 
spearhead the creation and training of WUOs following the mainstreaming of the IIP project (see 
Appendix on PIM in Egypt). In Azerbaijan, District (Raion) level Support Units (RSUs) have 
been set up under the auspices of a Central Support Unit (CSU) located within the AIOJSC 
(Amelioration and Irrigation Open Joint Stock Company), the agency in charge of bulk irrigation 
water supply, and development and management of irrigation and drainage systems throughout 
the country. In several countries supervision structures are weak or have limited staff and 
cannot attend to the needs of WUAs (see case in Tunisia in Box 7.6). 
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Training and awareness building firstly concerns the decision-makers and the managers in the 
agency. At one level, there is a need to convince those who could stand to lose out from the 
reform or would tend to favour the status quo. In Egypt no efforts were spared in trying to 
convince the rank and files of the ministry of the desirability and inevitability of the reform. 
Numerous intensive training activities and study tours to countries such as Mexico, Turkey, 
Jordan or the US were organized to raise awareness of the purported merits of IMT, trainings 
and lobbying efforts helped to provide the “bureaucratic orientation” required (Aziz, 1995). 
Turkish officials were also taken to Mexico and the US, while managers in Azerbaijan visited 
Turkey and Egypt (World Bank, 2011). At a more pragmatic level, managers need to adhere to 
and fulfil their new roles and need training on how to work with farmers in a participatory way, in 
addition of knowledge on the reform proper and its implications for their daily work. In Turkey 
the agency staff within the DSI was trained to acquaint themselves with new field requirements 
and the approach to be used when embracing their new role of supporting and working with 
WUAs (Svendsen and Nott, 2000; Murray-Rust and Svendsen, 2001). It is obvious, however, 
that emphasis on „training‟ works to occult the fact that resistance to reform by officials is in 
general not related to a lack of understanding and has deeper roots (see § ‎8.4). 
Box 7.6: Capacities of regional authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture (CRDA) in Tunisia 
(IFAD case study in the PDARI of Siliana and Zaghouan, Tunisia) 
“The data provided by the offices in charges of GDA within the CRDA were grossly incomplete 
because these offices have neither the staff required (two technicians to take care of 120 GDA 
in Zaghouan) nor the competences (the person in charge of GDAs in Siliana CRDA was newly 
recruited) needed for supporting, monitoring and supervising the GDAs placed under their 
responsibility”. 
Source: field visit to the PDARI of Siliana and Zaghouan, Tunisia (2012) 
WUAs‟ staff usually has to handle a lot of new activities for which they often have little ability, 
although this varies with the historical background and educational level of each locale. Often 
the main key area for training (as expressed during the case studies‟ field visits) is the financial 
area. Training of WUAs staff, especially the treasurer/accountant in the field of financial 
management, is fundamental to WUAs‟ success. Tasks like collecting, recording and updating 
membership registrations and irrigation service fees, donations and fines; keeping and issuing 
receipts; preparing monthly accounts; preparing seasonal and annual statements of accounts; 
and preparing annual and seasonal budgets require some financial abilities to be carried out 
properly and regularly. 
Others required skills to be acquired by WUAs‟ staff would include human resource 
management; planning; determining water requirements; irrigation planning and scheduling; 
maintenance management; communication and liaison with water users; WUA staff duties and 
responsibilities; accounting and book keeping; budgeting; fee setting; principles and practices of 
service provision; cash flow; support service provision… (see Pant, 2008; Burton, 2010). While 
the wide number and the diversity of tasks indicates that training of farmers is necessary, it is 
however not a sufficient condition for successful management (Mukherji et al., 2009). 
Box 7.7: Inadequacy of training activities in Sudan 
“The training contents provided WUAs members looks problematic and irrelevant as it focuses 
principally on technical issues relating to water management rather than being framed within a 
holistic approach of empowerment that recognizes the WUA as an institution with diverse 
capacity building needs and requirements. 
In addition focus of training on theoretical issues provided through lecturing render most of the 
trainees, who are mostly illiterate, ready or capable enough to follow the training and to benefit 
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from it. This also creates problems of poor communication and dissemination of the acquired 
skills and knowledge to their constituencies. The failure to make use of the relevant training 
tools and methodologies including audio-visual techniques is a major setback in the training 
undertaken. The training allowance, as argued by some participants in the training, is probably 
the main motivation and end objective for some participants to attend the training sessions”. 
Source: Mid Term Review Report of the GSLRP, Sudan (2008) 
7.5 Rehabilitation/status of the hydraulic infrastructure 
Another essential condition for successful PIM/IMT is the status of the infrastructure. This is due 
to two reasons. First if the maintenance burden is partly or fully transferred to farmers, the „gift‟ 
of IMT is basically tantamount to asking farmer to pay for earlier delayed maintenance. Second, 
management of a dilapidated network is uneasy and makes it hard to ensure a minimum degree 
of efficiency and equity in supply. The hydraulic infrastructure should be in fair condition 
allowing an affordable and reliable water supply. 
This was an obvious pre-condition in the establishment of WUAs in the Jordan valley, where 
each of them is in charge of a pressurized system of several hundreds of hectares. 
Rehabilitation of the system prior to the transfer of responsibilities to WUAs included physical 
changes in the system (retrofitting pipes, changing meters, flushing pipes, improving the filtering 
process, detecting and repairing leaks, etc…) to ensure a better uniformity of pressure (in 
particular to higher level plots) (Salman et al., 2008; Regner, 2012). 
In contrast, handing over poor and degraded infrastructures to farmers is a sure recipe for 
failure. Infrastructural problems can be inherited from the governmental agencies (e.g. the case 
of the Bergama irrigation scheme in Turkey (Uysal and Atışa, 2010), or Azerbaijan (Rzayev, 
2007). 
In Egypt, setting up Branch Canal (secondary) WUAs involved several steps, including 
obtaining legal authority (by decree), developing the association by building local management 
skills, including financial accounting, establishing an agreement between the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation and the BCWUAs regarding the activities that each would perform, 
rehabilitate the system to a mutually agreed level, before, finally, transferring the local 
management and maintenance of canals and drains to the BCWUAs (IRG, 2002). 
But rehabilitating the infrastructure is not enough. The quality of the execution is essential and 
should not be taken for granted. Azerbaijan (cf Box 7.8) and Egypt are good examples. 
Box 7.8: Poor quality of rehabilitation: Azerbaijan 
“Particular attentions should be paid to the quality of the design and construction standards, 
materials and workmanship of the irrigation system to avoid expensive repairs and remedial 
works, later. Poor quality of construction is associated with loss of production and lack of 
interest of the beneficiaries to form WUAs and assume responsibilities for operation and 
maintenance of the system”. 
Lessons learned in Azerbaijan (IFAD midterm review, 2009) 
In Egypt‟s rehabilitation of mesqas (IIP and IIIMP projects) contracting procedures and 
contractor performance have remained a strong concern up to these days. “Contractor non-
performance not only caused project delays but seriously undermined farmer confidence in the 
IIP and its abilities” (IRG, 1998a). Non performance includes poor work execution (canals with 
faulty slope, leaks in canals or pipes, bad compacting, poor design and too low pressure in 
pipes, etc), low or no responsiveness to the problems signalled by farmers after construction, 
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etc. The limited monitoring of the works and accountability created situations where contractors 
were rushing to bid for and initiate new works without having finished the on-going ones (in 
some cases, re-contracting of a new firm has been necessary). Contractors‟ performance and 
reducing implementation delays was reportedly improved through consideration of smaller 
contract packages (World Bank, 2007). These problems of low quality work are actually 
observed in all types of interventions (e.g. canal dredging) and seems to either receive 
insufficient attention from officials or to be very resilient to change. 
Box 7.9: Deterioration of the state of irrigation infrastructure in Azerbaijan 
“A recent survey of project areas of the International Development Association (IDA) funded 
Rehabilitation and Completion of Irrigation and Drainage Infrastructure Project found that 
around 80% of the infrastructure has been deteriorating in some form and needs urgent 
attention. The lack of maintenance has a serious impact on overall water use efficiency, which is 
estimated to be no more than 30%. This low efficiency requires large water abstractions, which 
increases the entrance of sediments into the systems and leads to over-irrigation and its harmful 
effects on yields as well as water logging and salinity. As funds for adequate irrigation and 
maintenance were not available, the area irrigated and agricultural production decreased. 
In addition, the deteriorated infrastructure and the on-farm management vacuum have led to 
inadequate and inequitably distributed water supplies. In most cases, the margins of the 
systems are no longer irrigated and service on the lands still under irrigation is erratic. Influential 
farmers often receive priority access and conflicts are becoming more frequent”. 
Source: Appraisal Report of the NEDP, Azerbaijan (2004) 
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8 Participation to / transfer of / what? 
Echoing the reflexion on the PIM-IMT continuum discussed in section 5.2, this chapter attempts 
to revisit the different cases reviewed and to synthesize the information given. It is abundantly 
clear from the diversity of cases that the different WUAs encountered are actually very different 
„beasts‟. This reflects the varying degree of participation and empowerment that is constitutive 
of the PIM-IMT continuum itself but also a diversity of arrangements at the interface between 
managers and farmers, the multiplicity of financial architectures that strongly govern the 
sustainability of the scheme, as well as the structure incentives that links actors together (or 
not). We first reflect here on the hypothetical balance of costs and benefits, as perceived by 
farmers, and its implication for the success of IMT. We then examine how participatory water 
reforms in the countries of the region fit in the regional PIM/IMT spectrum, the diversity of 
financial arrangements, and the relationships between the wider political economy context and 
the policy process. 
8.1 Cost-benefit balance and incentives 
PIM and IMT policies are institutional processes whereby the roles, responsibilities and their 
associated costs and benefits are redistributed among the actors. It is therefore pertinent to look 
at the array of costs and benefits accruing to farmers. Meinzen-Dick (1997) noted that “the initial 
success and sustainability of WUAs was found to depend largely on the provision of sufficient 
incentives, or gains, for farmers”. Technical interventions and physical improvements to 
irrigation systems (rehabilitation) and, for example, access to credit provide short-term 
incentives to farmers. But long-term incentives should include improved water management 
through transparency of water distribution, reliable water service and accountability, 
representation at higher levels of water management, reduced conflicts, ownership of the 
irrigation system, intensified agricultural production, increased incomes and household food 
security (Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Sehring, 2005). Such benefits are not always „tangible‟ and may 
also vary from year to year, influencing the long-term perception and judgement of farmers of 
the PIM/IMT policy. 
Figure 5 attempts to summarize how, in theory, a reform should translate into a stream of 
benefits. The establishment of WUAs comes with two major injunctions for farmers: the need to 
organize and the need to mobilize their own resources, in kind (e.g. voluntary labour) and cash 
(through an ISF: irrigation service fee). These two injunctions are clearly a cost to farmers. This 
is obvious for the latter but, unfortunately, not well recognized for the former. There is an implicit 
hypothesis that self-organization is more or less costless, which is of course a gross neglect and 
misunderstanding of the transaction costs that comes with collective action. These costs are 
particularly high, as illustrated earlier, for situations with low social capital and uncertain water 
supply. 
What do we have on the benefit side of the scale? Better maintenance of infrastructure (through 
both financial and in kind contribution, but also –possibly- participation in the planning and 
execution of related works), as well as better coordination between managers (supply) and 
farmers (demand), are likely to result in an increase in efficiency and reliability of supply. 
Conflict mediation and local water management by WUAs should also result in more equitable 
distribution. All these outcomes should translate in concrete benefits to farmers in terms of yield 
increase, lower risk, possibility to diversify out to cash crops, and ultimately higher incomes (see 
Figure 5). This must be seen at the aggregate level, because it is also possible that restoring 
equity chiefly works for those at the tail end of the canal and/or with poor access, while some 
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farmers with secure and preferential supply may not see their situation improved. (This 
heterogeneity in situations is precisely what is often forgotten and what may work against 
successful collective action). To these expected benefits to farmers, one should add the benefits 
of the rehabilitation that comes with the reform (if this is the case). 
Figure 5: The balance of costs and benefits in PIM/IMT reforms, as perceived. 
 
 
It is apparent that most reforms are launched based on unrealistic assessments of the costs 
(underestimated) and of the benefits (overestimated). When the former end up offsetting the 
latter then the whole process of collective action is undermined and quickly annihilated. 
Governments, on their side, tend to focus on their perception of the benefits (reduction of state 
expenditures). 
We have discussed a number of issues why the expected processes and outcomes are often 
not forthcoming, jeopardizing the policy reform. They include the difficulties faced by both 
levying substantial fees and instilling collective action within WUAs and that make the expected 
processes highlighted in Figure 5 not unfolding as planned : the recovery of fees will be more 
difficult than planned (§ ‎5.3), especially when benefits are not materializing, local maintenance 
may face difficulties in mobilizing labour, an association set-up by the state may not have the 
legitimacy to mediate conflicts or to curb free-riding (practices (water thefts, „ghost pipes‟ that 
are „clipped‟ on underground main pipe adductors, etc), and the agency might not demonstrate 
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any willingness to really empower farmers and co-manage the scheme with them. This explains 
why the „expected outcomes‟ shown in Figure 5 do not materialize to the extent that would make 
the associated concrete benefits large enough to instil adherence of members to the reform. 
As discussed by Freitas (1996) it is very difficult to shift from a situation where the state agreed 
to maintain the scheme and deliver water against a water fee, to one where additional financial 
and organizational efforts are requested against, at best, no change in water supply, and often 
decreasing supply because of the growing imbalance between supply and demand in some 
schemes. 
8.2 Institutional settings and state agencies’ commitment 
As discussed earlier, there is often little clarity on what the precise attributions and duties of the 
different parties are, whether the policy is advanced under a PIM or an IMT banner. Even for 
Turkey, once celebrated as a success story of IMT, and for which there is a substantial 
literature, it is hard to find details on what is really transferred and how. 
Based on our earlier discussion on the degree of transfer, as seen through three areas of 
responsibilities and two levels, we revisit here the countries with large scale public irrigation 
schemes and distinguish between those which are closer to IMT (Turkey, Jordan Valley, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan) and those which display a participatory rhetoric, with varied degrees of 
achievement (Egypt, Morocco, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Yemen). 
8.2.1 Cases of (partial) IMT: what contracts between agencies and WUAs? 
We review here the four countries where some degree transfer has been effective and examine 
what are the attributions of both farmers and the agency, and how they are made explicit or 
contractualized. 
In Turkey, and similar to Mexico, transfers are based on three sets of legal documents: a 
transfer agreement (contract) between the DSI and the IA, a protocol which identifies the 
conditions of the transfer (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008), and by-laws for the IAs. The transfer agreement 
makes the IA responsible for all the O&M services related to specified irrigation facilities at the 
secondary or tertiary level and for recovering the service costs of this service provision (Kukul et 
al., 2008). The contract mentions the supply source (main canal and associated infrastructure) 
(Döker et al., 2003), but does not mention any specific water allocation or specify the conditions 
and details of the infrastructure that is transferred. 
IAs are set up as non-profit organizations using a legal patchwork of local and regional 
government and cooperative law (1580, 442, 5442). This legal shopping was not considered 
ideal and several attempts were made at a new law specific to IAs. However, it took until March 
2011, almost two decades after starting the accelerated transfer, that this „Enabling Law‟ was 
promulgated. More than an enabling requirement for transfer, this law actually stabilized and 
legitimated a set of institutional relations that was the product of the transfer process. 
The IAs consist of two governing bodies: The General Assembly, consisting of local authorities 
called muhtars from the area. This Assembly elects an Executive Committee, consisting of a 
chosen president, four executive committee members, a general secretary (agricultural 
engineer), who steers the association‟s daily operation, and an accountant. The Executive 
Committee presents its work plans, budgets and accounts to the General Assembly for 
approval. 
DSI and IAs share the operating responsibilities in larger systems (Yazar, 2002). DSI operates 
the head works and the primary canals which serve several IAs and take a lead in planning the 
annual irrigation calendar. IAs distribute water below the secondary canal, maintain canal 
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infrastructure and collect fees in their zone (Yazar et al., 2006; Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008). IAs identify 
the total water demand at the start of the season for the DSI, which then allocates the amount of 
water from the reservoirs (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008). The IAs schedule and deliver water to water 
users in their zone (Yazar, 2002), usually through a rotation system among tertiary canals and a 
distribution ranking among farmers (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011). Irrigation fees constitute 
the bulk of the WUA revenues, and the fees are set by each WUA and vary according to the 
crop and the area that is cultivated (Yazar, 2002; Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011). 
DSI gradually transfers the responsibility for the maintenance of the secondary and tertiary 
infrastructure to the IAs. The pace depends on the developing capacity of the IA to take over 
maintenance, determined by the employment of technical staff, training, equipment and financial 
resources. IAs make use of DSI maintenance machinery, but can also acquire their own 
machinery, which was supported by a World Bank loan of 1997. Ideally, all maintenance and 
repair responsibility is devolved to the IAs. 
The Irrigation agency (DSI) remains committed to transferred schemes and active in continuous 
monitoring, identifying required improvements and providing assistance to users in all related 
aspects, including assistance in acquiring and maintaining required skills and consulting and 
technical support when needed; regular technical training of the staff of WUAs on different 
aspects of irrigation; assistance in obtaining essential O&M equipment and handling urgently 
needed repair or rehabilitation works on the basis of reasonable repayment or cost sharing 
arrangements; and legal procedural and organizational changes concerning both the WUAs and 
relevant Government agencies and taking appropriate action (Tekinel, 2004). Dadaser-Celik et 
al. (2008) reported that the majority of farmers think that WUAs are better at irrigation 
management than the DSI. 
Hence, the legal framework clearly demarcated the rights and responsibilities of the IAs (Yercan 
et al., 2004; Uysal and Atiş, 2010), but did not always clearly specify to the-transfer-of-what 
exactly the state committed. For example, in the present circumstance, IAs identify the total 
water demand at the start of the season for the DSI, which then allocates the amount of water 
from the reservoirs (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008). The transfer agreements fail to specify the bulk 
allocation or water entitlement of individual IAs and also the details and conditions of the 
operation, maintenance and administrative facilities that were transferred (Dadaser-Celik et al., 
2008; Kukul et al., 2008; Kibaroglu et al., 2009). “Ownership of facilities is not transferred to the 
WUO and remains with the state. Likewise because of the loosely defined character of Turkish 
water rights, there is no conveyance of any formal right to use water to the WUO” (Kodal et al. 
2005). 
The IAs were set up by local authorities with DSI support (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011). 
The General Assembly of the IA is composed of municipal and village leaders (muhtars) and 
democratically elected members of municipal authorities within the irrigation system. For the 
governing body they elect a chairman and four executive committee members. Together with an 
assigned general secretary (an agricultural engineer) and an accountant, the body consists of 
seven members (Tekinel, 2004). At every regular general assembly, which consists of local 
authorities, the chairman and the board of directors present their account for approval and the 
technical and managerial issues are discussed for water tariff setting. IAs are non-profit 
organizations which range from 300 up to 35 000 hectares. If an irrigation system serves more 
than one region or village, it is generally transferred to the IAs formed by the municipalities of 
these villages (Tekinel, 2004). The most striking feature of these original legal provisions and 
organizational structure for the IAs is that there was no direct water user representation in the 
transfer process and the irrigation management. Their only recourse was the five yearly 
elections of muhtars (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). 
Several legal complications have influenced the formation of IAs. These user organizations 
were originally established in majority under the Municipal Law No. 1580. This legal solution 
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was considered convenient although not entirely appropriate, because it made IAs accountable 
to the Ministry of the Interior. This Ministry did not necessarily possess the appropriate technical 
expertise to supervise the IAs. DSI officials (and WUAs) started to regret this „patchy legal 
foundations‟ (Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011) and the plea for a new law, specific to make IAs 
sustainable, was frequently repeated in the literature (Vidal et al., 2001; Çakmak et al, 2004; 
Kadirbeyoğlu, 2008; Uysal and Atiş, 2010). Several drafts of this law were circulated, presented 
and discussed during the last decade or more. In 2001 a proposal was debated but not 
accepted. In 2005, the Local Administration Act 5355 incorporated a special article 19 that 
specifically mentions the Irrigation Association for the first time in Turkish legal history (Özerol et 
al., 2013). The IAs acquired the status of local administration associations but remained under 
the Ministry of Interior. In March 2011 a new Irrigation Associations Law was finally enacted. 
Amongst others, this law reinstated DSI as the dominant public water authority that acts as an 
„advisory and controlling institution‟ to IAs (Uysal and Atiş, 2010). The Law redefined the IAs‟ 
status7: 
 from „local administration associations‟ to „public legal entities‟, implying more 
government control 
 subject to an administrative and technical audit of DSI, i.e. not the Ministry of the Interior 
 in case of not meeting standards or good management practices, DSI can recover the 
management of IAs and either exercise this itself or outsource it to the private sector. 
A DSI official summarised the position of the IAs: “They were rambling, since there was no 
coherent legal setting for them and they had no connection to the Ministry of Interior. Now we 
will monitor them and make sure that they do the things right; otherwise we always have the 
right to sell the irrigation canals to private companies” (Özerol et al., 2013). 
In Kyrgyzstan, the first WUAs were created in the mid-1990s as part of pilot projects with the 
support of the ADB, FAO and the Japanese government. The subsequent country-wide 
development of WUAs was part of rehabilitation and canal improvement programmes of the 
World Bank and ADB. In 2000, Kyrgyzstan created a WUA support department at the Water 
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. This agency provided training and helped WUAs to 
register, set up their budget, and make contracts on water with farmers and the RayVodKhoz 
(District Canal Management Organization; CMO). The WUAs were set up under the 1995 
government decree “Regulations on WUAs in Rural Areas” and the 1997 “Statute of WUAs in 
Rural Areas“. Based on these, the “Law on Water User Associations” was promulgated in 2002 
(Sehring, 2005). 
The Canal Management Organization (CMO) jointly operates the larger irrigation systems with 
the WUAs. Prior to the irrigation season, WUAs collect the necessary information on cropped 
area and cropping patterns and calculates the seasonal water requirements of the network 
under its control. The WUA manager then submits the water plan to the CMO. The CMO 
reviews the requested requirements against the water availability in the reservoir and makes 
necessary adjustments in the water plan for the cropping season. These adjustments to limit 
water supply are particularly important for periods of droughts and water deficiency when 
demands exceed available water. The requested amounts in the plan are reduced proportionally 
by a specified coefficient set by the Ministry of Agriculture. Adjusted plans are approved by the 
CMO and serve as the basis to sign seasonal water delivery agreements between the CMO and 
WUAs. The CMO is responsible for supplying water to the WUA during the season taking into 
account the demand in relation to the capacity of the canals and actual requests made by 
individual farmers or water user groups (WUGs) (Kazbekov et al., 2009). 
                                               
7
 We thank Gül Özerol for this information about the new law. 
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Nevertheless, the contracts between a WUA and the CMO do not specify a bulk allocation. It is 
difficult to determine in advance the exact amount water needed (it may be less in a year with 
lot of rainfall; it might be more in a dry year). Because many WUAs order more water to be 
flexible, the contracts are subject to frequent changes. So factually much water delivery takes 
place on the basis of oral agreements. Even though Kyrgyz farmers are involved in water 
allocation decisions, they do complain about having to pay an ISF, without any guarantee to 
receive the amount of water stipulated in the contract (Ul Hassan, 2004). 
Maintenance at the primary and secondary level is still largely the responsibility of District and 
Provincial CMOs, depending on their financial situation. Formally the WUAs are also involved in 
the maintenance of the secondary infrastructure, but in practice they lack the equipment, 
professional capacity and financial resources to be involved in maintenance, let alone 
rehabilitation. At the tertiary level, WUAs and local authorities do occasionally engage in 
maintenance, e.g. through „voluntary‟ collective work. Because of the bad state in which users 
received the infrastructure, these efforts are not sufficient and may lead to tensions. 
The level of fee collection indicates how underfinanced the current system of water 
management is. Irrigation Service Fees are collected by WUAs to finance their tasks at the 
tertiary level and the CMO‟s activities at higher levels, but the rate of fee collection is a major 
problem. Although the amount is agreed by the General Assemblee, many of the farmers are 
not willing to pay. Virtually none of the WUAs are therefore really self-financing and many have 
debts with the government. Many of the WUAs do exist on paper, but are not really active in 
practice. The CMO is financed mainly by the water tariffs, which indicates the limits of that 
agency to attract qualified personnel and perform its tasks in O&M. In this situation, the CMO 
provides water in return for the monetary value of work done by the WUAs at the off-farm level. 
No effective sanction exists to enforce fee payment and water delivery is also unreliable 
(Sehring, 2005). 
Kazbekov (2009) observes that there are four problems that currently threaten the functioning of 
WUAs: 1) The provision of water to many water users, 2) sustaining crop yields and productivity 
of water in subsistence farming, 3) ability of small farmers to pay ISF and 4) institutional 
sustainability of WUAs. 
Due to a sheer lack of funds to maintain irrigation schemes, Azerbaijan has attempted to 
transfer the maintenance burden to some private organizations (548 of which between 2000 and 
2002). WUAs were established as limited liability enterprises established in accordance with the 
Law on Limited Liability Enterprises, dated December 29, 1998. From a legal perspective they 
are not 'associations' under the control of an elected body accountable to members but 
enterprises free to undertake any kind of lawful commercial activity. WUAs were allowed to 
collect 25% of the amount required to be paid to AIOJSC for their own O&M costs (van den 
Boom, 2007). They used their income to pay a stipend to the Chairman and to pay a number of 
regular and seasonal staff to operate the system to the best of their ability. As for maintenance, 
with no machinery, transport for staff, and budget not much could be achieved.  
The Irrigation Distribution System Management Improvement Project (IDSMIP, funded by the 
World Bank), signed in September 2003, undertook the rehabilitation of 56.000 ha (i.e. 45 
project WUAs, eventually 22), restructuring 225 WUAs, that had taken over the management of 
irrigation and drainage infrastructure, establish proper operation and maintenance plans and 
water charge structure for 200 WUAs. To put WUAs under an elected board accountable to 
members, an amendment to the 1996 law was passed in 2004 and WUAs were re-registered as 
non-commercial rather than private sector organizations. WUAs would have a governing body 
and a separate management body, members would have access to the association‟s accounts, 
The on-farm area would be transferred to the WUAs after 20 years. 
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Box 8.1: IMT in Azerbaijan 
“The transfer of irrigation water management responsibility to users is a declared government 
policy and is part of the country‟s development strategy. The Water User Association law has 
been amended to provide the legal framework for their successful operation. However, NDP has 
shown that there are some institutional obstacles hindering the full implementation of the PIM 
policy and the WUA law. SAIC has still not yet transferred responsibility for part of the irrigation 
system to WUAs on long term lease arrangements as stipulated by the law. SAIC‟s explanation 
of the delay in transferring the system to WUAs is that it awaits a decision from the Government 
authorizing it, and SAAC is now in the process of requesting this decision from the Cabinet of 
Ministers as it pertains to the NDP. The transfer agreement between SAIC and WUAs should 
clearly state that the WUA is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the relevant part 
of the system and for charging the farmers for the service it provides on full cost recovery basis. 
At present, WUAs also claim that SAIC unofficially imposes limits on their ability to raise water 
fees to members to the level necessary for their attainment of full financial viability.” 
Source: Completion report of the NDP, Azerbaijan (2011) 
In 2005 IFAD launched the North-East Development Project, NEDP (IFAD: 2005-2010), with 
similar objectives to be achieved over another set of six districts, rehabilitation going hand in 
hand with massive interventions in terms of training and institutional building. 
What are the features of this IMT program, notably in rehabilitated areas? As for water 
management the agency (renamed AIOJSC) and WUAs enter into annual water supply 
contracts and agree upon a bulk allocation to the WUA. Planning of allocation is done by the 
Rayon (district) Irrigation Departments (local branches of AOIJSC), based on the type of crops 
and the number of sources of water available, with an order of magnitude of 3500 m3/ha (after 
losses in conveyance) (Rzayev, 2012). According to the rules fostered by the IDSMIP project, 
WUAs are to receive compensation (from SAIC) in case of damage caused by a failure to 
deliver water as per the contract. Yet, it is unclear what really happens in this particular case 
and it does not seem that this clause is operational. 
Water scheduling and rotations (typically 4-6 days) are defined by the department based on the 
bulk amount allocated, the sources available, and crop requirements for the actual vegetative 
phase. Water management within the WUA (secondary) area (around 2000 ha) is under the 
responsibility of the associations which hire their own gate operators. Water records are based 
on gate measurements at several points but many of these are not reliable. But WUAs and 
Rayon Irrigation Department regularly check the amount of water provided at the dividing point 
to the WUA, where the WUA establishes its own control (Rzayev, 2012). The new land use 
structure (divided in very small plots), is not easily irrigated with infrastructures initially designed 
to supply large plots. 
Maintenance at the WUA level is implemented jointly by Rayon irrigation Department (the owner 
of property) and the WUAs (the operator). Maintenance includes cleaning of the canals and 
drains and repair of hydraulic works for a better distribution and recording of data. Since the 
capacity of WUAs is poor due to low financial capacity, lack of technical know-how, experience 
and machinery, currently AIOJSC has taken most responsibility to support WUAs through 
rehabilitation projects for construction, trainings and maintenance of the irrigation systems. This 
is seen by the government (and project donors) as something temporary, with the hope that 
WUAs will gradually become financially autonomous (Rzayev, 2012; Vermillion, 2012). 
The management of WUA is appointed based on a free election organized by the WUA 
members. The more experienced persons and those who are respected by the village society 
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and have the capacity to solve the conflicts that arise with water consumption tend to be 
selected (Rzayev, 2012). Membership in WUA is compulsory, and so is the payment of the fee, 
whose amount is nevertheless fixed by the association itself. Board members are elected every 
5 years. 
Agreements between the government and (rehabilitated) WUAs define water supply services 
and payments, O&M responsibilities and obligations, and financing and support arrangements. 
The fees collected by WUAs cover bulk water supplies (0.63 USD per 1,000 m3, that go to the 
agency), and WUA fixed costs (salaries and expenses) and system maintenance. On top of that 
–for the 22 WUAs that were considered for rehabilitation in IDSMIP - 10% of the rehabilitation 
costs (after 5 year grace) are to be added. The fee is decided by the WUA and there are large 
variations (depending in particular on maintenance needs and the crops grown) (World Bank, 
2011a, 2011b). 
Several WUAs have been formed in the 2000s in the Jordan Valley with the help of the GIZ. 
These WUAs were registered under the Cooperation Law No. 18/1997 and thus affiliated to the 
Jordan Cooperative Corporation JCC. Cooperatives, and have internal regulations that specify 
the objectives, capital, membership procedure and financial and administrative issues (GTZ, 
2010). In early 2012, 23 WUAs have been established in the Jordan Valley, covering around 
80% of the irrigated area in the valley, with 11 of them contractually tied to the JVA for joint 
management (Adwan, 2012). Each WUA correspond to a unit of 400-500 ha served by a 
pumping station that takes water from the main canal and supplies a pressurized pumped 
system. Prior to the transfer of responsibilities to WUAs rehabilitation of the system is 
necessary. This includes physical changes in the system (retrofitting pipes, changing meters, 
flushing pipes, improving the filtering process, detecting and repairing leaks, etc…) to ensure a 
better uniformity of pressure (in particular to higher level plots) (Salman et al., 2008). 
The main canal is under dynamic regulation and fully under the control and the maintenance of 
the JVA. 
WUAs (i.e. cooperatives) are now largely autonomous with regard to O&M within their command 
area. They collect a subscription fee of 3-5JD/month for each member of the cooperative that 
can be used for small running costs but are largely kept in a bank account to constitute shares 
for shareholders. The 11 WAUs under contract and the JVA sign annual agreements that 
specify the maintenance works, the salary of the President of the Association, of the ditch riders 
and even a (former JVA) water engineer (who can be „shared‟ between several WUAs). This is 
said to result in a reduction of costs at the level of the JVA (but no specific data could be found). 
Ditch riders inspect the network, collect cropping patterns and individual meter readings 
monthly. The association registers violations, farmers‟ complaints and tries to solve them 
internally, or with JVA if need be. A qualified maintenance technician receives necessary 
materials from the Agency to carry out maintenance tasks according to a mechanism agreed 
upon between the Association and the JVA. Transparency is enhanced by the reporting of the 
WAUs to their members and there is also an annual audit and a report duty to the General 
Association of Cooperatives (Regner, 2012). 
Membership is not obligatory and non-members receive the same benefits; the project strives to 
take membership over 80% during the first year of establishment (Regner, 2012). Elections are 
held every one to four years, depending on the assembly‟s decision. Farmers pay individually 
for the amount of water they use (a quota based on the type of crops, and evenly reduced in 
case of shortage), and the fee is recovered directly by the JVA (WUAs cannot legally do this). 
The water prices haven‟t been raised for almost 10 years. Although they are now pretty low the 
current economic and political situation in the region rules out any drastic changes in this 
situation. Water fees go directly to the Ministry of Finance‟s coffers and are not tied to 
performance nor reflect any type of commitment. 
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The schedule or the daily irrigation order of each pump is prepared jointly by the JVA and the 
WUA, according to crop water demand and keeping in mind the annual quota established by the 
JVA based on the available supply. 
The wider context of this IMT reform and how a degree of trust has been restored both between 
farmers of a same unit and between farmers and the agency is noteworthy and will be examined 
in § ‎8.4. 
8.2.2 Between cosmetic and effective PIM 
Since the late 1980s, Egypt has experienced with a large number of projects devoted to 
institutional building. Because of the richness of this experience, a retrospective is presented in 
annexe. We analyze here the degree of transfer/empowerment that has occurred. 
A first initiative geared towards setting up tertiary level WUAs is associated with the IIP (now 
IIMP) projects developed since 1988 up to these days (with support from USAID, World Bank 
and other donors). These projects replaced tertiary canals, from where farmers were abstracting 
water through individual pumps, by collective pumps that distribute water through raised canals 
or, under the current design, by low pressure buried pipes. The collective pumps make it 
necessary to establish an organization in charge of their operation and maintenance. A WUA is 
defined as “a private organization owned, controlled and operated by member users for their 
benefits in improving water delivery, water use and other organizational efforts related to water 
for increasing their production possibilities” (IIP, 1990a; Hvidt, 2004). WUAs access water from 
a Branch canal in which, following IIP‟s design, a continuous supply is to be ensured, instead of 
the traditional on/off rotation. WUAs in areas improved by IIP come under the 1994 bylaw that 
gives them a legal status, with in particular the capacity to collect fees as income and engage in 
contracting. 
In 1996, efforts were geared towards the secondary (Branch canal) levels, where BCWAUs 
were expected to coordinate the actions of all tertiary canals, as well as liaise with the agency 
(local staff of the Ministry of Water resources and Irrigation). Branch canal level experiments 
were constrained by several factors. The absence of a legal status for user organisations at 
levels above the mesqa level boundaries made it difficult to develop the financial dimensions of 
decentralisation; the “Revision of Law 12/1984 on Irrigation and Drainage”, that was to 
recognise BCWUAs Water Boards as user organisations for water management at the 
secondary canal level and above made it to parliament but up to these days has failed to be 
passed (pilot BCWUAs were established under ad hoc ministerial decree). 
In parallel the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation “adopted a policy to integrate all water 
management functions at the district level to support decentralized management” (IRG, 2002b) 
and designated two pilot districts. The definition of an Integrated Water Management District 
was given as “an entity that has sufficient manpower, material, and fiscal resources to operate 
and maintain all water resources under its jurisdiction. All of the divisions support the water 
distribution process to ensure that water is delivered equitably, resulting in the various district 
water entities currently being merged to constitute a single entity referred to as an IWMD”. 
Concretely the goal was to merge the different exiting districts (Irrigation, drainage, mechanical), 
all defined with different boundaries and neither of them corresponding to administrative 
districts, into one „integrated district‟, thus 1) reducing the number of staff and putting all of them 
under the authority of one district engineer, 2) getting rid of the intermediate layer of the 
Inspectorate, 3) integrating the different functions of water management for coordinated 
planning and management. 
BCWUAs should participate in the annual planning, prioritization, and selection of maintenance 
and minor works, with one or more inspection of the branch canals and the drainage systems to 
be carried out jointly with the IWMD engineers and technicians. Likewise, MWRI should 
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inform/consult/involve BCWUAs when design starts and tender documents are prepared, about 
the award of contracts, and involve them in the monitoring of progress and quality control during 
the execution of maintenance or minor works (Barakat, 2009). BCWUAs are also expected to 
monitor, measure, and record the water levels at the head of branch canals and key control 
points, as well as in secondary drains, to detect and report anomalies and shortages. They 
should review and discuss the recorded water levels on the branch canals with the IWMD staff. 
Common understanding of the area‟s main problems and priorities is to be built through Branch 
Canal Needs Assessment, a diagnostic device to be carried out whenever needed (every 3 
years, for example). 
Relatively recent assessments of participatory water management (APP, 2007) has revealed 
worrying trends. Barakat concluded that (i) Participation of WUOs in water management is 
extremely low, (ii) all actors have a poor understanding of the possibilities to take action, (iii) 
WUOs and MWRI field staff don't feel partners, (iv) there is a felt need of clear instructions from 
higher levels. Likewise Bron (APP, 2007), based on the monitoring and evaluation of 150 WUOs 
during several years, concluded that: “1. The level of participation of water users in water 
management, also when organized in water users' organizations, is very low. Even the level of 
being informed after MWRI field staff has taken a decision often is not reached. 2. No water 
users' organization in Egypt has reached a level of institutional strength that can be considered 
sustainable. 3. Projects achieve an initial build-up of the institutional strength of WUOs. 
However, apparently the projects are not successful in reaching a sustainable level of WUOs 
strength. When the attention for the WUOs decreases after the completion of projects, the 
WUOs' sustainability level declines”. 
Another example of strong agency control is Morocco, where despite a participatory policy 
rhetoric developed in the 1990s (under the influence of USAID and the World Bank) and 
attempts to transfer some responsibilities to farmers‟ organizations, surface water management 
in large-scale irrigation schemes remains firmly in the hands of the state (Kuper et al., 2009). 
Initially, the irrigation agencies (ORMVA: Office Regional de Mise en Valeur Agricole) were not 
only responsible for water allocation and distribution but also determined cropping patterns, 
processed and marketed most industrial crops, including sugar, cereals, and cotton (Faysse et 
al., 2010). In addition, the State was strongly involved in the regulation of the market through 
prices setting and the implementation of development projects (Choukr-Allah, 2004). The 
situation varies depending on the ORMVA. Although there are officially 408 AUEAs in large-
scale irrigation (Aloussi and Anbari, 2012), many exist only on paper, like in the Doukkala, 
Gharb and Loukkos schemes (Faysse et al.; 2010). The Tadla scheme has been the object of 
repeated efforts and donors‟ attention (Schaak, 1995; Freitas, 1996). 
In the Tadla, a 100.000 ha gravity scheme, the ORMVAT is responsible for both operation and 
maintenance down to the tertiary level included. A provisional allocation based on available 
supply (in the dams) is established each year and farmers are informed about it. The gate 
keeper collects the requests from all individual farmers, prepares the rotation schedule for all of 
them (with starting and ending hours) and then establishes the duration of supply to the 
corresponding tertiary. The information is passed upward in order to prepare the overall 
distribution schedule. In return, on Thursdays farmers get a ticket with the details of the supply 
to their fields in the following week (there is a turn per week), as does the ditch rider (paid or 
nominated by the WUA), who distributes water within the tertiary. The system is somehow „on 
demand‟ but request are capped by the seasonal quota defined by ORMVAT. 
Farmers can decide whether to take water during a turn (for example some prefer to resort to 
groundwater) or to reduce the duration. As Plusquellec (2002) notes “although the system has 
the capacity to be operated on prearranged demand and to provide the flexibility required to 
meet the farmers' needs, it is essentially a centralized system. This mode of operation was 
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justified when rain-fed farmers were converted into irrigators a few decades ago. It does not 
respond to the needs of modern agriculture in Morocco”. 
During the year, the actual volume delivered to a farmer is calculated by multiplying the number 
of hours of his turn by the flow rate (generally 30 l/s) (Hellegers et al., 2007). The price of water 
is $US 4 cents/m3. Billing is done twice a year and the percentage of O&M fees collected is 
about 80 % (Van Vuren et al., 2004). 
The role of the 36 WUAs has remained minimal for years. Recently the WUAs have gradually 
been involved in prioritizing maintenance work, the planning of water distribution, and canal 
cleaning at the secondary canal level. This has been made possible by a younger and more 
informed generation of farmers who have been invited by ORMVAT to participate in several 
decision-making processes (Faysse et al., 2010). The link between farmers and their WUAs 
leaders, however, remains very weak and general meetings are rarely organised. 
In summary, there is no transfer of any task/responsibility to farmers. It must be noted that the 
incentives for farmers are quite low because O&M is quite satisfactory in the Tadla scheme and 
the problem of recurring scarcity lies beyond the scheme itself and its management. The 
financial contribution of farmers is substantial. 
In Tunisia, large scale irrigation is limited to the lower Mejerda valley and to the Cap Bon. No 
information on WUAs in these two areas has been found (which raises questions on why so little 
documentation is available). 
In Algeria, as mentioned earlier, the lack of experience of WUAs, water scarcity, the land tenure 
system and the complexity of large-scale irrigation systems are believed to have hindered the 
development of WUAs (Belkateb, 2012). The support provided since 2005 by ONID, the 
irrigation agency, resulted in a slight improvement in farmers‟ participation. Farmers are now 
participating in scheme monitoring committees and two of their representatives are invited to sit 
in their administrative boards. There is no clear evidence on what is the role of farmers in O&M 
and no clear policy seems to have been implemented in large schemes. 
Similarly, in Syria centralized government agencies from the Ministry of Irrigation and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform take care of day-to-day water management in large-
scale schemes along with their local directorates and the Farmers Unions. The Unions 
determine crop type and intensities on the basis of available water resources (Kaissi and 
Yasser, 2003). 
In Lebanon, only the Canal 900 irrigation system managed by the Litani River Authority (LRA) 
has attempted to establish a WUA, through two successive aid/development projects. No 
agreement for co-management could be established between farmers and the Authority, and 
the WUA is not active. In other schemes managed by the LRA or Water Establishments (e.g. 
Qasmieh, Yammouneh), or by municipalities (Kfar debiane, Aanjar), no participation is observed 
(Karaa, 2012).Other WUAs have been created by specific development projects, such as the 
Hydro Agriculture Development Project of Marjeyoun (UNDP/CIHEAM – IAMB), which has also 
attempted to elaborate a draft law on WUAs. 
Experience in a huge scheme such as the Gezira in Sudan with large number of smallholders 
under one administration has been reported as a case of successful PIM (Adam, 2003). 
Significant improvements in terms of crop productivity, maintenance, water delivery and fee 
collection rates were related to the given freedom to farmers to choose their crops, their full 
water management of the minor canals and also the government commitment through the 
Ministry of irrigation to keep the main irrigation system (upper system) in good shape and to 
supply the contracted amounts to the WUAs (Abdelhadi et al., 2004). These performance 
improvements were a result of „concerted efforts from all parties to make the pilot project a 
success story‟ and were not necessarily expected to be easily replicable in other Blocks without 
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the same concerted effort (Adam, 2003:18). What the impact of this pilot project is in the longer 
run, is therefore difficult to say, especially because no more recent studies over a longer period 
than 3 years are available. Since 2005 with a new Gezira Act, water user participation was 
generalized in the Gezira Scheme. More recently in 2010, the institutional set-up of water 
management in the system was changed again, with new entities entering the field of water 
management. Unfortunately, we do not know how this has affected the performance of the 
Abdel Hakam pilot project and other areas of the Gezira Scheme. Recent work on the Gezira 
Scheme shows a more complicated picture, were the responsibilities of O&M and fee collection 
are shared between the new Gezira Scheme Management Body, private security companies 
and WUAs. 
8.3 The diversity (and importance) of financial flows 
PIM/IMT worldwide has been strongly motivated by a desire by the state to shift part of the 
financial burden to water users. Cost recovery is chiefly targeted at the O&M costs and very 
seldom at recovering costs of investments, generally considered as sunk costs (see Molle and 
Berkoff, 2008, for more details). Faced with fiscal drought, agencies may either increase 
farmers‟ contribution and/or decrease their own costs. It is remarkable that policy emphasis on 
recovering costs from users often results in deflecting attention from the question on what these 
costs are, and whether they could be reduced in the first place. 
But paying for water does not by itself ensure good maintenance and service. When the receipt 
from water charges is directly channelled to state coffers, there is no certainty that this money 
will come back earmarked for maintenance, and indeed the allocation of funds by the state for 
O&M is known to be quite independent from the receipt. Likewise farmers come to regard 
charges as a tax rather than as anything of direct benefit to themselves. This is even stronger 
when the water fee is incorporated in the land or other tax. Farmers then pressurize politicians 
to reduce - even abolish – the charges; or fight against their being updated or raised. This is the 
case in Morocco, where recovery is one of the highest in the region and worldwide. And in 
Egypt, where water is free, although farmers pay a land tax that may be considered as partly 
accounting for this service. 
As Freeman and Lowdermilk (1991) rightly state: "Farmers are quick to see that, from an 
individually rational standpoint, one is foolish to pay water assessments-especially those whose 
water supply and control are decidedly inferior- when water service is not substantially affected 
by making payment. To disconnect farmer payment of assessments for maintenance, whether 
in cash or kind, from water delivery is virtually to invite organisational decay." 
A second possibility is to have the receipt from water charges collected and directly used by the 
irrigation agency for its O&M activities. Often only one part of the receipt is kept locally and 
other parts go to upper levels of the water bureaucracy (like in Vietnam). In this case managers 
have an incentive to recover fees but the users still don‟t. 
A third option is to have the money collected managed internally by the WUA for local repairs 
and maintenance, or to pay ditch riders, thus ensuring that user payments are used to maintain 
the infrastructure and improve operations in direct sight of the farmers concerned. The focus 
here is not on paying benefit taxes to the state but on ensuring both financial and physical 
sustainability of the tertiary (sometimes secondary) level through direct farmer involvement. In 
such a case the incentive for farmers to pay is much higher, since 1) they decide on what to do 
with the money, and 2) the outcome is of direct benefit to them. 
A forth, hybrid, option is possible whereby the receipt is divided between the WUA and the 
agency. WUAs can directly keep a fraction of the receipt but it is more common to have the 
agency giving back a given percentage (as in Turkey and Azerbaijan?), to cover local O&M 
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costs (sometimes the transfer may also be conditional upon carrying out maintenance works or 
water savings first). 
Cost recovery makes full sense when arrangements are centred on WUAs‟ financial autonomy, 
a clear definition of the responsibilities of managers and users, and inbuilt accountability 
mechanisms (Small et al., 1986, Small and Carruthers, 1991, ICID, 2004). Accountability 
mechanisms may include bulk allocation contracts, for example, but the virtuous circle of 
incentives is closed when managers depend financially on farmers' contributions. In such a 
case, the financial contribution from farmers is not just a transfer of costs to them but becomes 
an expression of their empowerment. Expectedly this situation is quite rare (Philippines, 
Columbia, Peru,..) and not observed in the NEN region. However, autonomy whereby WUAs 
fully decide how to spend funds on maintenance in their tertiary or secondary area, and 
hires/fires gate keepers to manage water locally, is already a substantial achievement. A farmer 
financial contribution to O&M is no doubt necessary if farmers are to be given significant 
managerial powers, but is neither necessary nor sufficient for effective overall management and 
maintenance. In some cases (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia) farmers cover most a substantial fraction 
of O&M costs and receive a reasonable service without strict accountability mechanisms. 
While Small and Carruthers (1991) rightly recognized „linkages existing between structural and 
managerial aspects on the one hand, with financial approaches on the other‟ (Small, 1990) they 
retained a functionalist view of agency-farmers arrangements: that charging linked to 
accountability could ensure transparent and effective cross-compliance and end the 
„degradation vicious circle.‟ They have been criticized for overlooking the wider social and 
political dimensions that affect the level and utilization of charges independently of performance 
(Oorthuizen and Kloezen, 1995). Water charges are elements of negotiation in power struggles 
between farmers and their associations, and between WUAs and the agency or state. While 
these negotiations are bounded by hardnosed realities, such as farmer financial capacity and 
the actual cost of supplying water, they also reflect competing interests, differing perceptions, 
the political clout and bargaining power of the different parties, and the various levels of 
accountability and dependency between them. They are permeated by the distribution of power 
within and across these groups. In other words, while money creates some dependency, 
accountability is often shaped predominantly by inter-group and interpersonal relationships 
expressed in such factors as friendship, kinship, gifts, business partnerships, bribes, threats of 
violence, patronage, debts, asymmetries of power and information, and political allegiance. In 
Taiwan, for example, where the state pays for O&M, accountability is not supported by 
bureaucratic rules but is embedded in social relationships and social control. This warns us 
against simplified views of human organization and may help anticipate dysfunctions. 
Another implication from this discussion is that empowerment of WUAs will be partly linked to 
the legal dispositions regarding fee collection and use. In Morocco a lack of political will to 
empower farmers (Faysse et al., 2010), is well illustrated by the authorities‟ indecision in 
allowing WUAs‟ financial independence (van Vuren et al., 2004): in the Tadla scheme WUAs 
were first established with budgets constituted by the 20% of collected fees handed back to 
them. However, this transfer was later cancelled because it was found to be in contradiction of 
the Code of Agricultural Investments (Doukkali, 2005). 
In many countries where fees are conceived as a tax they can legally only be collected by the 
state and contribute to state revenue. WUAs are therefore not allowed to collect money by 
themselves and keep a part of the receipt. They have to levy additional WUA fees for their own 
current costs, should the law allow it. 
Our review identified, yet other possible financial flows that all reflects different social and 
political arrangements. In Jordan, WUAs are so far registered as cooperatives and may collect 
their own fee as well as constitute their stocks of shares. They cannot collect water charges. But 
instead of having the charges used to cover part of O&M costs, WUAs receive money from the 
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JVA to hire ditch riders and engineers, and to cover some local maintenance costs. This is 
reported to be cheaper for the JVA than ensuring O&M beyond the collective pumping stations; 
and meant that JVA had to reduce its staff accordingly (Adwan, 2012). In Egypt, between 1995 
and 2005, more than 40 Water Boards have been established in Fayoum by the Dutch-funded 
Water Board projects (APP, 2007). The Water Boards were trained to plan and execute (by 
themselves or through local small contractors) O&M works on a yearly basis, with funding 
channelled through the Technical Assistance, thus circumventing the legal constraints faced by 
MWRI to transfer funds to WUO‟s (APP, 2007). These legal constraints can be obviated in the 
framework of pilot projects but are often not removed after the project end, as no legislation is 
issued to fully recognize the new types of organizations. 
This discussion on whether, how and by whom can contributions from users be collected 
extends to how WUAs can, more generally, generate income. This has been discussed in § ‎6.7. 
It is not always very clear, even in official dispositions, what activities WUAs can undertake. As 
Faysse et al., (2010) note regarding the Tadla scheme in Morocco, “although the 1990 WUA law 
does not impede WUAs from undertaking production-related activities, it is not yet clear which 
activities are acceptable for raising funds. WUAs were [also] prohibited from receiving a rebate 
from the irrigation authority in exchange for their activities. The limited enthusiasm farmers 
showed at the beginning completely vanished when they learnt that they had to fund the WUA 
on top of what they were already paying to the irrigation authority”. 
Another dimension of financial flows is who determines how much users have to pay. It is 
generally the state agency (even for communal systems in Tunisia, where the CRDA 
determines the fee) but it is sometimes left to WUAs, like in Azerbaijan, where the fee reflects 
the maintenance needs of each area. While farmers generally react to high water prices (like in 
the Tadla, where demonstrations were staged two years ago against planned hikes), the agency 
sometimes cap the amount that WUAs can charge to avoid conflicts and possible abuses; this 
happened in Azerbaijan, at the cost of local-level maintenance and WUAs‟ autonomy. 
8.4 The political economy context of IMT 
Bureaucratic reforms that alter the relationship and the distribution of roles and power between 
the state and citizens are seldom implemented by an enlightened decision-maker suddenly 
convinced by the necessity of some change. They unfold in complex bureaucratic and political 
environments and are linked to wider societal changes. It is remarkable that PIM/IMT reforms 
focus on what farmers should be doing and pay so little attention to the other side of the 
„transfer‟ equation: the state irrigation agencies. If some responsibilities have to be transferred, 
one should look not only at whether this is desirable for the state as a whole (reduction in costs) 
but also whether water bureaucracies have incentives to comply and support changes. We also 
discuss here how PIM/IMT reforms and their relative success/failure are related to their wider 
environment. 
In Morocco the large-scale irrigation schemes developed between the 1950s and the 1980s, 
have long been under strong centralized management. In early days farmers had to comply with 
the land structure, the cropping patterns and the calendars determined by the nine ORMVAs, 
while prices were fixed by the government (Faysse et al., 2010; Pérennes, 1993). During the 
structural adjustment years of the 1980s and 1990s, the state withdrew from agricultural and 
marketing activities and raised water charges. The PIM policies put in place, much to the 
insistence of the World Bank, and “as had been the case in the past, the government took the 
initiative, defined the rules of the game in its own way, and maintained the right of oversight of 
the associations operations” (Belghiti, 2005). These policies did not yield significant changes in 
governance and most WUAs remained apathetic or non-existent. We have reviewed a number 
of reasons for this state of affairs (§‎8.2.2), not least the one-way burden that was to be placed 
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upon the WUAs. Van Vuren et al. (2005) identified a lack of political will for an effective transfer 
of irrigation management, illustrated by the failed intent to devolve part of the collect fees to 
farmers, and noted that “the staff from the ORMVAT does not want to lose its position as 
irrigation manager” (Van Vuren et al., 2004). Likewise, Bergh (2007) identifies a problem with 
the “purely technical and depoliticized view of participation that dominates the attitudes of 
Moroccan civil servants… The deeper origin of such attitudes lie in the central government‟s 
reluctance to open up the spaces that are necessary for a more political sense of agency to 
develop. The latter would in turn allow participation to unfold as a truly transformative power for 
rural development”. 
A similar situation is observed in Egypt, where a lack of motivation is perceptible at both the 
field-staff and manager levels. Field staff includes managers from the ministry at the 
Directorates and district levels, as well as the gate operators (bahari), but also dedicated project 
staff (e.g. IIP) and the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) that was created to spearhead the 
creation and training of WUAs. It is apparent that field staff has an inadequate sense of 
ownership and understanding of the improvements made by IIP (APP, 2007), are subject to 
frequent rotation and transfers, and have little incentives and even self-interest in the work they 
are supposed to perform. 
Indeed the lack of field staff‟ personal involvement in WUAs formation can be explained by 
several negative incentives “like the absence of rewards, career risks, over-asking WUOs, risk 
of delays in construction, lack of endorsement by superiors, etc” (APP, 2007). The failed 
implementation of continuous flow provides a good example of this state of affairs. Beyond 
technical justifications it is apparent that continuous flow basically dispenses with the need for 
bahari and reduces the intervention needed by both the local gate keepers and the district 
engineers. This results not only in a loss of social status, prestige, self-esteem and sense of 
usefulness, but also of the complementary income that comes with farmers‟ demands for extra 
supply and associated bribing (Hvidt, 1998). 
Likewise it can be argued that the failure to pass the revision of the Law 12 (which made it up to 
parliament 10 years ago but has not been ratified) is, in no small proportion, linked to the 
disincentives to staff at different levels. Empowering BCWUAs might not only make staff 
redundant (which is actually a stated objective), replace private maintenance contractors by 
community-based and -controlled operators, but it is likely to come with greater exigencies for 
accountability and improved water management formulated by user organizations with a 
stronger negotiating-power. All this is extremely disruptive of the status quo and of the 
„management-as-usual‟ strategy that minimizes management input. 
There is also evidence that the ministry‟s officials were somehow confused by the multiplicity of 
institutional building programmes in Egypt, where WUAs, BCWUA, local water boards, district 
water boards, integrated districts, Farmers‟ federations, etc. were (and still are) developed in 
parallel by diverse projects funded by USA, The Netherlands, Germany, Japan, IFAD or the 
World Bank, without clear policy direction on resolving possible antagonisms or contradictions 
(Allam, 2004). 
Barakat (APP, 2007) aptly describes the division of MWRI staff into two categories. The first 
category includes officials who see institutional building as a part of a wide participatory policy 
(PIM), whereby the communication between engineers and users is improved, farmers solve 
some internal conflicts among users, elect representatives to liaise with ministry staff, collect 
information on crop calendar, and take care of O&M activities at the tertiary level and below 
(that are beyond the officials‟ purview and interest): “they see WUOs as an extension of the 
MWRI”. The second category includes officials with a deeper reform agenda in mind who see 
irrigation management transfer (IMT) as including a reduction in both the prerogatives and the 
budget/staff of the ministry, against an empowerment of farmers to be organized at different 
levels and increasingly in charge of O&M in an autonomous way, with a degree of accountability 
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to be established between managers and users. As Barakat stresses, “both reformers and 
improvers are not well aware of the perspective of the other group. Because both groups make 
use of the same (generally accepted) words and terminology it is quickly assumed that there is 
agreement, while in reality each group means something completely different when using the 
terminology”. 
All these contextual institutional elements provide entry-point to an analysis that goes beyond 
emphasizing the infamous “lack of political will”, commonly conjured up in critical evaluation of 
reforms. On this basis it is dubious that only mitigating the usually advanced causes of failure 
(“lack of clear instructions from higher levels”, “the absence of legal status for WUOs”, the “lack 
of skills or training” or more strangely the fact that “MWRI field level has not been instructed to 
involve the WUOs in the decision-making” (APP, 2007)), can revert a situation described as “the 
zero-involvement of WUOs at present” (APP, 2007). 
We may continue zooming out and look at the wider political economy of agriculture and of the 
water sector. Reforms that alter decision-making power and/or the bureaucratic configuration of 
agencies are embedded within larger political or societal changes. The case of Jordan provides 
some illustration. 
The achievements of the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), since its establishment in 1977, have 
been mixed. Efficiency of irrigation has been increased due to a shift to pressurized delivery and 
micro-irrigation but later decreased due to maintenance costs and deterioration of the network, 
as well as degradation of both relationships between the JVA and farmers and collective action 
between farmers dependant of the same pumping station. Early rehabilitation efforts focused on 
the redesign and improvement of piped networks (TO2 project) but farmers rejected the transfer 
of the management to farmer's organizations (Mazareh et al., 2004). A GTZ-funded project 
started in 2001 attempted to redefine co-management by the JVA and WUAs in a context made 
difficult by resistance of farmers to this change due to previous negative experience with JVA, 
increasing transfers of fresh water to Amman and recurrent shortages in the valley, social 
heterogeneities (with large farmers favouring the status quo), dilapidated infrastructures and 
piped networks, and a lack of adequate legal frame for the farmers participation in the irrigation 
management (GTZ, 2010; Ababneh and Al Adwan, 2012). 
The JVA was put under pressure in 2003, when rumours of privatization of the Authority were 
heard. At this stage a few promising interventions in four pumping stations provided a hope for a 
model, whereby farmers would take control of O&M beyond the point of the collective pumping 
station, leaving the JVA mainly with the operation and maintenance of the main canal. JVA was 
bedevilled with problems of corruption, over-staffing, and declining technical capacity (recruiting 
staff other than worker had been banned for ten years). With reduced budgets, vanishing 
political support, pressures from the cabinet to implement wider decentralization and 
privatisation, drought years which revealed poor water management, and complaints emanating 
from politically quite powerful tribes in the valley, JVA‟s room for manoeuvre was drastically 
reduced (Regner, 2012). 
In 2008, the Ministry of Water incorporated the transfer of O&M to WUAs in the strategy of the 
Ministry and then into the National strategy, whereby WUAs would be made obligatory, with 
prerogatives to be defined by a new law that would give a legal basis to WUAs so that they 
could not be reversed by the administration. 
As detailed above, WUAs now receive money from the JVA to hire ditch riders and engineers, 
and to cover some local maintenance costs. They are in charge of O&M within the service areas 
of the pumping stations and are becoming partners in the co-management of the scheme. The 
weakening of the JVA‟s political position, as well as the weakening of agriculture within the 
Jordanian economy altogether defined a background where some changes in agency/farmers 
relationships could more easily occur. Rehabilitation of pumping schemes and social facilitation 
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by the French and German cooperation respectively, complemented the stream of favourable 
conditions for a change. 
Although reform often seems to be imposed from above or outside, in the case of Mexico Rap et 
al. (2004) argue that water reform was strongly linked with the engagement of the Mexican 
bureaucracy that was aware of insufficient funds for operation and maintenance under the 
financial crisis in Mexico. In the case of Turkey “there seems little doubt that dealing with 
runaway personnel costs and vanishing maintenance funding were primary motives driving DSI 
in its push to transfer O&M responsibilities to local control with such rapidity” (Kodal et al., 
2005). Commitments and political will may also be the result of policy articulation rather than 
prerequisites for reform. 
Zooming out further, we need to take into account “path-dependencies” (the importance of past 
history in determining evolutions) and the historical contexts of PIM/IMT reforms. While early 
programmes were focused on achieving a number of local objectives, for which WUAs were a 
necessary element, water policies took a much more reformist turn during the structural 
adjustments of the early 1990s, when the then ubiquitous ideology of „rolling-back the state‟ 
translated into policy proposals that moved from conventional participatory approaches to more 
radical management transfer programmes. The rationale of these transfers was unambiguously 
linked to a will to reduce state expenditures and shift part of the O&M burden onto farmers. It 
was also expected that decentralisation, transfer, and the privatization of some tasks (e.g. some 
maintenance work being handled and paid for by BCWUAs in Egypt, but more generally 
allowing the private sector to take managerial and financial control over operation and 
maintenance) would result in more efficient outcomes in terms of water control. This was a clear 
driver of the Turkish IMT programme. In Egypt the former Minister of Irrigation, as mentioned in 
the introduction, stated that “irrigation operation and maintenance always require big efforts and 
form a large financial burden to the government… [and spoke of the] great desire to transfer the 
irrigation management responsibility to farmer's organizations”. 
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, too, irrigation reforms were both triggered and shaped by the 
peculiarity of the recent political history. In general, this region faced the decline of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent geopolitical and resource struggles between major power blocks and 
individual countries along the borders of the former Soviet empire. Further, after independence 
these countries experienced the disintegration of a complete system of centralized planning of 
irrigated agriculture and the reorientation towards a market-oriented economy. Irrigation reforms 
thus became triggered by and followed the land reform policies that broke up former state and 
collective farms. Different countries followed other trajectories dependent on this regional history 
and the rate and pace of land and water reforms. 
8.5 Policy models and their formation 
Last, we can zoom out one more time to consider the global context in which concepts like PIM 
or IMT are designed, as well as the interests and practices of donors with regard to the way 
development and cooperation projects are implemented. At the confluence of participatory 
rhetoric and the politics of „rolling back the state‟, institutional reforms carried out under the 
banner of PIM or IMT have acquired the status of a panacea (Meinzen-Dick, 2007) and have 
become standard policy recommendations. The Mexican model, in particular, has fulfilled the 
role of a „policy model‟ in the dissemination of institutional „best practices‟ (Molle, 2008). 
It is not rare to see donors, or their consultants, having to pursue the reforms they have 
promoted or designed even though they are aware that the conditions for the sustainability of 
WUAs are not met. In no known case has the proper mobilization of funds for O&M been 
ensured after the project, and the likelihood of having enduring and effective WUAs is extremely 
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low. In Azerbaijan, the sustainability of WUAs in non-rehabilitated was a matter of concern. The 
World Bank (2011a) recognized that they “will also only become strong and sustainable if the 
economic productivity of agriculture increases through changes in crops, better cultivation 
practices, value-added crop processing and access to good markets. This will require a 
significant role for the Ministry of Agriculture. Without improvements in the value and stability of 
irrigated agriculture and more open, democratic decision-making, WUAs will be weak”. Wishful 
thinking allowing, the outcome is left to be dependent on hypothetic (and unlikely) 
developments. If farmers are unlikely to pay for O&M at the levels required, the government 
might step in. But here, too, “It is still not clear to what extent the Government will adequately 
fund O&M at the main scheme level”, notably drainage. 
In other situations, donors –and their consultants- spend remarkable energy in trying to 
generate enthusiasm for their reforms. In Egypt PIM/IMT policies were strongly supported by 
USAID, for whom Egypt had joined “other governments around the world [which were 
attempting] to reduce their recurring expenditures on irrigation and stabilize deterioration of 
scheme infrastructure without sacrificing the productivity of irrigated agriculture” (IRG et al., 
2001b). No efforts were spared in trying to convince the rank and files of the ministry of the 
desirability and inevitability of the reform. Numerous field trips arranged for politicians and 
officials to see by themselves IMT and privatization models in other countries, trainings and 
lobbying efforts helped to provide the “bureaucratic orientation” required (Aziz, 1995). 
Since development bank and aid experts have ben instrumental in introducing and supporting 
PIM/IMT based reforms in the water sector, it is therefore not surprising that they use, with 
some exception, a very positive language to describe what is being achieved, or what could be 
achieved: In Egypt “The incentives for the GOE and farmers to undertake the development 
BCWUA are clear and compelling. MWRI, through this IMT policy initiative, has set in motion a 
long-term evolutionary process, which will allow the GOE to significantly reduce its costs while 
continuing to expand its coverage and services in other areas” (IRG et al.; 2001a). There is little 
room for doubt or reflection on the contexts in which the policy would be more relevant, or on 
the possible variations it could follow: “Formation and establishment of water user associations 
at the branch canal level is viable, highly desirable means of advancing farmer participation in 
irrigation management” (IRG et al.; 1999a). 
There is also strong emphasis on the willingness of the Egyptian government to embrace 
reforms and changes, even though –as shown above- this is not true for all levels or 
individuals.8 For example, the GOE is seen as being “keen to replicate BCWUAs in non-IIP 
areas, and to take the organizing and supporting of WUAs out of a “project” modality and have it 
in the mainstream of MPWWR‟s work” (IRG et al.; 1998b). Effective water user participation in 
irrigation system improvement, operation, maintenance and management are said to be “a 
policy objective of the Ministry” (IRG et al., 1998) that is described emphatically: “The GOE 
transfer of major management responsibilities for sections of the irrigation system above the 
mesqa-level to stakeholders and/or the private sector is a bold advance toward the goal of 
participatory management and privatization of the irrigation system. Although irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) is now a major feature of irrigation delivery in many other countries, 
IMT is only now being launched in Egypt. Successful implementation of this benchmark will be a 
major turning point for this process to take hold at the grass-roots level of the GOE. MWRI has 
prepared a master IMT plan to the year 2025, culminating in a transfer program of selected 
main canals and drains” (IRG et al.; 2001a). 
                                               
8
 But some of the ministry officials did share/echo donors‟ enthusiasm (e.g. “The modernized process, through 
implementing the full package of the IIP, can be considered as revolutionary changes in the irrigation system in 
Egypt”, Allam, 2002). 
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The diversity of WUAs points to the inappropriateness of the universal blue-print models often 
observed (e.g. Mollinga and Bolding, 2004) and policy documents sometimes explicitly state 
that models need to be adapted to the context and needs of people. Nevertheless, the 
standardization of organizational models is ongoing among donors and governments. So, what 
drives this process of standardization and formalization of WUAs? 
First, as water professionals and researchers we also participate in this process of 
standardization by labelling a large variety of organizational forms as WUAs that are similar in 
shape and appearance, but different in practice, content and context.  
Second, institutional theory explains the role that coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphic 
pressures play in the adoption and spreading of organizational standards (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Brunsson et al, 2012). Coercive pressures often originate from international bodies or the 
state, as we have seen throughout this study. Normative or expert pressures occur in a context 
of professions that share a common knowledge base and disciplinary background and have a 
dominant influence on policy making, in this case for example engineers. Mimetic pressures 
mean that organizations often model themselves on other organizations, not necessarily to 
improve performance, but to achieve external legitimacy.  
Third, standardization is part of a bureaucratic process of policy making that includes the 
creation and diffusion of organizational models, enhanced by well-supported and privileged pilot 
projects, promotional campaigns and their further up-scaling (Rap, 2006). Further, the 
acceleration of the IMT policy process like in Turkey or Kyrgyzstan imposes a degree of 
routinization, homogenization and replicability. Finally, the way in which the national 
bureaucracy and international development institutions constructs rural society in terms of 
organization imperatives facilitates standardization (Mosse, 1999)? 
This section draws our attention to the fact that policy reform outcomes should not merely be 
seen as some kind of social engineering, where a set of given measures -if properly 
implemented by the state - should mechanically lead to successful outcomes. Reforms are 
embedded within broader political transformations at the national and global levels. 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 General conclusions 
This report has investigated the role and importance of Water User Associations (WUAs) in the 
NEN region. WUAs distinguish themselves from traditional communal - largely autonomous- 
collective action around the management of relatively limited sources of water, such as springs, 
qanats, wells, or small river diversions. They are basically creatures of the state: it is useful to 
distinguish between a first situation, where WUAs are set up to be the counterpart of donor- of 
state-initiated projects, and are expected to ensure their physical and financial sustainability, 
and a second situation where WUAs are meant to co-manage large public irrigation schemes 
with public agencies. In both cases however, institutional building is shrouded in a participatory 
rhetoric and largely thought of, and implemented by, state or development agencies. 
Participatory irrigation management (PIM) and irrigation management transfer (IMT) have been 
prominent in many policy packages of national water sectors worldwide. Although in line with 
the emergence of participation as a central theme of natural resources management, PIM/IMT 
policies are unambiguously linked to the „rollback the state‟ ideologies of the late 80s and 90s. 
They correspond to structural adjustments, massive deficits of government budgets, donors‟ 
frustration in the face of the recurring degradation of irrigation infrastructure, and a depreciation 
of the role of the state as the central actor of economic development. As a result, state-initiated 
PIM/IMT policies often heavily emphasize the financial autonomy of Water User Associations in 
charge of, or benefiting from, some water infrastructure, be it independent or part of a larger 
public state-managed scheme. Financial autonomy means that WUAs are chiefly expected to 
ensure both cash and in-kind contributions to the operation and management of these hydraulic 
networks, thus lowering state expenditures. 
Institutional building, however, is too often mistakenly conceived of as a sort of social 
engineering. Functionalist approaches look for the right mix of internal rules, enabling 
environments, and management tools that are supposed or expected to be conducive to active 
and sustainable water user groups. This is fully in line with conventional approaches to water 
governance and mirrors the fundamental „pillars‟ on which good governance is supposed to rest 
(GWP). 
Social dynamics in general, and collective action in particular, are however not easily elicited or 
shaped by voluntary approaches, often implemented in the framework of a time-bond and 
budget-limited development project. Human groups are not homogenous and rarely found to be 
self-organizing just because one believes “it is in their interest” to do so. In large-scale public 
schemes managed by irrigation agencies, water users at any scale are dependent upon water 
fluxes and management decisions taken at upper levels. This practical interdependence is also 
shaped by the power dynamics which permeate the allocation of scarce resources and by the 
wider cultural relationships between the state and the citizenry. These general introductory 
statements are needed to understand the context in which the following detailed conclusions are 
to be considered. 
Overall few WUAs in the region can be said to be active and performing as planned. 
Participation has been in most cases limited, if not cosmetic, and the physical and financial 
sustainability of both hydraulic infrastructures and Associations are not forthcoming, especially 
in large scale public schemes. Determining whether WUAs in the NEN region are effective or 
not, and how they could be made more efficient and sustainable, gradually appeared to us as 
an inadequate overarching question. Our review has led us to formulating the following 
comments and conclusions: 
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 Available literature. Most of the literature on PIM/IMT experiences originates from 
individuals belonging to ministries, companies, or aid agencies that are linked to these 
projects and merely publicize their results in a summary and uncritical manner. The 
advantage is that these professionals have first hand information, yet this also creates 
powerful incentives to report and produce evidence on the success of policy and may 
generate less attention for those aspects of policy that work differently than the model 
predicts. Assessments usually concern on-going or just completed projects and changes 
are frequently reported in a partial and/or vague way. There is a sheer lack of 
independent, comprehensive, long-term assessments, which makes it very difficult to 
discuss the sustainability of any arrangement or reform. 
 Review of effectiveness. Reviewing the performance of WUAs in their three main 
responsibility domains (water management, maintenance, financial management) was 
disappointing. One of the reasons is the high diversity of situations and reporting. There 
is a mixture of data that relates to ongoing projects, projects that have just been 
completed, as well as more general country level analyses. Most of the literature 
available is very sketchy in its description of how operation and maintenance are 
conducted in practice. Measuring improvement or changes in the quality of water 
management and maintenance is not easy; few -if any- studies provide well-documented 
evidence of changes and causal links. 
 Limitations to quantitative assessments. As a result our initial attempts to quantify the 
magnitude of changes associated with the establishment of WUAs or wider policy 
reforms appeared to be vain. Even aggregated or qualitative indicators of changes were 
found to be illusory. The analysis was therefore redirected to illustrating the diversity of 
cases, discussing implementation and policy processes, and reflecting on wider 
institutional and political practices. 
 Emphasize qualitative nature of social processes. PIM/IMT is by nature a social process 
and the quality of this process –changes in behaviors, social interactions, sense of 
responsibility, accountability mechanisms, etc- is very hard to capture on a quantitative 
scale. 
 Internal and external (un)favourable conditions. An IFAD study in 2001 (Bishay et al., 
2001) found that the technical, productivity and financial impact of WUAs are likely to be 
enhanced when: (i) WUAs are appropriately established, trained and operate efficiently 
and equitably, (ii) WUAs are given opportunity to participate in planning of the tertiary 
system, (iii) WUA members have access to other needed production inputs and 
infrastructure, (iv) There is irrigation agency or other government (e.g. MOA) or NGO 
support for WUAs, and (v) The external policy environment is supportive of WUA 
operation. Vermillion (1995), based on a study of IMT programmes in five countries, 
identified five conditions for successful IMT efforts: strong high-level political support with 
clear policy direction, legal basis for new managing entities, economic benefits for 
farmers, well defined water rights at system and farmer levels, functional irrigation. Other 
studies (Garces-Restrepo et al, 2007; Aditi et al., 2010, etc) have identified the same 
and other factors. 
Generally speaking, context-specific factors positively correlated with effectiveness 
include the small size of systems, positive incentives to both farmers and WUAs staff, 
leadership and strong social capital, administrative, managerial and accounting skills, 
the provision of a diversity of services, democratic choice of board members, the 
definition of clear policies and responsibilities for each party involved in water 
management, adequate staffing levels and physical infrastructure, a legal framework, 
low interference from politicians or other groups, high-level political commitment, 
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marketing facilities, predictable water supply and irrigation scheduling, sufficient revenue 
(state budget and user participation) to support proper O&M and prevent the degradation 
of irrigation and drainage infrastructures, etc. Conversely, WUAs are negatively affected 
by the lack of such factors and conditions. 
 Are legal frameworks key? While these many factors are well identified, it is however 
apparent that none of them is either necessary or sufficient. A good example is provided 
by the oft-stated necessity to have a clear legal framework defining the attributions of 
WUAs. The diversity of cases in the region illustrated that the correlation was not so 
obvious: countries without proper legislation, but which have made use of other 
institutional and legal configurations (eg Turkey and Jordan), fared better than others 
where specific pieces of legislation have been passed (eg Morocco, where WUAs 
attributions amount to a long list of duties). 
 Elections and democracy. Likewise, the election of WUA boards by democratic election 
is seen as key to ensuring legitimacy and transparency. However the democratic nature 
of elections is often affected by the high rate of illiteracy of farmers (e.g. 70% in the 
Tadla case, Morocco), and the capture of the organization by local elites or powerful 
people. In some cases the WUAs are controlled by the ruling party, while board 
members may use their new position and power as springboards to political positions. In 
such organizations, elections may take place only to conform to the requested formal 
procedure. They are perhaps often a necessary step, but clearly not sufficient to ensure 
proper management of the WUAs and their representativeness. 
 Illusive Leadership. Charismatic or strong leadership, once again appears to be a 
paramount factor in explaining local social dynamics and successful collective action. 
This is of little help to social engineering approaches, because such occurrence largely 
lies beyond external interventions and remains as a fact of life rather than something 
which can be duplicated or even enhanced. 
 The predictability of water supply. Like in many other places, water efficiency at both the 
plot and system level is heavily determined by the quality in supply ensured by scheme 
managers. 
PIM/IMT are heavily focused on the new roles that farmers or water users should be 
fulfilling. Much of the blame for water overuse or degradation of infrastructure is placed 
on farmers. This conveniently detracts attention from the responsibility of the irrigation 
agency itself. Of concern are not only whether the actual O&M costs that are expected to 
be partly shouldered by farmers are acceptable (in other words why would farmers 
accept to pay for overstaffed and costly administrations) but also whether the way water 
is distributed to the different user groups is predictable enough to enable them to 
manage water at the lower levels. 
Improvement in the predictability of water supply is probably the most important 
expectation by farmers (e.g. Nubaria‟s New Land in Egypt). It is noteworthy that 
instances where management transfers have resulted in commitments from the agency, 
and therefore in creating a degree of accountability, are very rare in the region. Even 
transfer agreements in Turkey do not mention the bulk amount of water that a given 
WUA is supposed to receive. Agreements are more specific in Kyrgyzstan and 
Azerbaijan, but we didn‟t find evidence that something happens when planned bulk 
allocation is not respected. Only Jordan and Morocco ensure volumetric service, but the 
volumes allocated are defined by quotas that are much below farmer requirements. 
 Financial management. While financial management, and its transparency to members, 
is rightly seen as key to the good functioning of WUAs, hardly any report/article dwells 
on how WUAs effectively manage their finance; whether wrongdoing is frequent or not. 
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 What should a WUA have/be? The search for a definite number of parameters and 
conditions that should be ensured in order to produce effective words is illusory, for two 
reasons. The first reason is factual: as there are very few, if any, both performing and 
enduring WUAs in large-scale public irrigation schemes, it is virtually impossible to 
identify conditions or contexts, conducing to successful comanagement. This applies to 
the NEN region but is probably true worldwide (even if some statistical analysis may 
prove to be worth, when the cases considered are restricted to a more homogenous 
sample, like farmer managed irrigation schemes in Nepal, or Taiwan, to take a few 
examples of earlier studies). 
 Consider social „thickness‟. The second reason is more fundamental. It enounces the 
limits of a functionalist approach where institutional building is akin to social engineering, 
and success merely the result of the optimal adjustment of institutional nuts and bolts. 
There is little room here for competing interests, differing perceptions, the political clout 
and bargaining power of the different parties, and the various levels of accountability and 
dependency between them. They are permeated by the distribution of power within and 
across these groups. WUAs are not homogeneous and inter-group and interpersonal 
relationships are expressed in such factors as friendship, kinship, gifts, business 
partnerships, bribes, threats of violence, patronage, debts, asymmetries of power and 
information, and political allegiance. 
 Determining water fees. Regardless of what is felt by consultants and economists to be 
the right cost of water to be paid by farmers, it is apparent that actual prices reflect more 
pragmatic realities (farmers‟ ability to pay; the state‟s legitimacy to impose payments; as 
gauged by the quality of the water supply service it is able to ensure; the political clout 
and bargaining powers of the different parties; the political risk to increase prices; etc). 
 Cost recovery and its hurdles. Irrespective of the price of water charged to users and of 
the way it is recovered in practice, it is abundantly clear that water fees are always 
insufficient to cover operation and maintenance costs, even if there were fully recovered, 
which is never the case. This is true for both farmer managed schemes and public 
irrigation systems, and only one WUA (GDA) in Tunisia was found to be capable of fully 
covering both current and emergency needs. 
 Can farmers pay for O&M? An implicit conclusion is that IMT policies focused on shifting 
costs to farmers group might just be unrealistic in most settings. In several cases it was 
clear that objectives of reducing the role and expenditures of the state translated into 
wishful thinking, and into the failure of projects as soon as direct support ended. While in 
many cases farmers are capable of taking over costs and management roles at the 
tertiary level, it is clear that it is not the case at the secondary level. At this level financial 
autonomy is probably only possible within the framework of a sweeping reform that 
would not only transfer costs but also empower farmers and assure a degree of 
accountability of the irrigation agency. No such transfer can be found in the NEN region. 
 Second generation problems? The main problems facing WUAs after PIM/IMT have 
been dubbed „second generation problems‟ (see Svendsen et al., 1997; Hamdy, 2004) 
and include insecurity of water supply, lack of support from irrigation agencies, economic 
and physical un-sustainability of irrigation systems, especially related to insufficient 
financial autonomy, insufficient financial and administrative management skills of both 
agencies and WUA staffs. With hindsight, this can rather be read as a failure to 
implement institutional changes, further to early statements of success based on 
superficial indicators (number of WUAs established and trainings carried out, initial 
increase in water fee collection, apparent adherence of agency staff, etc). 
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 Build on existing organizations. Standard WUAs are often created in contexts where 
other organizational forms are already in place and could be made use of. For example, 
in the new lands of Egypt, cooperatives are already significantly involved in both 
operation and maintenance, and have effective mechanisms to enforce payment of 
expenditures by farmers. Adjusting or expanding their mandate might be a much smarter 
way forward than creating additional artificial organizations that have no legitimacy and 
power. 
 WUA‟s horizontal expansion (economic diversification). At present it is difficult for most 
WUAs to generate sufficient income to cover the ordinary expenditures related to O&M, 
let alone rehabilitation. One solution can be to raise irrigation tariffs to the level of 
financial sufficiency, but this is financially and politically extremely difficult and unlikely. 
Another solution consists in diversifying WUAs‟ activities (horizontal expansion), 
including fertilizer, pesticide and seed supply, sale and repair of on-farm irrigation 
equipments, animal husbandry services, transport facilities (e.g. refrigerated vehicles), 
crop processing and storage, marketing, contract farming, loans, incentives, sale of 
water to other users, renting-out land or equipment, etc. However functional 
diversification generates its own risks and requires considerable professional and 
managerial knowledge, but also strong social capital among the members of the WUAs, 
and transparency in financial management, with rules and legal frameworks to regulate 
services and help prevent financial abuse. 
Although evidence from the region is limited, we tend to endorse Garces-Restrepo et 
al.‟s (2007) statement that “The possibility for WUAs to make profits and engage in 
agribusiness should be explored. Most governments resist this and do not allow WUAs 
to engage in activities other than irrigation system management. However where 
permitted, WUAs have often developed cooperative purchases of inputs, agribusiness 
activities and group marketing that have proved viable particularly in Asia. These 
activities build on the social capital created by the WUAs and can build stronger loyalty 
to the WUA if managed properly”. 
 Financial flows. Financial flows (who pays how much and for what) in public schemes 
are critical to ensuring both sustainability and accountability between parties. In most 
cases, however, water fees go to state coffers, without direct link and much impact on 
the local operation and maintenance. In some countries like Turkey and Azerbaijan 
WUAs keep and manage part of the receipt to pay for local costs, including hiring their 
own staff (this is now also the case in the Jordan Valley). Agency‟s staff is never directly 
paid by water fees, which precludes any kind of accountability through users‟ payment. 
 Imposed collective action? The local maintenance that can be done through farmers‟ 
collective action (typically cutting grass and cleaning small canals) is hard to elicit 
through an external intervention if farmers have not been able to organize in the past; 
especially if the organizational form is imposed from the top and comes together with an 
increase in duties and costs to farmers. 
 Assessment of costs and benefits to users. It is apparent that most reforms are launched 
based on unrealistic assessments of the costs (underestimated) and of the benefits 
(overestimated). When the former end up offsetting the latter then the whole process of 
collective action is undermined and quickly annihilated. Governments, on their side, tend 
to focus on their perception of the benefits (reduction of state expenditures). This 
explains why the „expected outcomes‟ do not materialize to the extent that would make 
the associated concrete benefits large enough to instil adherence of members to the 
reform. 
Page | 100 
 
 Assessment of costs and benefits to managers. PIM/IMT policies also display a lack of 
concern for the incentives faced by managers and officials in concerned agencies. By 
definition PIM/IMT policies are meant to reduce agencies attribution, and more often 
than not budget and staff, and yet this staff is also precisely the expected agent of 
change. Capacity building and awareness raising are obviously not sufficient to elicit 
adherence to reforms. Frequent failure to pass laws empowering WUAs (or processes 
than take one or two decades and lead to watered down legislation) can also be 
ascribed to the disincentives to line agencies and ministries. 
 Reforms and societal changes. Reforms that alter decision-making power and/or the 
bureaucratic configuration of agencies are embedded within larger political or societal 
changes that have a strong bearing on effectiveness. The case of Jordan provides an 
illustration of change whereby the agricultural sector has partly lost its importance and 
where the irrigation agency (JVA) has come under both political and financial pressure. 
 Community management vs. public management. It is paramount to distinguish between 
community-managed (small) systems and large public schemes. In the first case, WUAs 
are supposed to be as autonomous as possible (at least in financial terms) and generally 
have greater latitude to design them management rules. Since many of these systems 
are akin to common pool resources systems, they also have substantial and ancient 
social capital; although this capital is frequently challenged by growing heterogeneity in 
communities (migrants coming in, economic diversification which may decrees the 
interest of some farmers in agriculture, etc) or by changes in the resource itself (springs 
or qanats undermined by wells, river diversion affected by upstream development, etc). 
In the case of public schemes, collective action is often more strictly defined through the 
establishments of WUAs which generally face higher costs than benefits, and are more 
tightly controlled by state agencies. 
 State interventions in farmer-managed schemes. While theses external interventions 
have succeed to meet „some‟ technical objectives, they have often weakened traditional 
management. This may happen through the disappearing of collective labour for 
seasonal repairs (for example of weirs or qanats) and the social links that it both help 
creates and result from, or through the induced perception that major works or 
rehabilitation are eventually the responsibility of the state. It also happens that a new 
project brings additional benefits (e.g. the possibility to expand the irrigation area) which 
may be captured by local elites, thus reinforcing inequities. In other cases, however, it 
was observed that WUA formation was taken advantage of by younger generations 
eager to challenge the status quo of older elites. In yet other cases, WUAs are seen as 
convenient channels for political influence, and are either controlled by the ruling party or 
opportunistically used by some individual with political ambitions. 
In other words, there is insufficient attention to the fact that external interventions, 
however technical they may appear, often have a bearing on the distribution of power 
and benefits within the community. As such, they trigger individual strategies and social 
dynamics that are often quite different from the desired collective action expected from 
formal WUAs for the sake of the common good. 
 Pervasive state control. In most countries, the state by means of its water, agricultural, 
environmental bureaucracy retains a tight control over WUAs. As we have seen in this 
report, this happens for example by controlling the election of board members, the legal 
status of WUAs, the rights and responsibilities stated in legal documents, the direction of  
revenue flows, or their societal and political role. The governmental bureaucracy thus 
effectively plays a determining role in making and implementing PIM/IMT policies. It 
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shapes WUAs in ways that are instrumental to its interests.  Any idea to change the 
relationship between state, society and market in water management, therefore also 
requires a perspective on bureaucratic reform.  
 Imposed models and legitimacy. The degree in which WUAs were externally imposed to 
materialize the (financial) needs or cover for the limitations and costs of international and 
national organizations does not contribute to their internal legitimacy and authority 
among water users. On the contrary, in some cases the formalization WUAs has 
destroyed or weakened the authority of existing customary organizations. Admittedly, in 
a limited number of cases, especially through horizontal integration, the WUA has 
enabled existing community institutions to link in new and productive ways to the 
government and the market. 
 Contextualizing policy changes. In order to move beyond the single-minded focus on the 
success of IMT and PIM policies and the performance of WUAs, this study has tried to 
re-contextualize these policies in time and space as part of a set of wider policy and 
transformation processes occurring across various scales: 
- following the end of the Cold War and furthering the advance of global capitalism  
- following a long process of centralization of water management in the state  
- part of neo-liberal transformations aimed at rolling back the state, such as 
privatization, liberalization & decentralization 
- structural reforms of state-led and central planning systems into a market-based 
economy 
- policies adopted by governments in the context of financial crisis, dependent on 
international capital, made conditional upon structural adjustment  
- in the former Soviet Union closely associated with agrarian and land reform policies 
and the disintegration of state and collective farms  
- promoted by a policy coalition of international financial institutions, development and 
research institutions and transnational policy elites 
- influenced by geopolitical (and resource capture) shifts between the US, Russia and 
more recently China and other regional powers (e.g. Turkey) 
- embedded in bureaucratic reform processes and internal struggles between different 
bureaucracies 
Understanding this context clarifies the overall focus on the reduction of public 
expenditure and the improvement of fee recovery. Nevertheless, it is still remarkable to 
recollect what an ideological fervour was invested in WUAs, PIM and IMT as the solution 
to many rural problems at the time. Irrigation reforms in different parts of the world 
converged to a large extent and the WUA became a dominant organizational model, 
because policy makers ascribed many ideal features to a WUA that neither the state nor 
the market possesses. Retrospectively, it is not entirely surprising that these policies and 
organizations fail to meet these high expectations. 
 “WUA” obscures diversity. We subscribe to the statement that “WUAs encompass a 
variety of organizations, which assume different names but their basic structure 
conforms to a singular somewhat idealised model of organised user management... 
Imposing blue-print, one size fits all institutional models will not fix the complex and 
diverse management problems of irrigation systems” (IWMI, 2011). 
9.2 IFAD projects and WUAs in the region 
The study‟s comprehensive literature review on water management and WUAs in the NEN 
region included all relevant documents on 12 IFAD projects in seven countries of the region that 
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included a component on setting up or strengthening WUAs (see Appendix 2 for more details on 
the projects). Most IFAD project documents were found to be very general in nature, which led 
us to limiting our analysis to qualitative insights. Since the project documents contain little 
information on the inner workings of WUAs, it has not been possible to carry out an in-depth 
assessment of IFAD‟s approach to setting up WUAs, nor on the determinants of their degree of 
success/failure. But some commonalities associated with wider policy tendencies regarding 
WUAs are presented below. 
International donors and development banks played a major role in promoting IMT/PIM policies, 
together with international organizations, such as FAO, IFAD, IFPRI and IWMI, which played a 
supportive role in the formalization of WUAs. These banks and donors had an interest in the 
physical and financial sustainability of their investments and often made the formation of formal 
WUAs a pre-condition to their loans or grants. In the NEN region and elsewhere these policy 
processes were thus more externally than internally driven. 
Most of the reviewed IFAD projects also included formation and/or strengthening of WUAs - 
although not explicitly as a precondition- as part of the creation, rehabilitation or modernization 
of small-scale to medium scale rural infrastructure for improved agricultural land and water 
management. Project documents, especially those related to Egypt (WNRDP), Tunisia (PDARI 
Siliana and PDARI Zaghouan), Morocco (Province d‟Al-haouz and Taourit-Taforalt), 
Azerbaïdjan (NEDP), Sudan (GSLRP), Yemen (DPRDP), and Jordan (YARDP), indicate that 
IFAD development projects are highly composite/integrated and address several aspects of 
rural livelihoods including agricultural development, rural development, conservation of soils and 
water resources, gender, animal husbandry, financial services, coordination and management, 
roads, health, drinking water, education, etc. Only a few projects had a specific component on 
irrigation (Azerbaijan, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen) (see appendix), and only the North-East 
Development Project of Azerbaijan had as its primary goal to “support WUAs to operate and 
gradually rehabilitate on-farm irrigation and drainage systems on behalf of their members in 
ways that are financially viable, equitable and sustainable”. 
The reporting takes a quantitative and descriptive approach towards the technical as well as the 
institutional achievements, focussing on size, surface and number. This reflects an approach 
focused on the faithful ticking of boxes according to the ideal that WUAs should exist, but does 
not encourage a clear view of where this is heading. Unfortunately, the number of created or 
strengthened WUAs, the amount of surface area managed by WUAs, the number of users 
served, meetings held or board and staff members trained are not reliable indicators for the 
institutional sustainability of WUAs.  
From our review of IFAD projects, we identified factors which can contribute to the sustainability 
of WUAs are:  
 existing communal organizations appropriate WUAs 
 informal and formal organization  
 strong leadership  
 diversification of revenue sources and horizontal integration 
However, what deteriorates the sustainability of WUAs, are:  
 weakening of customary and collective rules & rights  
 political aspect of water management 
 limited and late involvement of water users 
 lack of accountability of the WUA Board 
 lack of marketing and credit facilities 
 low cost recovery for WUAs 
 WUA formation and fee collection externally driven 
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These results confirm the insights of IFAD‟s 2001 study (Bishay et al., 2001) on the factors 
contributing to the establishment of effective and sustainable WUAs (24 IFAD projects in 22 
countries), as well as other studies with similar approaches. 
These factors are not only contextual but are also related to how the process of technical 
intervention and involvement of water users was undertaken. This prompts the need to rethink 
the social engineering approach with which IFAD plans and implements its project interventions 
and combines technical and institutional dimensions of water management. Why does IFAD 
help to establish WUAs? are the expectations behind their establishment realistic? Are WUAs 
the solution to the problems faced by IFAD in achieving needed and sustainable infrastructural 
interventions? Instead of creating new standard associations, is there any existing 
organizational structure which could be used and expanded to fit the project‟s objectives? 
Financial viability may be considered as a core problem of the organizational performance of 
WUAs. Initial expectations are optimistic, because pilot projects show that it is possible to reach 
high degrees of cost recovery with the support of aid/development projects. However when 
these experiences are scaled up to less privileged conditions, cost recovery levels drop 
significantly and many formal WUAs stop to function. Since the level of water fees in farmer 
managed small schemes is generally defined by the users themselves, it is unreasonable to 
expect that associations, under the economic and socio-political conditions observed in most 
projects, will be able in most cases to collect more than running costs; this leaves emergency 
and depreciation costs unattended and indicates that state intervention will often be inevitable in 
the future. 
IFAD and other donors, however, find themselves constrained by the legal framework of each 
country, as well as by the limited degree of autonomy of civil society organization generally that 
is allowed by the states. Although the diversification of activities of WUAs holds the promise to 
increase both the financial capacity of the Association, and the stream of benefits to users, in 
many cases this is not allowed by state legislation. 
The technical and construction components of projects (lining, replacement of earthen canals 
with PVC pipes or concrete canals, digging wells, construction of permanent diversion weirs, 
etc.) usually receive the bulk of the project funds. Since fewer efforts are devoted to “soft 
components”, since it is predictable that in many cases the WUAs are unlikely to be sustainable 
in the mid-to long-term, and since project evaluations are quite superficial, one may question 
whether WUAs are just token organizations needed to 1) package the project in participatory 
rhetoric, 2) make the investment possible. The weakness and superficiality of the monitoring 
and assessments of PIM/IMT project components and policies, prompt the question, that 
applies to all projects in general and IFAD‟s in particular, as to whether anybody really wants to 
know. 
Bergh (2007) (evaluation of IFAD‟s project in the Mountain Zones of Al Haouz Province in 
Morocco) and Pant (2008) showed that lack of openness in the preparation of development 
plans and planning phases, as well as project implementation, was the main impediment in the 
successful execution of IMT/PIM programmes. Indeed, these programmes were apparently not 
widely discussed nor shared with farmers‟ representatives, farmers‟ points of view were not 
incorporated, and works were usually undertaken without any involvement of local 
representatives. Thus, technical design was not conducted in a way that it is effectively 
responsive to farmers‟ concerns and knowledge of the terrain. 
Another common observation is that the efforts devoted to supporting WUAs are in most cases 
minimal, at least when seen in terms of budget and compared with infrastructural components. 
An additional limitation of time-bound projects (even though some IFAD projects lasted between 
5 to 10 years), where institutional activities are often delayed due to the fact that government 
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counterparts are not trained or ready to implement them at the beginning of the project, is that 
social dynamics and learning can rarely be made to fit with the project schedule. 
In spite of these findings, and widespread adoption of the rhetoric of PIM/IMT, not much has 
changed in the social engineering approach applied in the recent past. The way that WUAs 
were addressed is instrumentally filling in an institutional gap according to a particular model of 
a WUA. However, this does not create sustainable organizations able to challenge the problems 
that they are facing, such as bad infrastructure, lack of technical equipment, underpaid staff, no 
incentives for good work, difficulties in collecting fees, etc. 
In summary, IFAD could consider the following options: 
 Questions whether and when formal WUAs established for the projects‟ purposes are 
the most appropriate institutional solution to secure the physical and financial 
sustainability of its interventions; existing organizations (such as cooperatives) might be 
better suited (eg Nubaria project), especially when they allow for horizontal expansion of 
activities. 
 Rethink approaches to plan, monitor, implement and evaluate project interventions and 
combine social, technical and institutional dimensions of land & water management, 
bearing in mind the ultimate purposes of this endeavor; “soft” components should 
probably receive more attention (and budget) than is the case at present. They could 
also be given specific attention at the time of project appraisal (when overoptimistic 
assumptions are made about collective action or agency‟s institutional and political 
support). 
 Make sure local populations are involved in the design and preparation, even if this has 
to lengthen the preparatory phase of the project; this may sound like a standard 
recommendation, but whatever the participatory rhetoric is, this is still found to be 
insufficient and to negatively impact project‟s outcome. 
 Support to WUAs after realization of works is often limited. IFAD could diversify its 
counterparts and involve NGOs to be in charge of institutional support. This could even 
continue at a modest cost after completion of the project. 
 Capacity-building is too often limited to the board members of the association, while 
other members are only considered in „awareness raising‟ activities. This often proves 
insufficient to generate adhesion to collective action and WUAs‟ objectives. Widening 
capacity-building activities is certainly helpful. 
 Reconsider reporting requirements for ongoing projects with the aim to include the social 
and technical as well as institutional process of intervention; it must be recognized that 
this is very hard to achieve through the standard short-term evaluations that are 
currently carried out. Consequently, a few in-depth studies of selected projects could be 
commissioned in order to provide hints on how to better deal with institutional complexity 
and dynamics. 
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11 Annexes 
11.1 Annex 1: Brief retrospective on Water User Organizations in 
Egypt 
Introduction 
Egypt has a rich experience with the development of WUOs in the field of agriculture. This 
includes a diversity of geographical situations (groups around tubewells in the oases, large 
scale irrigation schemes in the valley, the delta, or the new lands), types of water management 
(collective pumps for 4 to 8 farmers in the new lands, or at the tertiary canal level in the old 
lands), and different scales (from the tertiary (mesqa), and the secondary (branch-canal) to the 
district level (around 10 branch canals)). 
In the past 25 years, many projects have dealt with organizing farmers, improving the 
interface/coordination between farmers and irrigation managers, or developing district levels 
“water boards‟ to ensure the participation of all concerned stakeholders. It is therefore very 
instructive to take stock on this rich experience and draw some lessons for the future. A full-
fledge analysis of the numerous initiatives and projects would however be a huge task and this 
section limits itself to providing a summary chronology before addressing the difficulties that 
have been faced and the attitudes from farmers, managers, and donors. Because of its 
importance the Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) is given some more in depth consideration. 
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Chronology 
Some early attention to the potential benefits of better organizing farmers can be traced back to 
the seven-year Egypt - Water Use and Management Project (EWUP, 1977-84), an 
interdisciplinary project implemented by the MWRI and researchers from Colorado State 
University. The project recommended that farmers‟ participation should be sought in the field of 
both irrigation management (scheduling, rotations, improved delivery, etc) and maintenance, 
protection, and upgrading of physical works (current repairs, mesqa improvements, renovations 
of branch canals). This called for the establishment of a special well-trained cadre of 
professionals (Irrigation Advisory Service: IAS) for defining new responsibilities for farmers and 
train them to acquire corresponding skills. 
Other recommendations concerned the benefits that could be expected from disseminating 
collective pumps serving canal (or later piped) delivery networks at the tertiary (mesqa) level as 
a substitute for a situation characterized by diffuse individual pumping from multiple points 
(canals and drains). This led to the Irrigation Improvement Project, launched in 1987, which has 
since then acquired sector status within the MWRI and been supported by several donors and 
international lenders (see more details on IIP and its successors projects later). A direct 
consequence of the technical options proposed and implemented was to make the 
establishment of mesqa level Water Users Associations (WUAs) necessary. Collective pumps 
mean that collective action is needed for operating and maintaining the pump, organize water 
distribution, and pay for energy costs. 
Initially WUAs had no legal status, which among other things constrained their ability to levy 
money and act as independent bodies with full private ownership of the mesqa level 
infrastructures. This changed in 1994 with the modification of the 1984 Law 12, wherein WUAs 
were defined as legal organisations at the mesqa level in the improved irrigation systems (IIP) in 
the old lands, while similarly Water Users Unions (WUUs) were made legal entities for the New 
Lands. The Bylaws of Law 213 (Decree No 14900 of 1995) detailed the rights and duties of the 
WUAs and WUUs. 
In 1995 the Dutch-funded Fayoum Water Management Project established the first Water Users 
Organisations at the Branch Canal or Secondary Canal level called a “Local Water Board” 
(Abdel-Aziz, 2003). These local Water Boards were responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of irrigation intake structures of all mesqas, possible saquias (water wheels), and 
secondary drainage infrastructures in their command areas, weed control, as well as for 
domestic water use based on canal and drains. Small infrastructure works were funded by the 
project where needed. Below this level, infrastructures such as mesqas, individual saquias, 
marwas or field drains remained fully under the purview of individual farmers and are not the 
responsibility of the Water Board. Membership of the Water Board was made obligatory for all 
users of water drawn from irrigation and drainage, be they farmers, residents or industries. 
More or less at the same time, between 1994 and 2009, another project (The Fayoum Water 
User Organizations project, also Dutch-funded, in two phases) first focused on developing 
Water Boards in two administrative districts (markaz) in the Fayoum governorate, and then 
expanded to cover the remaining 7 districts in the governorate. Two models were tested, one 
with only users representatives, another with both user and government membership. Water 
Boards were meant to be small “water parliaments” which would congregate stakeholders from 
the civil society. The project was expanded to other regions and 900 Water Boards have been 
eventually set up in the Delta, Fayoum, Middle and Upper Egypt. 
Under the Agricultural Policy Reform Program (APRP) of USAID (1996-2003), a strong support 
to different kinds of decentralisation and Irrigation Management Transfer translated in several 
policy initiatives and changes. The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) 
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promulgated a policy allowing for the formation of secondary-level Branch Canal Water User 
Associations (BCWUAs) and also for the development of integrated districts. 
Nine initial Branch Canal Water User Associations have been formed in the Nile Basin by 
Ministerial decree (IRG, 2002b). Four of these BCWUAs were formed in 1999 as a part of the 
APRP programme (Kemri, Diarbanigm and Balakter in the delta and one village in upper Egypt), 
another four were part of the Irrigation Management Transfer activities of APRP/USAID in the 
pilot areas of Salhia, Dakahlia, Behaira and Qena. A last one, under the title of a Water Users 
Federation of Water User Unions [WUUs]), was formed in free-flowing deep groundwater area. 
Setting up BCWUAs involved several steps, including obtaining legal authority (by decree), 
developing the association by building local management skills, including financial accounting, 
establishing an agreement between the MWRI and the BCWUAs regarding the activities that 
each would perform, rehabilitate the system to a mutually agreed level, and finally, transferring 
the local management and maintenance of canals and drains to the BCWUAs (IRG, 2002b). 
The involvement of stakeholders in management decisions (public participation) was expected 
to help establish “mutual confidence between the MWRI District engineering staff and the 
farmers with respect to the ability to manage tasks on the branch canals to the benefit of both. 
Without this confidence, privatization will be a much slower process” (IRG, 2002b). 
Branch canal level experiments were constrained by several factors. The absence of a legal 
status for user organisations at levels above the mesqa level boundaries made it difficult to 
develop the financial dimensions of decentralisation; the “Revision of Law 12/1984 on Irrigation 
and Drainage”, that was to recognise BCWUAs Water Boards as user organisations for water 
management at the secondary canal level and above made it to parliament but up to these days 
has failed to be passed (pilot BCWUAs were established under ad hoc ministerial decree). 
Likewise the policy of transferring the responsibility to maintain assets such as canals or 
headworks made it necessary to rehabilitate these infrastructures before turning them to users, 
and this required the capacity/willingness of the government to make the corresponding outlays 
available (which, later, proved to be problematic). 
According to USAID “The incentives for the GOE and farmers to undertake this initiative, 
therefore, are clear and compelling. MWRI, through this IMT policy initiative, has set in motion a 
long-term evolutionary process, which will allow the GOE to significantly reduce its costs while 
continuing to expand its coverage and services in other areas” (IRG, 2001a). This statement 
evidences the strong motivation to cut government costs behind the IMT policy, as well as –
perhaps– a degree of self-persuasion. Intensive training activities and study tours to countries 
such as Mexico, Turkey, Jordan or the US were organized to raise awareness of the purported 
merits of IMT. 
In parallel the GOE (MWRI) “adopted a policy to integrate all water management functions at 
the district level to support decentralized management” (IRG, 2002b) and designated two pilot 
districts. The definition of an Integrated Water Management District was given as “an entity that 
has sufficient manpower, material, and fiscal resources to operate and maintain all water 
resources under its jurisdiction. All of the divisions support the water distribution process to 
ensure that water is delivered equitably, resulting in the various district water entities currently 
being merged to constitute a single entity referred to as an IWMD”. Concretely the goal was to 
merge the different exiting districts (Irrigation, drainage, mechanical), all defined with different 
boundaries and neither of them corresponding to administrative districts, into one integrated 
district, thus 1) reducing the number of staff and putting all of them under the authority of one 
district engineer, 2) getting rid of the intermediate layer of the Inspectorate, 3) integrating the 
different functions of water management for coordinated planning and management. The two 
pilot IWMD of Zifta and Ibrahimia, in the delta, were recognized in 2001 by Ministerial Decree 
No. 506 and further development led to covering 27 districts in 2007. 
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A number of issues and constraints facing the implementation of the IWMD were identified, 
including (IRG, 2002a): 1) the way to define the new boundaries (often taken as those of the 
irrigation district), 2) identification and selection of the IWMD officers (with conflict between the 
three departments on who would head the IWMD), 3) IWMD budget allocation and operation 
mechanisms (with budget coming from different departments), 4) lack of water monitoring 
programs (needed for improved management but requiring funding for equipment), 5) lack of 
public awareness and communication programs, 6) the difficulty to come up with an integrated 
operational program at the local level, 7) the reluctance to delegate authority and decision-
making from general directorate level to the IWMD level, 8) the limited cooperation of the 
Drainage and Mechanical equipment sectors (which maintained or shifted their best equipment 
and staff at the levels above the district). 
The USAID-funded LIFE-IWRM Project (phase 1) has, over four years, provided technical 
assistance to the MWRI to implement decentralized and participatory IWRM over an area of 
485,000 ha (15% of Egypt‟s irrigated area) (El Atfy et al., 2007; IRG, 2008). Achievements 
include: Establishment of 27 IWMDs integrating all MWRI District-level functions into a single 
water management entity, formation of 600 BCWUAs covering all branch canals in the target 
Directorates and involving over 500,000 users; and capacity-building and introducing 
procedures for systematic data collection and analysis to support measurement-based 
decentralized water management. The participation of all BCWUAs in the management system 
of the IWMDs was found to positively influence the quality and the equity of water distribution 
among in the IWMDs (El Atfy et al., 2007). 
This work has been furthered by the second phase of the LIFE-IWRM Project (Phase I: 2008-
2012), which has been instrumental in mainstreaming and expanding IWMDs to cover 27 
districts in 5 Irrigation Directorates (New Zifta, West Sharkiya, West Qena, East Qena, and 
Aswan) and to form 600 BCWUAs. The second phase of the LIFE–IWRM component (IWRM II), 
carried out during the period of January 2009–30 September 2012, is under way was expected 
to cover 45 districts in 8 Irrigation Directorates, with about 1000 BCWUAs to be formed 
(Barakat, 2009). 
BCWUAs should participate in the annual planning, prioritization, and selection of maintenance 
and minor works, with one or more inspection of the branch canals and the drainage systems to 
be carried out jointly with the IWMD engineers and technicians. Likewise, MWRI should 
inform/consult/involve BCWUAs when design starts and tender documents are prepared, about 
the award of contracts, and involve them in the monitoring of progress and quality control during 
the execution of maintenance or minor works (Barakat, 2009). BCWUAs are also expected to 
monitor, measure, and record the water levels at the head of branch canals and key control 
points, as well as in secondary drains, to detect and report anomalies and shortages. They 
should review and discuss the recorded water levels on the branch canals with the IWMD staff. 
Common understanding of the area‟s main problems and priorities is to be built through Branch 
Canal Needs Assessment, a diagnostic device to be carried out whenever needed (every 3 
years, for example). 
The two parallel initiatives consisting in establishing IWM districts on new district boundaries 
designed to better integrate the irrigation, drainage and mechanical departments, and Water 
Boards at the (administrative) district level (markaz), need – at some point – to be harmonized. 
The IWMDs are predominantly state units although participation of BCWUAs is intended to be 
substantial, while Water Boards are meant to directly represent users and stakeholders interests 
and collaborate with officials. Although IWMDs and marakiz9 boundaries do not correspond, 
                                               
9
 “The boundaries of MWRI district is usually different than the Markaz where the MWRI district is determined by the 
hydraulic characteristics of the irrigation and drainage network. Therefore, the MWRI district may overlap with more 
than one Markaz, and the Markaz may overlap with more than one MWRI district” (IRG, 2001c). 
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efforts have been made to make use of the district Water Boards to jointly manage the water 
resources with district staff by getting “involved in setting priorities, undertaking operational and 
maintenance works, in addition to water quality improvement activities” (APP, 2007). 
Relatively recent assessments of participatory water management (APP, 2007) has revealed 
worrying trends. Barakat concluded that (i) Participation of WUOs in water management is 
extremely low, (ii) all actors have a poor understanding of the possibilities to take action, (iii) 
WUOs and MWRI field staff don't feel partners, (iv) there is a felt need of clear instructions from 
higher levels. Likewise Bron (APP, 2007), based on the monitoring and evaluation of 150 WUOs 
during several years, concluded that: “1. The level of participation of water users in water 
management, also when organized in water users' organizations, is very low. Even the level of 
being informed after MWRI field staff has taken a decision often is not reached. 2. No water 
users' organization in Egypt has reached a level of institutional strength that can be considered 
sustainable. 3. Projects achieve an initial build-up of the institutional strength of WUOs. 
However, apparently the projects are not successful in reaching a sustainable level of WUOs 
strength. When the attention for the WUOs decreases after the completion of projects, the 
WUOs' sustainability level declines”. 
In 2006, the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (IIIMP) project, funded 
by the World Bank, KfW and AFD, was launched as a successor project of IIP. This new project 
introduces some adjustments in the IIP package (electric pumps rather than diesel, reduced 
capacity of the pump, cheaper piped distribution lines, improved on-farm/marwa level 
distribution, etc) and takes a much broader approach than the IIP by also considering the 
establishment of WUAs, BCWUAs and more widely integrating users participation, 
decentralization, IWM, institutional reform and system modernization into a "From Mesqa to 
District" approach (APP, 2007; World Bank, 2005). 
IIP’s promises and constraints 
Started in 1984 under USAID‟s support, turned into a full-fledged programme in 1989, expanded 
by the World Bank in 1995, and later in 2006 -and up to these days- expanded into the IIIMP 
programme, the idea of introducing mesqa-level collective pumping stations in the delta is 
nearing thirty years of history. This intervention has been praised as spearheading the 
“modernization” of irrigation in Egypt, the IIP being “a state-of-the-art project, especially in terms 
of the approach followed in involving the end users - the farmers - through Water User 
Associations (WUAs) in the design, implementation and maintenance of the physical structures 
and the allocation and distribution of water by WUAs themselves” (Hvidt, 2004); “The IIP is to be 
seen as the first step to bring the Egyptian irrigation system in line with the functional demands 
it will be facing by the turn of the 21st century” (Hvidt, 1998). The project has improved 2900 
mesqas covering an area of 200,000 feddan (World Bank, 2007). 
Because of its iconic status, and because collective pumping stations make it necessary to 
establish Water User Associations to ensure their operation, physical and financial 
sustainability, this section dwells further on the IIP experience and its lessons in terms of 
collective action. 
A WUA is defined as “a private organization owned, controlled and operated by member users 
for their benefits in improving water delivery, water use and other organizational efforts related 
to water for increasing their production possibilities” (Hvidt, 2004). WUAs access water from the 
Branch canal in which, following IIP‟s design, a continuous supply is to be ensured, instead of 
the traditional on/off rotation. This is to be achieved by retrofitting regulators and the branch 
canal profile and using automatic gates that allow more water in when a downstream increased 
demand manifests itself by a drop in water levels. Continuous flow was the most attractive 
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feature for farmers, who saw the prospect of a continuous supply and the end of water 
shortages, and rightly seen as “important to assure the success of the project” (Metawie, 2002). 
Expected benefits 
The IIP package was potentially very attractive and had several expected benefits (Hvidt, 1994; 
Lowdermilk and Barakat, n. d.): 
 The collective pumping stations would do away with the scattered and diffuse individual 
pumps and achieve economies of scale in terms of energy costs (for both farmers and 
society). 
 Engineers anticipated that continuous flow would put an end to unpredictable supply, which 
was considered as the main cause of farmers‟ “over-pumping” during their „on‟ turn (seen 
as a means of storing water in the soil profile to offset possible discontinuities in supply). 
 Delivery of water to the marwa or plot level through a network of lined canals or pipes would 
reduce losses and improve irrigation efficiencies (also limiting overall water abstraction and 
return flows to drains, where quality is often degraded). 
 Equity of water distribution would be improved due to the ease in distributing water and 
head-end/tail-end inequities would be relieved. 
 Positive environmental and health impacts would result from farmers no longer needing to 
pump polluted and/or saline drain water and mesqa being filled in. 
 Filling-in mesqas would increase arable land by 1 to 2%. 
 Farmer‟s irrigation costs (labor, pumping and mesqa maintenance) and drudgery (necessity 
to move the pump back and forth) would be substantially reduced. 
 Increased crop yield, diversification to cash crops (and farmer income) would result from a 
better and more secure availability of water. 
Problems faced10 
It is not the objective here to carry out a thorough assessment of the IIP experience. The 
evidence available is mainly derived from the Monitoring and Evaluation components (carried 
out by the Ministry itself) as well as a few occasional local studies. After a brief mention of the 
difficulties that were faced we examine some of the lessons that can be drawn in terms of 
collective action. 
Overall project support 
The rate of implementation has been slower than expected. IIP and IAS (Irrigation Advisory 
Service) staff were insufficient or overburdened with additional tasks (IRG, 1998a). Both World 
Bank-funded IIP and USAID IIP projects were hindered by staff turnover and losses of trained 
personnel, “lack of adequate training, lack of career opportunities and low salaries unattractive 
to new engineers, lack of support for field staff, and other internal management problems” (IRG, 
1998a). 
                                               
10
 The World Bank‟s (2007) “IIP Project summary” section on “Challenges Encountered” is summary: “During 
Implementation pertain to the devaluation of the Egyptian pound which led to failure of some of the contractors, thus 
affecting the implementation schedule and resulting in delays. The implementing agency had to resort to smaller 
contracts. Nevertheless, it managed to reach a 90 to 95% completion which is considered a satisfactory achievement 
given the prevailing conditions at the time of devaluation”. 
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Cost Escalation 
During the implementation of the project it became apparent that the cost of IIP works for mesqa 
rehabilitation was escalating and becoming excessive. This had several causes (WB, 2005), 
including delays in completing works; the tendency to overdesign pumps and pipelines under 
the expectation that continuous flow would not happen (with the same amount of water needing 
to be distributed during the shorter period of „on‟ days); higher than expected costs for 
contractors and tasks like filling up of mesqa, unmet expectations that more private sector 
participation in contracting would reduce costs. 
The IIIMP economic and financial studies have shown that such high costs would threaten the 
project‟s economic feasibility and also lessen the financial attractiveness of the package for 
farmers (WB, 2005). Several cost-cutting technical adaptations were tested in an experimental 
area (called W-10) and integrated into the IIIMP proposal before it started (including a switch to 
electrical pumps, a change in valves, a reduction of the pump capacity). 
Introduction of Continuous Flow Operations 
The establishment of continuous flow, “the key and lead technology of IIP” (IRG et al., 1998), 
has been the main challenge. Many mesqas were equipped with pumps before the interventions 
on the branch canals (re-profiling of the canal) were completed (or sometimes initiated), and as 
result continuous flow could not be implemented, frustrating farmers for whom this was the most 
attractive promise (IRG et al., 1998). The lack of branch canal profiling and other technical 
reasons made it necessary to ensure preferential allocation to IIP canals, which affected the 
balance with other canals and drew complaints from them (Hvidt, 1998). The recommendation 
was therefore made that continuous flow should be operationalized in the command area prior 
to improved mesqas coming on line. The BCWUAs could be formed early on, assist in the works 
on the branch canals, and then later on help in setting up the WUAs at the mesqa level (IRG et 
al., 1998). 
Construction Quality 
Contracting procedures and contractor performance have remained a strong concern up to 
these days. “Contractor non-performance not only caused project delays but seriously 
undermined farmer confidence in the IIP and its abilities” (IRG, 1998). Non performance 
includes poor work execution (canals with faulty slope, leaks in canals or pipes, bad 
compacting, poor design and too low pressure in pipes, etc), low or no responsiveness to the 
problems signalled by farmers after construction, etc. The limited monitoring of work and 
accountability created situations where contractors were rushing to bid for and initiate new 
works without having finished the on-going ones (in some cases, re-contracting of a new firm 
has been necessary). Contractors‟ performance and reducing implementation delays was 
reportedly improved through consideration of smaller contract packages (World Bank, 2007). 
These problems of low quality work are actually observed in all types of interventions (e.g. canal 
dredging) and seems to either receive insufficient attention from officials or to be very resilient to 
change. 
Maintenance and sustainability 
One of the most nagging problems invariably reported by farmers is the difficulty to find spare 
parts or to find the technical expertise to react to technical problems. This is true for all kind of 
pumps, including electric ones and associated transformers. 
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Organizational and collective action problems 
In some cases the pump and the distribution network don‟t have problems but farmers are 
unable to organize themselves to establish transparent and equitable rules for distributing water, 
to collect money to pay for repairs and sometimes even for current costs (diesel or electricity). 
The project typically overlooks the costs of collective action and does not anticipate that in some 
cases there is a lack of social capital or internal conflicts that militate against the establishment 
of O&M rules. 
In sum the degree of success or satisfaction is extremely varied, from very enduring WUAs and 
satisfied farmers to situations where the pump has been stolen/broken and farmers have 
reverted to individual pumps. It is apparent that the success of the IIP, and therefore of the 
WUAs in appropriating this innovation, is strongly associated with both environmental and social 
variables. Favourable conditions include: short branch canals, abundant supply from parent 
canals, cohesive communities. 
BCWA and districts: what benefits and roles for farmers 
The rationale for BCWUAs in irrigated agriculture were said to be based on principles of 
participatory irrigation management (PIM), whose “generally acknowledged benefits include, but 
are not limited to, productivity increases, positive changes in cropping intensity, improvement in 
financial impact performance indicators, resolution of water-related conflicts, and a positive 
environmental impact” (IRG, 1999a). 
But the policy to develop BCWUAs in the late 1990s was very much driven by a desire to 
reduce state expenditures and enforce “cost-sharing plans” (IRG et al., 1999a). These plans 
were to define in a negotiated manner (between the BCWUAs and the government) scheduled 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) works organized in “O&M pathways” that would be 
sanctioned by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the BCWUA and GOE. The 
BCWUAs would be reimbursed after assessment of the works achieved. They would also be 
trained by the IAS and later be instrumental in helping establish WUAs when a mesqa 
improvement package would be applied (IRG et al., 1999a). 
Between 1995 and 2005, more than 40 Water Boards have been established in Fayoum by the 
Dutch-funded Water Board projects (APP, 2007). They were trained to plan and execute (by 
themselves or through local small contractors) O&M works on a yearly basis, with funding 
channelled through the Technical Assistance, thus circumventing the legal constraints faced by 
MWRI to transfer funds to WUO‟s (APP, 2007). This temporary solution was supposed to be 
addressed by the revised law which was to empower WUAs above the mesqa level and give 
them autonomy. Although the work was supervised by the MWRI, the process was largely 
driven by the BCWUAs assisted by their own Federation Engineer (district level). 
After 10 years (in 2006) the Dutch government decided to channel the funding through MWRI in 
an attempt to „internalise” the process. The minor maintenance works and the weed control 
program came under the Ministry and had to comply with its central tender regulations. The 
planning process is still managed by the WUO‟s but the execution is now managed by the 
MWRI, although WUOs can still be sub-contracted for some work by the contractors. 
Ultimately it was expected that the users would bear the costs of O&M of the part of the system 
they manage as well. This would amount to a shift of about 50% of the current government 
expenditures on O&M to the Water Boards (farmers) or an expenditure of about LE 15/feddan 
per year (Table2). +The overhead costs for the Water Boards for running their organization are 
estimated to reach about LE 15/feddan per year (Abdel-Aziz, Y. 2003). 
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The BCWUAs established in the IWRM 1 project (USAID) have been assessed by means of 
questionnaires files by BCWUAs‟ boards and by district engineers (Barakat, 2009). They show 
that communication has improved markedly between managers and farmers. However the 
activities that involve a degree of transparency and accountability have been the least adhered 
to: for example the information on the award of maintenance contracts, or the involvement of 
farmers in the monitoring of progress and quality control of works was found tin only 40-50% of 
the associations. The joint review of recorded water levels on the branch canals also occurred 
only in 62% of the cases. No more in-depth assessment of these BCWUAs has been carried out 
yet. 
Perspectives from different stakeholders 
Acceptance or reluctance: farmers 
Whether farmers show enthusiasm, acceptance, reluctance or rejection of the various top-down 
initiatives aiming at establishing participatory management and associations is unclear, and 
highly varies with the context. Reports on workshops organized as part of IIP or similar projects 
tend to show that farmers supported the reforms and even displayed “an overwhelming positive 
interest among stakeholders in establishing WUAs in non-IIP areas and apex organizations at 
the branch canal level; the apex organizations would be instrumental in the effective formation 
of mesqa-level WUAs in non-IIP areas” (IRG, 1998b). Representatives and members of the 
Water Boards have also frequently declared and showed that they were ready to work in a 
voluntarily manner because they saw that the Water Board served their interests, and were 
even “enthusiastic” due to the feelings that they had a say in resource allocation of the ministry 
(water and maintenance) (APP, 2003). 
But careful reading of reports also explains why this occasional enthusiasm remained guarded 
or often evaporated. Adhesion to the IIP programmes was closely linked to the promise of 
continuous flow, in which farmers saw the end of all their water-related problems. Experts 
observed that “there are indications that users are willing to share in the costs if services are 
reliable and responsive to demand” (World Bank. 2005). But satisfaction was often registered in 
the first years, especially because of preferential allocation to IIP branch canals to offset the 
incapacity to ensure continuous flow. 
A similar, seemingly contradictory, situation can be found with regard to maintenance. Better 
maintenance is appealing to farmers and they are keen to contribute to improving it. But when 
asked whether specific maintenance operations should continue being carried out by the 
government or managed by the private sectors or the water users, there was not a single 
maintenance operation where less than 65% of water users thought the government should 
continue management (Moustafa, 2004). When asked about maintenance in a way that makes 
clear that costs will be on them and works achieved by the government there was clearly (and 
expectedly) no support for taking over this burden. When asked the same question in a context 
where costs are shouldered by the project (e.g. Water Boards) or where WUAs feel empowered 
and involved in the definition of what has to be done and which work should be prioritized, or 
directly in the execution of the works by either being hired to do some of the maintenance work 
or be in a position to jointly tender maintenance activities, then adhesion to what is proposed 
normally increases. 
In such conditions, which are those envisioned by the different projects involved in institutional 
building, farmers express a willingness to take on the O&M activities on the branch canals (IRG 
et al.; 2001a). They indicate that trash removal and preventing dumping trash and sewage in the 
canals would be improved if BCWUAs had the authority to maintain the canals and punish 
polluters; and that they can do many of the branch canal O&M operations at lower cost than the 
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currently contracted private companies (IRG et al.; 2001a), which are widely criticized for the 
speedy way in which they expedite their work and the severe problems induced by careless 
execution (deepening of canals that lowers water levels, dredging of banks in way that induces 
land slides, removed material deposited on the side and obstructing movement, etc). Often, 
however, “it was felt that the issues and implications related to cost recovery were not 
adequately understood by WUA shareholders at the time of implementation” (IRG et al., 1998b), 
and the degree of involvement announced, as well as purported benefits, did not materialize. 
Surveys at the national level showed that a high percentage of farmers express their desire to 
be included in the decision-making process regarding canal operation and maintenance 
activities (El-Zanaty & Associates 2001). Willingness to participate in WUAs and to share the 
cost of upgrading the irrigation and drainage systems in their local area is also high when 
associated with promises such as continuous flow or improved drainage. The desire for more 
consultation, discussion, recognition, attention from officials is widespread and also shows a 
feeling of hopelessness of those located at the very tail end of both water distribution and 
decision-making systems. For example “nine in ten farmers would like the irrigation engineer to 
consult with them on matters such as branch canal operation, scheduling cleaning, the rotation, 
garbage in canals and illegal outtakes” (El-Zanaty & Associates 2001). 
Farmers convened in workshop to discuss the role of WUAs indicate “that the opportunity to 
dialogue with senior ministerial officials on a regular basis would provide a significant 
psychological boost to support the fledgling WUA organization” (IRG et al., 1998b). Likewise the 
question of the amendment of Law 12 in order to legally allow for full-fledged and autonomous 
BCWUAs or district water boards is believed to be key to improving their position to negotiate 
with MWRI staff and widening their scope and self-reliance in contractual matters, but also to 
“increasing the WUOs' self esteem” (APP, 2007). 
Relations between farmers and authorities, however, remain unsatisfactory, despite intensive 
training and awareness raising activities (see next section). “A prevailing weakness in the IIP 
approach is lack of popular understanding of the working inter-relationships between IIP, IAS, 
and the WUAs” (IRG et al., 1998b). Batt and Merkley (2009) consider that “the MWRI, together 
with the international funding agencies, does not pay much attention to exploring farmers‟ needs 
in their area, and they continue to introduce new projects based only on their own point of view 
of what the irrigation system might be”. Their study in El-Ibrahimia canal area (Skarquia 
province), showed that almost 100% of the farmers surveyed were not asked about whether 
they wanted a project in their area or not, that it was all done exclusively by government 
decision. In the IIP it is apparent that farmers did not understand the use/need of branch canal 
automatic downstream control gates provided by the project, leading to their being tampered 
with, disabled or bypassed (World Bank, 2007). Likewise, although on paper farmers at each 
individual mesqa are free to choose either to accept or reject the IIP improvements (Hvidt, 
1998), strong persuasion by different means often left farmers with the perception than they 
had, in fact, no such choice (as illustrated by the stiff resistance displayed by, and the conflicts 
surrounding the very few cases where groups of farmers have succeeded in staying out of the 
project). 
Farmers seem to believe that under the plans and changes presented to them by project 
engineers or experts, the improvement in overall irrigation and drainage conditions offsets the 
additional costs in terms of financial contribution or transaction costs in building and sustaining 
organizations over time (IRG et al; 2001a). Yet while official discourse of aid professionals and 
officials is centred on instilling in farmers a „sense of ownership‟ it is often the objective of 
transferring the „management burden‟ to farmers which dominates (Moustafa, 2004). When 
empowerment and expected benefits are not forthcoming, participation and collective action are 
severely dented (Abou-Seida, 2001). 
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Acceptance or reluctance: The ministry 
This leads us to turn our attention to the side of the government in general and of the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Irrigation in particular. While a lot of attention is directed to the analysis of 
the costs and benefits accruing to farmers and the circumstances under which they might 
support reforms and contribute to their success, very little work is available on similar questions 
applied to the other key stakeholder, the ministry of water resources and irrigation. 
Rolling back the state 
While most of the IIP programmes were focused on achieving a number of local objectives, for 
which WUAs are a necessary element, water policies took a much more reformist turn in the 
late 90s with the USAID-funded Agricultural Policy Reform Program (APRP) programme. The 
then ubiquitous ideology of „rolling-back the state‟ translated into policy proposals that moved 
from conventional participatory approaches to more radical management transfer programmes. 
The rationale of these transfers is unambiguously linked to a will to reduce state expenditures 
and shift part of the O&M burden onto farmers. It is also expected that decentralisation, transfer, 
and the privatization of some tasks (e.g. some maintenance work being handles and paid for by 
BCWUAs, but more generally allowing the private sector to take managerial and financial 
control over operation and maintenance; IRG et al., 2001b) would result in more efficient 
outcomes in terms of water control.  
As made explicit by Dr Abu Zeid, former Minister of Irrigation, “irrigation operation and 
maintenance always require big efforts and form a large financial burden to the government, 
and this is true in Egypt with the large Nile irrigation system. Therefore, it is of great desire to 
transfer the irrigation management responsibility to farmer's organizations for improved and 
sustainable irrigation service. MWRI took many positive steps in the direction of participation 
and more efficient involvement of stakeholders in water management” (APP, 2007). 
These policies were strongly supported by donors for which Egypt had joined “other 
governments around the world [which were attempting] to reduce their recurring expenditures 
on irrigation and stabilize deterioration of scheme infrastructure without sacrificing the 
productivity of irrigated agriculture” (IRG et al., 2001b). No efforts were spared in trying to 
convince the rank and files of the ministry of the desirability and inevitability of the reform. 
Numerous field trips arranged for politicians and officials to see by themselves IMT and 
privatization models in other countries, trainings and lobbying efforts helped to provide the 
“bureaucratic orientation” required (Aziz, 1995). 
Lack of motivation 
Unfortunately part of these bureaucratic orientation efforts was lost because of the typical high 
turnover rates of officials in the ministry, raising the need for continuous awareness raising 
(Aziz, 1995), but also generating inefficiency and frustration. 
Beyond officials at the central level of the ministry, the importance of the involvement and 
behaviour of field staff is paramount. Field staff includes managers from the ministry at the 
Directorates and district levels, as well as the gate operators (bahari), but also dedicated project 
staff (e.g. IIP) and the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) that was created to spearhead the 
creation and training of WUOs. It is apparent that field staff has an inadequate sense of 
ownership and understanding of the improvements (APP, 2007), are subject to frequent rotation 
and transfers, and have little incentives and even self-interest in the work they are supposed to 
perform. 
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Indeed the lack of field staff‟ personal involvement in WUs formation can be explained by 
several negative incentives “like the absence of rewards, career risks, over-asking WUOs, risk 
of delays in construction, lack of endorsement by superiors, etc” (APP, 2007). The failed 
implementation of continuous flow provides a good example of this state of affairs. Beyond 
technical justifications it is apparent that continuous flow basically dispenses with the need for 
bahari and reduces the intervention needed by both the local gate keepers and the district 
engineers. This results not only in a loss of social status, prestige, self-esteem and sense of 
usefulness, but also of the complementary income that comes with farmers‟ demands for extra 
supply and associated bribing (Hvidt, 1998). 
Likewise it can be argued that the failure to pass the revision of the Law 12 (which made it up to 
parliament 10 years ago but has not been ratified) is, in no small proportion, linked to the 
disincentives to staff at different levels. Empowering BCWUAs might not only make staff 
redundant (which is actually a stated objective), replace private maintenance contractors by 
community-based and -controlled operators, but it is likely to comes with greater exigencies for 
accountability and improved water management formulated by a stronger negotiating-power of 
user organizations. All this is extremely disruptive of the status quo and of the „management-as-
usual‟ strategy that minimizes work input. 
On this basis it is dubious that the solutions usually advanced (“clear instructions from higher 
levels”, “the absence of legal status for WUOs”, the “lack of skills or training” or more strangely 
the fact that “MWRI field level has not been instructed to involve the WUOs in the decision-
making” (APP, 2007) can revert a situation described as “the zero-involvement of WUOs at 
present” (APP, 2007). 
Two schools of thoughts 
There is also evidence that the ministry‟s official were somehow confused by the multiplicity of 
institutional building programmes in Egypt, where WUAs, BCWUA, local water boards, district 
water boards, integrated districts, Farmers‟ federations, etc were (and still are) developed in 
parallel by diverse projects funded by USA, The Netherlands, Germany, Japan, IFAD or the 
World Bank, without clear policy direction on resolving possible antagonisms or contradictions 
(Allam, 2004). 
Barakat (APP, 2007) aptly describes the division of MWRI staff into two categories. The first 
category includes officials who see institutional building as a part of a wide participatory policy 
(PIM), whereby the communication between engineers and users is improved, farmers solve 
some internal conflicts among users, elect representatives to liaise with ministry staff, collect 
information on crop calendar, and take care of O&M activities at the tertiary level and below 
(that are beyond the officials‟ purview and interest): “they see WUOs as an extension of the 
MWRI”. The second category includes officials with a deeper reform agenda in mind that 
includes irrigation management transfer (IMT) and therefore reduction in both the prerogatives 
and the budget/staff of the ministry, against an empowerment of farmers to be organized at 
different levels and increasingly in charge of O&M in an autonomous way, with a degree of 
accountability to be established between managers and users. As Barakat stresses, “both 
reformers and improvers are not well aware of the perspective of the other group. Because both 
groups make use of the same (generally accepted) words and terminology it is quickly assumed 
that there is agreement, while in reality each group means something completely different when 
using the terminology”. 
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Limited partnership with farmers 
Barakat11 (APP, 2007), while stating that “the participation of WUOs in water management is still 
extremely low”, stresses that both WUOs and MWRI staff have a poor understanding of the 
possibilities and the limitations of participatory water management, see one another more as 
antagonists than as partners, and have not embraced the reform agenda in any significant way. 
What can be done to change this situation? To “overcome the continuing reluctance of some 
MWRI staff to increase the direct involvement of users in water management”, the Ministry will 
continue to support communication and awareness programs (El Atfi et al., 2007), and provide 
staff with responsibilities, training, equipment, software and encouragement (El Atfi et al., 2007). 
While an adequate budget and legal reforms are seen as necessary to achieve PIM/IMT 
objectives of ensuring the sustainability and replication of WUOs, the analysis of bureaucratic 
resistance sketched out above raises doubt on whether these will be sufficient. 
Donors’ enthusiasm 
Development bank and aid experts have ben instrumental in introducing and supporting 
PIM/IMT based reforms in the water sector. It is therefore not surprising that they use, with 
some exception, a very positive language to describe what is being achieved, or what could be 
achieved: “The incentives for the GOE and farmers to undertake the development BCWUA are 
clear and compelling. MWRI, through this IMT policy initiative, has set in motion a long-term 
evolutionary process, which will allow the GOE to significantly reduce its costs while continuing 
to expand its coverage and services in other areas” (IRG et al.; 2001a). There is little room for 
doubt or reflection on the contexts in which the policy would be more relevant, or on the 
possible variations it could follow: “Formation and establishment of water user associations at 
the branch canal level is viable, highly desirable means of advancing farmer participation in 
irrigation management” (IRG et al.; 1999a). 
There is also strong emphasis on the willingness of the Egyptian government to embrace 
reforms and changes, even though –as shown above- this is not true for all levels or 
individuals.12 For example, the GOE is seen as being “keen to replicate BCWUAs in non-IIP 
areas, and to take the organizing and supporting of WUAs out of a “project” modality and have it 
in the mainstream of MPWWR‟s work” (IRG et al.; 1998b). Effective water user participation in 
irrigation system improvement, operation, maintenance and management are said to be “a 
policy objective of the Ministry” (IRG et al., 1998a) that is described emphatically: 
“The GOE transfer of major management responsibilities for sections of the irrigation system 
above the mesqa-level to stakeholders and/or the private sector is a bold advance toward the 
goal of participatory management and privatization of the irrigation system. Although irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) is now a major feature of irrigation delivery in many other countries, 
IMT is only now being launched in Egypt. Successful implementation of this benchmark will be a 
major turning point for this process to take hold at the grass-roots level of the GOE. Process 
(emphasis added). MWRI has prepared a master IMT plan to the year 2025, culminating in a 
transfer program of selected main canals and drains” (IRG et al.; 2001a, emphasis added). 
                                               
11
 Based on a questionnaire filled by a sample of water managers and users. 
12
 But some of the ministry officials did share/echo donors‟ enthusiasm (e.g. “The modernized process, through 
implementing the full package of the IIP, can be considered as revolutionary changes in the irrigation system in 
Egypt”, Allam, 2002). 
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Some broad assertions, which sometimes border on wishful thinking, indicate faith in the project 
but also attempts to assuage doubts or hesitations. Multiple donor‟s projects show that “the 
farmers‟ organizational capability is already evident based on the establishment of a broad 
network of WUAs through the IIP program, the successful formation of BCWUAs under the 
APRP project, and the recent launching of the MWRI Water Boards Project” (IRG et al.; 2001a). 
However some occasional assessment paint a less optimistic picture, like the 1993 evaluation of 
USAID-IIP by Devers Inc (1993) which suggested that the mesqas considered by the project as 
having reached the operational phase were “so only in rudimentary way” and that the WUA 
leadership was “still basically a non-management force expert in a very few mesqas”. 
Unsatisfactory results spur calls for more resources and more training (“It is obvious also that 
implementing irrigation management transfer will require extensive resources for training 
members of BCWUAs and for the equipment necessary to carry out the BCWUAs functions”, 
IRG et al.; 2002b); and IMT goals or the implementation of continuous flow become “long-term 
goals”. 
While it is understandable that consultants and project implementers display faith in both the 
nature of their objectives and the process to achieve them, these statements reveal also 
unqualified adherence to the policy solutions of the day (e.g. IMT or pricing) and a reluctance to 
alter the project beyond a point that might spell doubt on its relevance and weaken the resolve 
of the government. 
Conclusions 
Egypt has experienced a large and variegated number of projects devoted to farmers‟ 
institutional building at different scales, in line with the magnitude and importance of its irrigated 
sector. By and large, “Participation of WUOs in decision-making in water management is 
extremely low if not completely absent and a formal procedure for involving WUOs doesn't exist. 
Nevertheless for the (far) future both the MWRI field level and WUOs show considerable 
agreement on a much stronger role for the WUOs on most issues with the final decision 
assigned to the WUOs” (APP, 2007). This somewhat contradictory statement illustrates that 
while on the surface, and on paper, all parties see value in a stronger role for WUOs, their low 
performance generates calls for “more of it” or for “strengthening” those already established; 
rather than discussions on why they did not perform as expected. 
Experience with implementation of WUAs and BCWUAs have been characterized by a trial-and-
error process involving numerous overlapping and sometimes conflicting institutional building 
interventions by various donor-funded projects. Some lessons have been learned (although the 
implications are sometimes disregarded) though a typical “muddling-through” process. There 
now seems to be recognition that institutional development must come as the first step in the 
mesqa improvement process, before construction works (IRG et al. 1998). There has also be 
discussions about the timing of establishing WUOs, mesqa WUAs being established before, at 
the same time, or after BCWUAs (World Bank, 2005) according to different sources. Others also 
stress the need to first establish all integrated districts (IWMDs) within the larger 
hydrologic/organizational unit (Directorate) at one time, and then have IWMD staff organize and 
support BCWUA formation (El Atfi et al., 2007), while still others promote establishing “water 
user organizations at the branch canal level, allowing for eventual expansion to the district level” 
(IRG, 1999). 
There is a clear disconnect between, on the one hand, the enthusiasm shown by donors, aid 
expert, and some officials convinced of the need for IMT and, on the other, the implementation 
level where understanding and acceptation of the reform is limited, which “results in 
misunderstandings, major irritations” (APP, 2007). It is apparent that the conceptions of 
participatory management in circles of decision making officials of the MWRI are “confused and 
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sometimes contradictory” (APP, 2007). While some genuinely believe in the merits of shifting 
governance, the balance of power and responsibilities, many see participation as a means of 
increasing the contribution, in kind or cash, of end-users. It is telling that all the measures meant 
to instil a higher degree of cross-accountability or transparency are those that are loosely 
adhered to even during the life time of the projects. 
There are clear disincentives for most staff to fully embrace the logic of management transfer. 
Transfer is likely to be associated with a loss of prestige, legitimacy or even job (Hvidt, 1998) 
and, generally, it is somehow odd to expect from the very line agencies poised to lose power 
that they would support the reforms. This also poses the question of what is the exact role of the 
ministry in the establishment of farmer organizations. With regard to the establishment of the 
water boards, for example, the question was raised of whether the “power and freedom [was] to 
be entrusted to water users to create Water Boards, along with applying to MWRI for 
establishment request and support, or [was] MWRI to carry out the task of their establishment?” 
(APP, 2003). This structural constraint can be removed by strong high-level political will 
(overriding the agency‟s preference for the status quo) and/or measures to relocate redundant 
staff or facilitate their hiring by the WUOs themselves; both measures/ conditions that are 
absent in the Egyptian case. With regard to management, there are also difficulties for the 
managers to commit to ensuring a more predictable water supply because of the complexity of 
water management in the delta. Each level depends on how water is apportioned and 
distributed at upper levels, which reduces its autonomy in improving supply. 
Whatever the reluctance from managers, most development projects also tend to minimize the 
transaction costs of the collective action that is requested from farmers, whether in cash, labour, 
time or other in-kind contributions (IRG, 1998b). In contrast the expected associated benefits 
are limited because of the lack of substantial improvement in water supply and the minimal shift 
in decision-making power. Expectedly the cost/benefit ratio to farmers remains too high and 
WUOs appear to be little sustainable. Only in the case where collective management is made 
unavoidable because of technological choices (notably the IIP and its collective pumps) do 
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11.2 Annex 2: Overview of IFAD’s project achievements 
 
























































































































d-  Promotion of micro-





- Implementation of 6 new tube wells  
- Equipment of 6 wells with pumping 
stations and photovoltaic cells 
- Rehabilitation of 7 wells 
- Construction of 8 reservoirs (total 
capacity of 2,440 m3) 
- Increasing storage capacity for 5 other 
reservoirs (total 770 m3) 
- Establishment of 114 km of pipes for 
pastoral water supply  
- Deepening 45 shallow wells 
- Rehabilitation of 29 water cisterns 
- Creation of 12 new water cisterns 
 
- Creation of 27 formal GDAs, 10 of them 
managed irrigation schemes 
- Training of 237 members of board 
directors in aspects of technical, 
administrative and financial management 
- 22 GDAs have their office.  
* When the component is bold it addresses Participatory Irrigation Management and when it is bold and italic it addresses marketing and 
financial issues 
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 Research and 
development 
  
- Rehabilitation of 02 spate irrigation 
systems  
- Creation and rehabilitation of 13 well 
schemes  
- Installation of hydro-mechanical 
equipment in 03 irrigation schemes  
- Rehabilitation of 04 irrigation schemes 
Creation of: 11 mixed GDAs (irrigation water 
and potable water management), 03 GDAs 
for management of irrigation schemes, 
03 female organizations.  
  
Consolidation and equipment of 30 existing 
GDAs (27 potable water management, 02 
irrigation water management, 01 mixed) 
 
(-) The project failed to develop a clear 
vision for the future and integrated rural 
development. The main limiting factors 
were: a limited capacity of communication, 
training and technology transfer to a limited 
number of beneficiaries and low 
participation of farmers in the definition and 
programming of interventions. 
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a- Integrated local 
development 
  
b- Development of 
small and medium-
sized business 
and open up 






d- Sustainable soil 
management 
  
- Creation and electrification of 05 new 
collective tube wells and their 
corresponding irrigation schemes  
  
- Creation of a hill dam and its 
correspondent scheme (S'mati: 177 ha 
and 60 beneficiaries) 
  
- Rehabilitation of a spate irrigation system 
(Oued el Oud around 300 ha) 
 
In 2010, 42 farmers were trained in the 
themes: 
- Management of irrigation networks at the 
field level in order to increase water use 
efficiency 
- Animal husbandry: Beneficiaries were 
supported to have loans to buy a cow  
 
(-) The project has not implemented an 
effective approach to local participatory 
planning in terms of identification, location, 
design and programming of actions 
 
(+) Only in the Bargou area several groups 
and associations were created and 
functioned well 
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b-  Conservation of 
















150% of the original target was 
reached in irrigated agriculture 
 
Main achievements : 
- Creation and equipment of 05 
deep tube wells  
- Equipment of 07 deep tube wells  
- Equipment of 738 ha with 
irrigation network and water 
saving systems within 12 new 
schemes and 07 old schemes  
- Creation of 45 shallow wells   
- Dredging of 60 shallow wells 




The project has achieved its „quantitative‟ objectives 
in terms of promotion of users‟ organization:  
- Revitalization of existing 07 GDAs in rehabilitated 
schemes 
- Creation of 12 GDAs in newly created schemes  
The „qualitative‟ objectives, in terms of performance 
and durability, were barely achieved.  
(-) Training and supervision initiated in the project did 
not promote the emergence of a sufficient number of 
dynamic GDAs, which are able to provide support 
and handle operation and maintenance in the project. 
Constraining were the irrigation management and the 
weak development of economic activities, which 
prevented the generation of revenues for O&M. 
(-) Institutional constraints:  
- lack of capacity and strategy to support and advise 
GDAs  
- GDAs are not representative and unable to assume 
management responsibilities  
- low autonomy of GDAs and strong dependence on 
Ministry 
- Absence of an organization able to defend GDAs‟ 
interests vis-à-vis third parties 
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c- Rural Financial 
Services 
 
- Investment support for water supply 
comprising 20 km of laid pipes, 4 
collection tanks and 3 livestock 
watering points 
  
- The rehabilitation work impacted 
30,893 ha. The supply of irrigation 
water per ha increased from 1,514 
m3 in 2007 to 2,960 in 2011 after 
rehabilitation, resulting in better 
supply according to crop water 




Six pilot WUAs were established and supported 
under the Farm Privatization Project (FPP) to 
manage the rehabilitated on-farm irrigation and 
drainage systems.  
A further 546 have recently been established, 
based on the FPP model but without the support 
that the FPP WUAs received. Consequently, these 
new WUAs suffer from lack of resources (e.g. 
budgets, equipment, etc.) 
Preparation of O&M plans and irrigation fee 
structure for 200 WUAs 
(-) The lack of an appropriate legal framework and 
the deteriorated state of the irrigation & drainage 
system  
(-) Limited knowledge about WUAs among 
members and its leaders are seen as people who 
are not accountable to the membership.  
(-) A WUA is mainly seen as an organization to 
distribute water and collect the water charges for 
government, rather than a genuine farmer-led 
organization with the mandate of managing the 
irrigation and drainage infrastructure. 
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c- Marketing operation 
support  
  





- Improved on-farm irrigation systems: 
Since the start of the project, there has 
been a continuous change of the 
prevailing irrigation systems from hand 
moved sprinkler irrigation to improved 
drip irrigation system;  
- The cumulative area reaches 15,000 
feddan. Investments in conversion to 
improved drip irrigation systems have 
been financed through loans to WUAs 
on a 50% matching grant basis.  
 
 
The total number of registered WUAs is 119. 
05 more WUAs are awaiting registration.  
 
The aggregate WUA membership is 5,680 
water users and the area served is 20,193 
feddan, which comprises only 30% of the 
irrigated project area.  
 
However, among the 119 registered WUAs, 
only 67 are active and of those only 7 have 
opened and use bank accounts.  
 
WUA boards need to be trained in 
management, accounting and business 
planning. In addition, larger WUAs should 
be encouraged to recruit an accountant for 
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a- Resource development: 
On- and off-farm soil 
and water conservation 
measures and spring 





at district level, 
training and extension 




c- Rural Roads  
 
d- Financial Services, 




of soil and water 
conservation measures 
by private sector, and 
income generating 
activities for women 
 
  
- Rehabilitation of 17 springs, which 
makes water available to irrigate 149 
ha (or 43% of the targeted 350 ha).  
  
- Construction of contour stone walls, of 
which achievement exceeded the 
targeted 2000 ha (122%),  
  
- 77% of the cisterns are completed 
  
- Earth contour banks (40% of the 
target) 
  
- Only about 9084 m3 (36% of the 
target) of gabion structures have been 
placed on wadi (river) banks  
  
- Construction of small earth dams, no 
progress has been made to date. The 
reason was all sites identified as 
suitable for construction of the dams 
are located in private farms and none 
of the farmers have accepted to 
construct dams. 
  
About 4,253 farmers have benefited from 
the various on-farm soil and water 
conservation activities. 
 
No water user‟s associations were 
formed. No arrangement in place to 
manage and eventually maintain these 
systems. 
  
The concept of organizing WUAs to 
manage and maintain irrigation systems is 
relatively new in Jordan. It is being 
advocated and promoted by irrigation 
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a- Providing technical and 
financial support to 
construct soil and water 
conservation measures 
and improve agricultural 
production through 
active participation of 
the target group  
 







c- Promoting rural micro-




Main achievements (% of planned): 
- On-farm soil conservation (30%) 
- water harvesting cisterns (60%0  
- construction of mini-dams (0%)  
- orchard establishment (46%) 
 
Off-farm soil and water conservation: 
- wadi bank protection (78%)  
- roman well rehabilitation (67 %)  




Community development for the 
strengthening of Community-Based 
Organizations (CBOs) and for the training 
of women in social and technical fields to 
generate income  
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b- Agriculture and 
Livelihood Development 





- Establishment of 8 dams with the 
potential to irrigate 163 ha for 1,100 
households in hilly areas.  
 
- Introduction new irrigation and water 
conveyance systems with 22 
demonstration piped irrigation systems  
 
- Drip irrigation systems installed for 
peach and other fruit tree orchards. 
Demonstration farmers were satisfied 
with new systems and willing to share 




8 water users‟ associations (WUAs) have 
been created and trained in the O&M of 
water storage reservoirs. However, only 
one WUA is currently operational. It is 
encouraging to note that the WUA is 
selling water to users and intends to use 
the proceeds to cover maintenance costs. 
 
The weakness of some of the users‟ and 
development committees who still have a 
very limited competence in operating their 
infrastructures, managing their community 
institutions, initiating new activities or raise 
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a- Capacity building and 
promotion of local 
development  
 





At the end of the loan, the total completed 
area was 4816 ha (or 120% compared to 
the initial target of 4000 ha) within 91 
programmed schemes.  
 
 
The works consisted mainly in: 
- Lining earthen canals for a length of 
172.9 km 
  
- Construction of 41 catch basins 
  
- Rehabilitation of 11 catch basins  
  
- Construction of 8 deviation outlets 
 
156 organizations were established and 
52 other existing associations 
strengthened. The project has assisted in 
the formation of 61 WUAs of which 48 are 
functional. 
 
Currently, each village (or douar) or group 
of douars has an association. These 
associations were formally integrated at 
the municipal level and two association 
offices were created. However, these two 
spaces were not functioning because of a 
lack of planning and competence.  
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development, small and 
medium hydraulic, 
destoning of agricultural 
 
b- Research and 
development, 
strengthening of 
extension services and 




component which includes 
actions for women and 
unemployed youth and 




The project achieved: 
 
- almost all the planned agricultural 
schemes, except two spate irrigation 
schemes  
  
- trenching area of 3700 ha (100%) 
  
- de-stoning of 2863 ha (77% trenching 
area)  
The project area has more than 248 
professional organizations (cooperatives 
and associations) involving nearly 10,000 
members (about 70% of farmers in the 
project area), covering diverse activities, 
such as bee-keeping, rangelands, 
livestock and genetic improvement, 
agricultural water use, income activities for 
rural women and processing of agricultural 
products. 
 
29 AUEAs were managing rehabilitated 
schemes 
The training involved 11 AUEAs in small-
scale schemes and 9 AUEAs in spate 
systems. The training has strengthened 
the capacity of AUEAs to become more 
efficient and dynamic. 
Meetings are regularly held, the 
attendance rate averaged 80%. The rate 
of fee collection reached and exceeded 
85%.  
Costs of management and maintenance 
significantly reduced. 
Improved management of water resources 
and rationalization of its use, which is 
likely to promote the sustainable 
management of water resources. 
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d-Financial services and 
marketing, and 
Institutional support and 
management 
 
The aim of the component irrigation 
infrastructure rehabilitation is to enhance 
the capture of flood waters through:  
 
a- better control of river flow 
  
b- reconstruction of the six main canal 
systems 
  
c- improvement of access roads and 
changes in field layouts.  
 
- The Project supports engineering 
interventions to restore main canals 
to their design capacity 
- Inlet structures will be repaired or 
new ones installed  
- Existing inlets from the main canals 
will be repaired or replaced 
- Regulator devices will be substituted. 
 
92 WUAs were formed (at completion 106 
will exist). Each WUA elects two 
representatives to the overarching WUA 
organisation at the Scheme level  
361 members of WUAs were trained during 
2006 to 2008 on 14 different topics.  
WUAs were formed mixing kinship relations 
and tribal affiliation. None of the WUAs is 
ethnically or tribally homogenous.  
WUAs have been introduced by the project 
and slowly adopted at all levels (farmers; 
GAS, State, Farmers Union).  
The speed at which this has taken place has 
been constrained by the development of the 
land tenancy ownership and the subdivision 
and pairing of land.  
  
Page | 147 
 
11.3 Annex 3: Distribution of responsibilities 
Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
JVA, Jordan. Automated main canal 
Main JVA plans water 
allocation according to 
available resources, 
land use, and quotas 








Water management of 
the pressurized system 
is handled by the 
Association. Ditch 
riders and irrigation 




recorded and must be 
equal to the farmers 
quota; the total 
consumption must 
match the associations 
quota. 
 
Small maintenance is 
carried out by the 
Association. 
However, major repairs 
generally exceed 




costs and technical 
improvement carried 
out before the 
establishment of the 
Association. 
Farmers pay a water fee (not 
updated since 10 years, and 
currently rather minimal), 
proportional to their quota (which 
varies according to the crop 
cultivated); the receipts go the to 
state coffers. 
Farmers also pay a membership fee 
that goes to the bank account of 
the corporative (WUAs are 
currently formed under the 
corporative law) 
the Association enters in contract 
with the JVA and receive a yearly 
amount to pay for technical staff 
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Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
South Bekaa Irrigation and Drainage System (Known as canal 900): Average area: 600 ha. Modern 
pressurized system. “Secondary canal” is canal 900 and “tertiary” are the 4 sub networks (supplied by 
three pumping stations) 
Secondary Fully managed by the 
agency 
Allocation: available 
supply depends on the 
amount of water that 




depends on their 
capacity and the 




continuous supply (?) 
transferred from the 
Qaraoun dam by 
pumping. 
Fully done by the 
agency. 
Start of canal cleaning 
decided by the agency 
(cleaning can’t start 
before rain completely 
stops) and conditions 
start of cropping 
season (often delayed) 
Farmers are not 
satisfied because 
cleaning of canal delays 
the date at which 
delivery starts. 
 
System as a whole (Secondary and 
tertiary) has the same financial 
management.  
All costs directly borne by the 
agency.  
Contribution of farmers via water 
fee collected by the agency. 
Water fees are set by the agency at:  
50$/0.1 ha/year. 
 
Tertiary Fully managed by the 
agency 
Allocation:1l/s per 0.8 
ha. No overall volume 
defined but individual 
consumption limited by 
the network capacity 
itself 
Distribution and 
scheduling: Decided by 




Note: Recently, agency 
is trying to involve in 
the distribution 
process, and each of 
the subnetworks, 
stakeholders who play 
a key role in land rental 
process  
Fully done by the 
agency.  
Repair of hydrants or 
network pipes is 
restricted to the agency 





System as a whole (Secondary and 
tertiary) has the same financial 
management.  
All costs directly borne by the 
agency.  
Contribution of farmers via water 
fee collected by the agency. 




Page | 149 
 
Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
Tadla irrigated scheme (Morocco). One WUA (AUEA) by tertiary (20-30 ha). Agency managing the 
scheme: l’Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole de Tadla (ORMVAT) 
Secondary ORMVAT plan seasonal 
water allocation 
according to available 
resources, land use, 
structural constraints. 
Farmers have quotas. 
Maintenance 100% by 
ORMVAT 
Costs by ORMVAT 
Tertiary The gate keeper 
collects the requests 
from all individual 
farmers, prepares the 
rotation schedule for 
all of them (with 
starting and finishing 
hours) and then 
establish the duration 
of supply to the 
corresponding tertiary. 
The information is 
passed upward in 
order to prepare the 
overall distribution 
schedule. In return on 
Thursdays farmers get 
a ticket with the details 
of the supply to their 
fields in the following 
week (there is a turn 
per week), as well as 
the ditch rider (paid or 
nominated by the 
WUA) who distributes 
water within the 
tertiary. The system is 
somehow ‘on demand’ 
but request are capped 
by the seasonal quota 
defined by ORMVAT. 
 
Maintenance 100% by 
ORMVAT. Note that 
tertiary canals are 
concrete elevated 
canals 
Billing is individual and proportional 
to the volume supplied (calculated 
as the discharge (30l/s) multiplied 
by the number of hours ‘on’. The 
rate is $US 4 cents/m3. It is paying 
part of the « water service ». Billing 
is done twice a year. 
 
WUAs nominate and possibly pay 
for the ditch rider which implement 
the rotation within the tertiary level. 
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Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
Turkey 
Secondary Irrigation Associations 
IAs identify the total 
water demand, DSI 
allocates the water 
volume from the 
reservoirs to the 
secondary level 





They rent machinery 
from DSI or sometimes 
buy their own 
 
“Pricing of water fees are 
determined on water prices lists 
prepared by association technical 
personnel and approved by 
Association Council and collected as 
whole in advance, or in installments. 
The collected money is used for 
operational costs of the association 
and for repair and maintenance. The 
assistance is requested for costly 
repair and maintenances from DSI” 
(Kodal et al. 2005). 
The DSI allows the WUGs to collect 
an amount between 20 and 40% of 
the annual water charge 
Tertiary Informally organized 
groups of water users 
within the tertiary 
units. 
The WUAs take the 
responsibility of 
allocating the water 
flows within the 
tertiary distribution 
canals to individual 
farmers and perform 
simple maintenance 
repairs 
Irrigation Associations Part of the water fee for tertiary 
level O&M 
 
Sudan, Gezira Scheme 
Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 






doing O&M and 
employing ghaffirs 
(canal operators) 






that do maintenance 
 
 
Gezira Scheme’s Management Body 
sets water fee, WUAs collect with 
assistance of security companies 
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allocation 
Tertiary WUAs, ghaffirs and 
sometimes farmers 
WUAs and sometimes 
farmers mobilize to 
attract a machine 
worker 
WUAs collect fees with some 
assistance of security companies 
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Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
Kyrgyzstan: Osh Province (Kazbekov et al., 2009) 
Secondary (District) Canal 
Management 
Organization (CMO) 
CMOs reconcile water 
plans with water 
availability and adapts 
water plan 
Ministry of Agriculture 
adjusts plans 
proportionately 
CMO and WUA sign 
annual water delivery 
agreement on this basis 
CMO releases water: 
actual supply depends 
on pragmatic 
considerations 
No clear bulk allocation 
Limited role WUAs 




and activities depend 
on financial resources 
available to DCMO 
WUAs lack equipment 
and financial and 
professional capacity 




ISF based on volumetric charges 
determined by Parliament, 
payments according to water 
delivered 
Approximately 50% of O&M costs 
covered by government 
WUAs 
Tertiary WUAs and informal 
water user groups 
WUAs aggregate 
individual demands or 
collect info on cropped 
area and cropping 
patterns. WUA submits 
water plan to CMOs 
Water user groups and 
WUA operate the on-
farm and inter-farm 
level (of the former 
collective farms) 
WUAs and water users 
Occasional ‘voluntary’ 
collective work 
organised by local 
authorities or WUAs 
(ashar), mostly for 
small canals  
WUAs 
Charges for WUA services vary per 
WUA and total charges per user are 
crop and area based (volumetric is 
rare). 
Water users pay ISF without 
guarantee that water stipulated in 








Level Water management Maintenance Financial management 
Secondary    
Tertiary    
 
 
 
